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I always felt that I would do a doctorate degree, but until recently I never 
imagined that I would do one in a social science. Engineering? Yes. 
Chemistry? Maybe. Management? No. This dissertation is the outcome of 
intellectual restlessness, curiosity about business organisations, technology, 
society and economic development. It is also the result of trust, love, and 
encouragement from a countless number of people. First, to my parents, 
Ibiwari and ‘Fome Akemu, who gave me a pleasant, carefree childhood and 
taught me to ask questions. We’ve been through some tough times together, 
but I know I can always rely on your optimism, resilience, and 
resourcefulness. Dad, I recall fondly the scent of your dimly-lit library on the 
top floor of the house at Anthony Village. The library was stocked with books 
on history, law, philosophy and your precious volumes of the Encyclopædia 
Britannica. I am sorry I lost two volumes of the encyclopaedia, but would 
you believe that I read every volume in the collection? Thank you for 
constantly stoking my sense of wonder about the world. As I read those 
delightful books at a young age, I was transported to worlds very different 
from the tropical city of Lagos. Mom, thank you for your steady hand, 
encouragement and discipline. From your example, I learned important 
lessons about dreaming, about integrity and about industriousness. You will 
always be an ‘ayounge’ mama to me.
To my siblings, Bikele, Dan, Edirin, Kareem, and ‘Sone, what would 
childhood have been without you? Bikele, thank you for your unconditional 
love. From childhood, your warm-heartedness, your humour, your tenacity 
always encouraged me to press on no matter the challenge. Edirin, thank you 
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for taking responsibility in the family in my absence and for your patience—
for tolerating my silly, often ill-tempered questions. I think I have the perfect 
excuse: it’s the Ph.D. That’s what a Ph.D does. One starts asking stupid
questions for which the answers are patently obvious. Your pragmatism, 
moral compass and deep knowledge of the practice of business inspires me. 
Now that this Ph.D. is over, we can do a movie marathon weekend! Dan, had 
you not asked me pointed questions about what I wanted to do with my life 
in 2009, I might not have considered doing a Ph.D. Funny isn’t it? Thank you 
for awakening me from my intellectual ennui. You infected me with a 
passion to study management and business. The flame has burned brightly 
ever since. Kareem, thank you for introducing helping me appreciate 
business practice while I was a teenager. I wager you were one of a handful 
teenagers in Lagos who subscribed to Business Week, following Lou 
Gerstner’s exploits as he attempted to restructure IBM.
To my teachers at the Command Children’s School, Lagos, and the 
Nigeria Military School, Zaria, it has been 22 years since I left high school, 
but the memories of the valuable lessons you taught me remain etched in my 
heart. Mr. Houmia, I cherished your maths lessons, especially your insistence 
that our solutions to our math exercises telescope visually as we wrote them 
from the top to the bottom of our 2D exercise books. You made mathematics 
seem so beautiful to me. Mrs. Soyingbe, thank you for your English lessons. 
They set the foundation for my subsequent love of the language. Mr. Ogidi, 
Mr. Muhammad and Mr. Udi, thank you for stimulating me to excel at 
mathematics, chemistry and geography. It did not matter that in Zaria we 
studied distant places like the Indonesian island of Java and desert geological 
formations that we had never seen. You enlivened those subjects so 
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forcefully that even today, whenever I think of Java, I still remember your 
classes with a smile. I know you expected me to join the army. Perhaps, the 
Nigerian army is better off without me; I don’t think I would have made a 
fine officer. Mr. Owvufeti, I admit: you were right. You counselled me at the 
age of 15 after a test in English composition to consider a career in 
journalism. You thought I would make a good journalist—in a country ruled 
at the time by a ferociously anti-free speech military junta. I told my parents 
about your counsel. As you can imagine, they would have none of it. 
Engineering school, they said, was the place for a good science student like 
me. Now, I have come full circle. I am a qualitative organisational researcher. 
What is a qualitative researcher if not a teller of theoretical, analytically-
rigorous, empirically-grounded tales about organisational life?
I have been extremely fortunate to have good friends. When I think of 
the many friends I have known, particularly from the old country, I recall the 
words of the great medieval theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas: ‘There is 
nothing on this earth more to be prized than true friendship’. How do I even 
begin to appreciate the friends from the military school, from university in 
Lagos and London, who have provoked me to ask questions about society, 
discussed with me great books, and supported me through difficult moments? 
I will inevitably miss out a few names, but I prize your friendship. To the 
‘fab’ five Dibia brothers—Emeka, Jude, Uzo and ‘Nayo and Ugo—I enjoy 
our stimulating debates about religious and political theory, history and 
economic ideology. And Ugo, thank you for constantly reminding me that 
the social world is messier, more complex than my favourite sanitised 
academic theories suggest. Some of the smartest, most socially-sophisticated 
people I know, from whom I learned the rudiments of small group dynamics 
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are Sanmi, Bimbo, Notoma ‘Jeffia’, Ayo Abegs, Ahmed ‘K’ Carew, Shanu, 
Leye ‘Blau’, Obi Nzewi, and Wole ‘Ollie’ Folayan. Chitu, thank you for 
those three weeks in 1992 during which you taught me Further Mathematics 
before our senior secondary school exams. I thought you were the smartest 
person in the world then, and I still think you are the smartest person I know. 
I finally made it, but, naturally, you trod the doctoral path ten years before I 
did.
I began my career at Shell Assen where I was lucky to have Stathis ‘the 
bulldog’ Kitsios as my manager. Stathis, I learned the hard way not to present 
half-baked, ill-considered ideas to you because you tore them into bits. From 
you, I learned the virtues of careful project management, the benefits of face-
to-face time with colleagues, and developed a nose for organisational power 
dynamics. My career stint in icy Siberia would not have happened without 
your support. Colleagues and friends from Shell days who made work and 
life in Groningen more fun than it should have been—Loay Al-Haj (Juanito, 
Oman por sempre!), Rob Smeenk, Vincent Hugonet, Martin Bosma, Julien 
Brocvielle, Andrew Agenmomen, Eric Ereyi (fada!), Leonard Onuga, Victor 
van Heeswijk, Marjan Smit, Andrea Caudullo, Thomas Bouchery, Carlo 
Scarabeo, Cees, and Amit Karnik—thank you.
From Shell Assen, I moved 250km south west to Schlumberger Den 
Haag. It was not simply a geographical move; it was also an industry move. 
I had started thinking about the environmental sustainability of the oil 
industry. Coincidentally, Schlumberger had begun an internal corporate 
venture (ICV) to develop market solutions for carbon capture and storage 
(CCS). Hanspeter Rohne, Markus Harting, Ulrike Miermann, Arnaud van der 
Beken and Suzanne Hurter made Schlumberger an exciting place to work 
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despite demanding clients, tight deadlines and constant travelling. At 
Schlumberger, I learned the difficulties of formulating and implementing 
organisational strategy in an uncertain business environment. Suzanne, those 
were heady days in La Defense, weren’t they?
It was at the London Business School (LBS), however, that my 
desultory, unfocused questions about sustainability, economic development 
and business coalesced into a plan of action. Professors Rajesh Chandy and 
John Mullins, your class on entrepreneurship in emerging markets was a 
source of delight and fascination. Thank you helping me connect the dots 
between the practice of business and the welfare of broader society. Professor 
David Arnold, your marketing classes were an intellectual high point. Your
teaching repertoires—your authoritative class presence, your superb 
communication skills and facile command of your subject—provides a 
model of pedagogy that I strive to emulate. To Corinne Talichet, Otto de 
Medeiros Carneiro, Riccardo Abello and Lia Barbopolou, despite the 
pressure of the MBA, we made it. And then I decided to plunge even deeper. 
‘What was I thinking?’ you asked.
That plan of action brought me to the Rotterdam School of 
Managament (RSM) and the city of Rotterdam. This dissertation would not 
have begun had the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) not 
risked admitting and financially supporting a middle-aged man’s research 
journey through RSM’s doctoral programme in September 2011. Thank you 
ERIM. The first thing I learned at RSM was that I had to unlearn most of 
what I had learned in business. Professor Gail Whiteman made my transition 
from industry to academia so much easier because of her deep understanding 
of both worlds. Gail, you challenged me to ask interesting questions about 
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important phenomena while crafting my own distinctive voice. We started 
off with no data at all. You warned me that I would be inundated with data 
once I started collecting it. Two years later, I see what you meant. Thank you 
for your unflinching support and for having a nose for a good qualitative 
story. From you, I learned a lot about dealing with uncertainty while 
conducting grounded qualitative research and writing gripping research 
accounts. Dr. Steve Kennedy, the review process was gruelling. We started 
with a ghost of a contribution. One reviewer even rebuffed our claim calling 
it a strawman argument, but we kept at it. We reworked it through endless 
discussion and coding. Thank you for your good-natured pragmatism, your 
scepticism, and for closely reading the work. Professor Pursey Heugens, 
Professor Will Felps, thank you for the wonderful classes on advanced 
qualitative methods and philosophy of science respectively. If I was not fully 
convinced of the methodological diversity and rigour within the qualitative 
research tradition before I took your courses, I became decidedly so 
thereafter.
The kind of qualitative research on which this dissertation is based 
would have been impossible without the help of informants across many 
organisations who took the time to explain their personal and organisationsal 
histories to me. Thank you to my informants at the following organisations 
(some of whom I will not name for confidentiality reasons): Annette Mutuku, 
Holy Ranaivozanany, Roland Sladek, John Munene, Carolyn Siboe (Huawei, 
Kenya and Shenzhen); Professor Harry Kaane (Government of Kenya); 
LIWA Trust; Peninna Wangari, John Kamonde (Samsung Kenya); Moses 
Sitati, Sanna Eskelinen (Nokia, Espoo and Nairobi); Télécoms Sans 
Frontière; Maurice Braga, Sharon Gordon (Columbia Global Centre, 
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Nairobi); John Muthee (CSR Africa); Nikolai Barnwell (88mph); Abagi 
Nator (Closet49); Josephine Busolo (Safaricom); Dr. Edwin Ataro (Moi 
University); Professor Mabel Imbuga, Professor Stanley Kamau (Jomo 
Kenyatta University of Science and Technology), and Michael Niyitega 
(Makerere University). Thank you Jael Amara, Ayanna Yonemura, and 
Vicky for welcoming me warmly to your beautiful city. Asante!
Kuwashukuru kwa ukarimu wako!
Most of the data used in this dissertation was collected at Fairphone, a 
very special startup venture based in Amsterdam. Thank you Fairphone’ers 
for giving me access to your remarkable story and for tolerating my pesky 
questions. I know I started off as a ‘fly on the wall’ but within 15 months, I 
became a chronicler of your history—‘Fairphone’s institutional memory’—
as someone remarked during a testy management meeting. I salute 
Fairphone’s founders and leaders: Bas van Abel, Miquel Ballester (gosh, I 
love your power quotes!), Tessa Wernink and Olivier Hebert. I do not take 
your trust and support lightly. I also received incredible support from 
Fairphone staff and associates: Joe Mier, Bibi Bleekemolen, Laura Gerritsen, 
Mulan Mu, Raluca Radu, Marco Jorritsma, Nur Icar, Esmee Lacle, Michiel 
Stoop, Phillippe Birker, Beth Russell, Roos van der Weerd, Rick de Groot, 
David B., Leontine van Geffen (’s up, Geffen?), Sietse van Erve, Erik, Sean 
Ansett, Gabriel Sebastian, Lidy Sjardin, Sacha van Tongeren, Anna Schwarz, 
Artur, David K., Marleen Sjardin, Nastasia, Rayda, and Youge. Thank you 
ladies and gentlemen. How quickly 15 months go by! I am especially grateful 
to a mysterious pipe-smoking angel investor/organisational 
consultant/history buff/cultural analyst for giving me privileged access to 
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Fairphone’s story, and to H.R.H Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme for 
taking the time to explain the workings of OECD committees.
Informants at other organisations associated with Fairphone also kindly 
provided data on which this dissertation is based: Anna Kakuli, Théo Jaekel
(SwedWatch), Natalie Ankersmit, Anneke Galama, Gerno Kwaks, Gijs 
Verbraak, Victor van der Veen (Niza/ActionAid), Martin de Jong, Casper 
Jorna, Jochum Heerkens (Vodafone), Peter Westgeest (KPN), Micheal Loch, 
William Millman (Conflict Free Tin Initiative), Mark Davis (DSI), Joost de 
Kluiver (Closing the Loop), Paul Miller (BGV) and journalist Natasja van 
der Berg. Thank you very much.
Whenever the stress of research became unbearable, I could count on 
my weekly volleyball training to help ease the stress. To Petra, Cornell, 
Robin, Ozeas, Ivo, Mernout, Hans (ons setupper), Ernst, Kees, Egbert 
‘Monsieur Le President’, Jacco, Andre. Jongens, bedankt voor de wekelijks
gezelligheid in Rotterdam en ons onvergetelijk weekend in Ameland! Now I 
will be the third ‘doctor’ on the team. Who says nerds cannot jump?
How could I have gotten through the Ph.D. without the support of my 
fellow doctoral candidates who were down in trenches with me? Pierre 
Legault-Tremblay, Nathan Betancourt, Inga Hoever, Maya, Amanda 
Williams, Victor, Silviu Tieran. Thank you for sharing the joys, the 
frustration and the wonderful lunchtime conversations. Jonathan Attey 
(bros!), we had good laughs about Ghana and Nigeria! Samer Abdelnour, 
technically speaking, you had crawled out of the doctoral trenches when we 
met, but your support and encouragement helped me through the frustration 
of the Ph.D. Thank you for those two days in Denver discussing materiality 
and effectuation theory. Professor Joep Cornelissen, thank you for providing 
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critical feedback and suggestions on earlier versions of a paper in the 
manuscript. Wendong Deng, thank you for reminding me of the levity of 
academic life. Riccardo Valboni, thank you for countless delicious dinners. 
If you say that my spaghetti Amatriciana is restaurant quality, it is only 
because I learned it from you. Diana Perra, thank you for lively conversations 
about culture, qualitative research and politics. I honestly believe that Italians 
have discovered the secret to happiness. No wonder Alyssa loves you! Thank 
you Yolanda Jahier and Janneke Suijker for helping me navigate the turbid 
waters of the ERIM bureaucracy and the SAP system.
To my family, Boudewijn, Joke, Ruben and Marije, thank you for your 
kindness, love, and encouragement. Thank you Ruben and Marije. De Punt 
is far away, but not as far as Lagos is from Rotterdam. You have welcomed 
me with open arms. Being part of the family feels so natural to me now that 
I struggle to remember a time when I was not. Thank you Boudewijn for your 
humour, your kind-heartedness, and long conversations about the human 
condition. Oh, and I will never forget the best wine I have ever had in my 
life: that 1947 French wine! Thank you Joke for your support, your curiosity 
about the past and your unquestioning love for the kids.
As I write this acknowledgment, I recall a verse from the Biblical book 
of Proverbs that I learned in Sunday School many years ago: ‘Lo, children 
are the heritage of the Lord: and the fruit of the womb is his reward. As 
arrows are in the hand of a mighty man; so are children of the youth.’ I don’t 
know that I have done anything particularly virtuous to deserve the joy that 
my children Alyssa and Zoë give me; they will perhaps be my most satisfying 
heritage. To Alyssa and Zoë, the sound of the words, ‘Papa!’, as I bicycled 
into the yard at the end of the day brought warmth to my heart. Your happy 
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faces lit up my mornings after long nights spent doing research. Your 
developing personalities—and your occassional vinegary moods—reminded 
me to put the Ph.D. into perspective. My research trajectory has been much 
more fulfilling because of your hugs and kisses.
To my wife Sanna, I dedicate this dissertation. Despite being pregnant, 
you completed your teaching degree and constantly supported my dreams. 
You comforted me through many ‘dark nights of the soul’ during my research 
journey. You tolerated my grumpiness, my brooding taciturnity as I 
contemplated research ideas, spoke to myself in the shower or scribbled
imaginary scripts in the air. You reminded me not to take myself too 
seriously; to laugh at myself—and we did have some good laughs. Thank 
you for holding the fort, for allowing me to sleep in on Saturdays and Sunday 
mornings. Sanna, I want us to grow old together, to laugh together, to cry 
together, watch our children grow, watch them become teenagers, fall in love 
(by that time I would gave gotten my gun licence) and leave the nest. With 
you, I feel I have won the lottery of life. I pinch my arm every morning to 
remind myself how lucky I am. I, the grandson of an illiterate peasant farmer 
born who lived in the shadow of the British Empire, feel blessed with you. I 
wonder what my grandfather would think if he could see me now. Life is 
indeed full of the most pleasant surprises.
Orhe ukpe sheke oye dia ohwere. Ukpe re akpome shekevwe vre obo 
miroro ri. A successul farmer is known by his bountiful harvests. My
harvest exceeds my expectations.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Introductions to doctoral dissertations typically give the impression that the 
doctoral candidate began the research process with well-articulated research 
questions, conducted comprehensive, focused literature reviews and then 
followed appropriate methods to answer the research questions. 
Undoubtedly, many doctoral research projects unfold that way. Mine did not. 
My doctoral journey is not a story of prescient foresight. Instead, this 
dissertation is the outcome of my initially vague interest in the intersection 
between business practice and social issues, restless intellectual curiosity,
serendipitous events, and exploitation of contingencies to address various 
inter-related empirical puzzles. In this introduction to the dissertation, I 
recount briefly my doctoral journey. Thereafter, I present the substantive 
themes that unify the studies in the dissertation and an outline of the 
dissertation.
SERENDIPITY AND CONTINGENCY: A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF 
MY DOCTORAL EXPERIENCE
I began my doctoral studies in September 2011 with a broad interest in 
how corporations, which are ostensibly arenas of private action, create value 
for constituents, such as customers, shareholders and employees, and are 
implicated in the welfare of their host societies. My interest in these questions 
stemmed from two factors: (1) my position as a simultaneous organisational 
‘insider’ and societal ‘outsider’, and (2) recent changes in the global 
economic landscape.
Being an organisational insider and a societal outsider. During my 
pre-Ph.D. career with two Fortune 500 multinational enterprises (MNEs), I 
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observed as an organisational insider that my employers had developed 
capabilities in the conceptualisation, management and execution of complex 
technological, operational, political and commercial operations around the 
world. These MNEs developed cutting edge technology, commercialised the 
technologies and deployed them in hostile environments ranging from the 
mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta to the Gulf of Mexico. They also 
attracted highly-talented employees, successfully socialised them within the 
company, and maintained sophisticated management systems that 
underpinned successful business operations in over 90 countries around the 
world.
While I was an insider in these organisations, I was simultaneously a 
societal outsider. My country of birth, Nigeria, is different—economically, 
culturally and institutionally—from the countries where I had been educated 
and subsequently started my career: Western European countries. Being an 
outsider, I questioned the cultural and institutional arrangements that my 
native Western European friends took for granted. For instance, to my 
Western European friends, their home countries seemed ‘natural’, taken-for-
granted. Why did these nation states enjoy so much cognitive legitimacy—
at least in the judgment of my friends?
Furthermore, I wondered what role organisations like my former 
employers had played in the tremendous economic and social advancement 
of Western European societies. What was the nature of the relationship 
between these corporations and their home societies? And how had that 
relationship changed over time? At the start of the Ph.D., it seemed to me 
that the sophisticated organisational capabilities I had observed and 
contributed to in my industry career were implicated in the generation of 
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enormous value for the corporations and for their home countries. How had 
these companies and their home societies done it?
Recent developments in global economy. Rapidly-developing 
countries, such as China, Brazil, India and Russia, command an increasing 
share of global economic power. For instance, in 2014, China had the world’s 
second-largest economy after the United States whereas barely three decades 
earlier (in 1981) it had only the twelfth-largest economy (The World Bank, 
2016). As these emerging countries become more prominent in international 
political and economic affairs (Brautigam, 2009; H. Campbell, 2008), MNEs
originating in those countries have provoked admiration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
2000; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2006) as well as mistrust (Fortune, 2009; 
Peng, Li Sun, & Blevins, 2011; The Economist, 2012b) within the business 
press, and triggered significant interest among management and 
organisational scholars (e.g., Guillén & García-Canal, 2009; Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; K. E. Meyer, 2004). I wondered whether these 
emerging country MNEs were different from the Western MNEs that I had 
worked for.
Many international business (IB) scholars have certainly argued so. 
According to these EMNEs are fundamentally different from DMNEs: 
EMNEs are late entrants to industries historically dominated by DMNEs
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Dawar & Frost, 1999); they are more 
technologically ‘backward’ (Ramamurti, 2012b, p. 41), and smaller in size 
(Fortune, 2011) than DMNEs. Scholars have also emphasised that EMNEs 
differ from DMNEs in another important respect: their home country 
institutions. Emerging countries are thought to have weaker civil society,
public governance, and environmental and labour standards than developed 
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countries (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Collingsworth, Goold, & Harvey, 1994; 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Kapstein, 1996).
Despite their technological, governance and size disadvantages 
(relative to DMNEs), many EMNEs were attempting to build sophisticated 
capabilities in manufacturing, operations and marketing (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012a)—the same capabilities that I had observed
in my previous employment. How were they doing it? How did these 
companies generate social welfare in their home countries? What effects did 
these EMNEs have beyond their national borders given their supposedly 
weak home country institutions? These were the questions I pondered as I
began my doctoral studies in late 2011. By the end of 2012, after completing 
my doctoral course work, I decided to investigate the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) practices of MNEs.
A twist in the tale. The rapid adoption of mobile telephony in Africa in 
the past decade has been described as a ‘revolution’ (Kalil, 2009). This
explosive growth of mobile telephony on the continent caught many research 
and business audiences by surprise (Etzo & Collender, 2010) and has since 
triggered significant optimism about the benefits of widely-available 
telecommunications in Africa (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Banks, 2008; The 
Economist, 2008). For instance, Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia 
University, one of the world’s foremost development economists, described 
mobile telephony in Africa as ‘the single most transformative technology for 
development’ (Bloomberg Business Week, 2007). High expectations and 
optimism indeed.
Rhetoric aside, was there any substance to the optimism? It appeared
so to me. Whenever I visited Lagos, the city of my birth, in the late 2000s, I
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noticed how ubiquitous mobile telephony ‘democratised’ 
telecommunications. This was a marked difference from the Lagos of my 
childhood. I remember as a child growing up in Lagos that having a fixed 
telephone line at home—provided by a notoriously inefficient state-run 
telephone monopoly—was a rare symbol of social status and privilege. No 
more. By the late 2000s, virtually everyone in Lagos—from roadside trinket
vendors to the occupants of the city’s well-appointed villas—seemed to have 
a mobile phone.
With the remarkable adoption of mobile telephony in Africa, even 
sceptical Western business audiences updated their portrayals of Africa. The 
influential news magazine The Economist, which had written off Africa as 
‘hopeless’ (The Economist, 2000), rebranded the continent 13 years later as 
‘hopeful’ (The Economist, 2013a) while consulting firm McKinsey released 
a report describing progressive African economies as ‘lions on the move’ 
(Roxburgh et al., 2010).
The burgeoning telecommunications sector in Africa, unlike the 
primary resource extraction sector that has historically dominated MNE 
activity on the continent (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 37, 41), was new, high-
technology and driven by consumption within Africa. I thought it a 
fascinating context to explore my research questions; by 2012 the sector was 
attracting investment from DMNEs as well as EMNEs. Given the differences 
in technological endowments between EMNEs and DMNEs (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 2000; Wells, 1983), stage of industry entry (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
2000; Dawar & Frost, 1999) and in the institutional landscapes of their home 
countries (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Collingsworth et al., 1994; Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Kapstein, 1996), I wanted to understand whether a 
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prominent class of EMNEs—Chinese EMNEs—operating in the 
telecommunications sector influenced their host countries differently than 
Western European DMNEs did. Specifically, I wanted to investigate the 
differences in the pattern of CSR practices of early versus late industry 
entrants and emerging country EMNEs versus DMNEs in the industry. Thus, 
I selected five companies that had extensive CSR programmes in selected 
African countries: Huawei (home country China, EMNE, late entrant), ZTE 
(China, EMNE, late entrant), Ericsson (Sweden, DMNE, early entrant), 
Nokia Siemens Networks (Finland, DMNE, early entrant) and Alcatel Lucent 
(France, DMNE, early entrant).
The study was designed on the assumption that I would interview 
company informants as well as external beneficiaries of the organisations’ 
CSR programmes. Armed with appropriate letters of introduction from my 
promotor, I contacted all five firms through my network of friends and via
CSR or sustainability departments mentioned in the MNEs’ sustainability 
reports. ‘Would they be interested in participating in my study?’ I asked. As 
I importuned potential informants for interviews, I added two other firms to 
the study: Samsung and Nokia. Though there were not in the same industry 
sector as the original five they also claimed to have extensive CSR initiatives
related to mobile telephony in Africa.
My contacts at the target firms were friendly, but ultimately unhelpful. 
Some of them were genuinely excited to be the subjects of interest by a 
researcher from a reputable business school. One contact from Ericsson 
promised to give an interview after the company’s annual sustainability 
report preparation cycle in March 2013. She jokingly remarked, ‘We get 
requests for research all the time from NGOs, but not from business schools.
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I will do my best for you.’ She did not. Between February and September 
2013, I successfully interviewed informants from only two firms: Nokia and 
Huawei. Despite repeated promises to cooperate in my research project, 
contacts at Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent could not commit to a 30-minute 
interview in 2013 even after I committed to meeting them in-person in their 
offices on a Friday afternoon. (ZTE contacts did not respond to my e-mails.)
By late September 2013, two years into the doctoral programme, the 
messy reality of doing qualitative research started to sink in. My carefully-
designed multiple case study was being dismantled by the real world 
challenge of negotiating access to the field. I was not sure how to proceed. 
Should I continue with the study as originally designed or should I change 
my research question? I decided tentatively to analyse the data I had collected 
from Huawei and Nokia. Perhaps, I reasoned, I could unearth novel themes 
in the data before making a final decision.
That was my situation when my promotor, Professor Gail Whiteman, 
walked into my office on a Monday morning in mid-October 2013. She spoke
excitedly about her weekend. ‘I know that you have been having trouble 
gaining access to companies for your study’, she said, ‘but hear me out.’ She 
told me that she had been at a sustainable business event the previous 
weekend where she met the founder of a social enterprise called Fairphone. 
‘The company is worth researching’, she advised. ‘Fairphone have just run 
the most successful crowdfunding campaign in the Netherlands.’ ‘Ona’, she 
continued, ‘Speak with these guys. See if they are interested. I met the 
founder, Bas van Abel, last weekend and I can set up a meeting with him.’
I could tell from the tone of voice that she was insistent, but wanted me 
to make up my own mind. I was sceptical about changing course mid-way 
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into the Ph.D. ‘Why would I want to do that?’ I thought to myself, ‘I would 
have to do a new literature review.’ Prof. Whiteman knew that I was 
interested in entrepreneurship. She also knew that I was still trying to make 
sense of the interview and documentary data that I had already collected. 
‘Surely’, I said to her, ‘I needed to complete the analysis of the CSR data 
before pursuing a research project with Fairphone.’ She responded, ‘Think 
about it. Do some preliminary research about Fairphone and make up your 
mind.’ And so I did—reluctantly. I read press releases from Fairphone’s
websites and watched YouTube videos about the company.
I was intrigued by what I learned about the company. At the time (late 
2013), the new venture Fairphone had eight employees. The Fairphone staff, 
who announced that they had no experience in the mobile phone industry, 
spoke rather immodestly about ‘changing the mobile phone industry supply 
chain’. They described themselves as ‘strategically naïve’; yet, they had 
raised through crowdfunding over €6 million without producing a 
smartphone. ‘How had they done it?’ I wondered.
My curiosity whetted, I walked into Prof. Whiteman’s office and 
agreed, ‘Yes. Let’s arrange that meeting with Bas van Abel’. She 
immediately sent an e-mail to Fairphone’s CEO, asking for a Skype meeting. 
Within two hours, van Abel responded to the e-mail. We set up the Skype 
meeting and had a genial conversation about the company and the 
possibilities of doing research within Fairphone. Van Abel invited me to 
Fairphone a week later and introduced me to the Fairphone staff, who 
occupied two tables in a noisy shared office on the fifth floor of an old grain 
warehouse in Amsterdam.
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Though I had begun my doctoral research with a carefully-designed
multiple case study of CSR practices in Africa, my ‘discovery’ of Fairphone, 
the site that provided most of the data used in this dissertation, was not the 
result of the deliberate, methodical sampling process that I had initially 
envisioned. It was, instead, an opportunistic, purposive sample (Patton, 2001, 
pp. 243–244; Riemer, 1977) that eventually provided a rich site to investigate 
my research interests. In October 2013 when I began fieldwork at Fairphone, 
I intended to spend six months within the enterprise. I reasoned that that 
would be enough time to observe a production cycle within the company. I 
eventually spent 15 months in Fairphone, wrote a prize-winning teaching 
case about the company’s organisational challenges, observed three 
smartphone production cycles, and witnessed the organisation grow from 
eight to 43 employees.
Despite the emergent nature of my research trajectory, the studies that 
comprise this dissertation share common themes: they concern the nature of 
activities that corporations employ to address social issues.
THEMES IN DISSERTATION: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO 
SOCIAL ISSUES
Social problems abound in the world. Poverty, unemployment, lack of 
access to basic sanitation, healthcare and education are examples of problems 
that tax public policy makers, corporations, and civil society organisations 
around the world (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Porter 
& Kramer, 2011; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). I discern four broad 
approaches within the business & society (B&S) literature to theorising and 
explaining corporate reactions to social issues: partnerships; social 
intrapreneurship; social entrepreneurship; and corporate social 
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responsibility. Though there is significant overlap in focus, method and 
theories, these approaches differ in two significant respects: the nature of the 
focal organisational entity that is the unit of analysis; and the centrality of the 
organisation’s social response to its rent-generating process. I explain these 
two dimensions in subsequent sections of this introduction. Refer to Figure 
1-1.













Centrality of response to rent-generating 
process
Figure 1-1. Corporate responses to social issues in the business and society 
literature
In this dissertation, I examine two types of corporate response to social 
issues: social entrepreneurship and corporate social action. However, before 
I do so, it is useful to say a little more about scholarship on partnerships and 
social intrapreneurship.
Partnerships. Broadly speaking, this body of research examines the 
interactions among corporations, governments and civil society 
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organisations, specifically focused on the influence of non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) activism, global governance and standardisation, cross-
sector partnerships, and national and global governance (Kourula & 
Laasonen, 2009). As relationships between corporations and NGOs have 
become less adversarial in the last decade, corporations, NGOs and 
governments have formed new organisational entities or vehicles—cross-
sector partnerships—through which corporate social responsibility practices 
are conducted in response to some social problem (e.g., De Bakker, 
Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005; Laasonen, Fougère, & Kourula, 2012; 
Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004; Vachani, Doh, & Teegen, 2009; Vock, van 
Dolen, & Kolk, 2013). Typically, these partnerships conduct activities that 
are not central to the rent-generating processes within the firm.
Social intrapreneurship. This involves entrepreneurial activities or 
innovations occurring within established organisations in which resources 
are combined in new ways to create social value or stimulate social change 
(Mair & Martí, 2006). Scholars study for-profit enterprises (Halme, 
Lindeman, & Linna, 2012; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010) as well as non-profit 
organisations (Grohs, Schneiders, & Heinze, 2013; Summers & Dyck, 2011).
However, the entrepreneurial activities studied in this body of work create 
social value by generating economic rents for the focal organisation through 
some commercial model (Kanter, 1999).
A key theme in the social intrapreneurship stream of scholarship
focuses on the processes by which actors within firms navigate internal 
obstacles, such as dominant commercial paradigms within firms (Kanter, 
1999), business unit and managerial incentive structures (Halme et al., 2012),
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and expectations of external constituents (Dees, 1998; Phills, Deiglmeier, & 
Miller, 2008) that prevent social value creation.
Having said a little about partnerships and social intrapreneurship, my
task in the rest of this introduction is to develop the themes in this dissertation 
and give an overview of the aims, methods and chapters that comprise the 
work.
Social Entrepreneurship
Social entrepreneurship is a process that involves the formation of new 
organisations and ‘the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue 
opportunities to catalyse social change and/or address social needs’ (Mair & 
Martí, 2006, p. 37). In the past two decades, social entrepreneurship has 
gained popularity. The business press (Bornstein, 2012; Dees, 1998; 
Westaway, 2011), practitioner-oriented journals (Dees, 1998; Haigh & 
Hoffman, 2012; Martin & Osberg, 2007), business schools (Mirabella & 
Wish, 2000) and prominent civil society organisations (Ashoka, 2015; 
Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, 2015), have championed 
social entrepreneurship as a way to address pressing social problems.
Research on social entrepreneurship has proceeded apace. Scholars 
have documented social entrepreneurs alleviating social problems such as 
unemployment (Pache & Santos, 2013; Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000; 
Tracey et al., 2011), lack of access to financial services (Alvord, Brown, & 
Letts, 2004; Battilana & Dorado, 2010) and poverty in post-conflict societies 
(Mair & Martí, 2009; Tobias, Mair, & Barbosa-Leiker, 2013). Social 
entrepreneurship scholars have explained the formation of social enterprises 
in one of three ways. In the first approach, scholars invoke the putatively 
virtuous characteristics of the individual entrepreneur or quasi-stable 
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characteristic of the organisational actor to explain the emergence of social 
enterprises. For instance, in one of the earliest heroic characterisations of 
social entrepreneurs, Dees (1998) described social entrepreneurs as a ‘rare 
breed’ who act as change agents, relentlessly pursuing opportunities to create 
sustained social value. Similarly, other researchers have ascribed the 
emergence of social enterprises to the unique psychological traits of venture 
founders such as drive (Thompson et al., 2000), inspiration and creativity 
(Martin & Osberg, 2007), and compassion (T. Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & 
Vogus, 2012).
The main limitation with the ‘heroic’ approach (Dacin, Dacin, & 
Tracey, 2011, p. 1205) is that social entrepreneurship is neither the sole 
preserve of the lone heroic entrepreneur nor the single optimally-structured 
organisation. It is often the outcome of collective action by individuals and 
organisations (Haugh, 2007; Montgomery, Dacin, & Dacin, 2012; Sud, 
VanSandt, & Baugous, 2009). Like their commercial counterparts, social 
entrepreneurs and social enterprises are embedded in networks of 
relationships with external actors who provide advice, capital and other 
resources essential to entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2011; Kotha & George, 
2012; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Thus an atomised view of social 
entrepreneurship cannot account fully for many social entrepreneurial 
solutions for complex problems (Montgomery et al., 2012).
The second set of explanations in the literature invoke the patterns of 
actions entrepreneurs take to found social enterprises as a key explanation 
for the emergence of social enterprises. The entrepreneurial actor may create 
social enterprises by skilfully combining resources through bricolage (Di 
Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010; Mair & Martí, 2009) or by purposefully 
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following a succession of temporally distinct, pre-determined stages (Haugh, 
2007; Perrini, Vurro, & Costanzo, 2010; Robinson, 2006). The main 
difference between the explanations that invoke personality traits (described 
in the preceding paragraph) and those that rely on entrepreneurial action is 
that the former locates the cause of social enterprise as unobservable and 
internal to the entrepreneurial actor whereas in the latter the social enterprise 
emerges due to observable actions that the entrepreneur takes.
Purposive action by the entrepreneurial actor following an inherently 
logical opportunity development process implies that the entrepreneurship 
has clear, fixed goals ex ante. The assumption of purposive action ignores 
the emergent nature of entrepreneurship, specifically how entrepreneurial 
actors change, update, revise, and improvise their short-term goals as they 
act on perceived entrepreneurial opportunity in the real world (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Hence, while accounts of purposive action provide valuable insight 
into entrepreneurial decision making, they may overstate the foresight of the 
entrepreneurial actor. Thus, they may paint an inaccurate picture of the often
serendipitous, contingent and non-linear process of social entrepreneurship.
The third approach to explaining the emergence of social enterprises—
the least developed in the literature (Dorado & Ventresca, 2013)—highlights 
the broader institutional and discursive environments that foster social 
entrepreneurship. Social enterprises, in this approach, emerge due to 
changing institutions or taken-for-granted cultural models and the deliberate 
propagation of discourses supporting the application of commercial logics to 
address social problems that were historically addressed by public and non-
profit sectors (Dart, 2004; Dorado & Ventresca, 2013; Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004; Lounsbury & Strang, 2009). For instance, Dart (2004), puzzled by the 
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rise of social entrepreneurship, argues that social enterprises emerge because 
proffering market-driven solutions to social problems conforms to norms 
within OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] 
countries that favour neoconservative, pro-market ideologies. As social 
entrepreneurs create new enterprises they may also do institutional work by 
championing new organisational forms, drawing on established institutional 
logics, and connecting the new forms to macro level discourses in a given 
society (Tracey et al., 2011).
One limitation of the institutional approach is that scholars have 
stressed the effect of taken-for-granted cultural cognitive models on the 
emergence of social enterprises, but have paid little attention to other aspects 
of the institutional environment such as the socio-technological (Orlikowski, 
2007) that may influence social enterprise formation.
Given the diverse theoretical approaches to explaining social enterprise 
emergence, what are the underlying characteristics of social 
entrepreneurship? Scholars, regardless of their theoretical approach to social 
entrepreneurship, share at least two assumptions about the phenomenon. 
First, it is assumed that social entrepreneurship involves the formation of new 
organisational entities (e.g., Alvord et al., 2004; Mair & Martí, 2006; Martin 
& Osberg, 2007; Perrini et al., 2010; Robinson, 2006). Second, all 
approaches imply or assume that sustainable social enterprises are those 
whose business models, defined as the system of activities by which an
enterprise produces and delivers a valuable product or service to its 
customers and retains economic rents (Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010),
integrate and simultaneously advance the firm’s social mission (e.g., 
Battilana & Lee, 2014; Dees, 2001; Mair, 2006/2010; Seelos & Mair, 2007).
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Thus, sustainable social enterprises are those in which activities that address 
social problems are central to the rent generation processes of the enterprise.
Second, social entrepreneurship may involve the mobilisation of 
marginalised groups; against influential institutional actors (Mair & Martí, 
2009; Vasi, 2009) and has consequences for the firm, such as venture creation 
and growth, and for beneficiaries external to the firm (Alvord et al., 2004; 
Vasi, 2009).
These foregoing characteristics of social entrepreneurship differentiate
it from corporate social action, the second type of corporate response to 
social problems that I study in this dissertation.
Corporate Social Action
Scholars in the B&S literature debate the definitions of corporate social 
action (CSA) and cognate phenomena such as corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate citizenship 
(Carroll, 1999; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Windsor, 2006). Despite the 
apparent definitional differences advanced by these scholars, these 
phenomena refer to few underlying dimensions of corporate behaviour with 
respect to broader society: environmental, social, economic, stakeholder and 
voluntariness dimensions (Dahlsrud, 2008). In this dissertation, I adopt the 
definition of CSA proposed by Marquis, Glynn & Davis (2007, p. 926) as 
organisational ‘behaviors and practices that extend beyond immediate profit 
maximization goals and are intended to increase social benefits or mitigate 
social problems for constituencies external to the firm’.
Corporations have enacted various CSR programmes that purportedly 
extend beyond the firms’ immediate profit maximisation goals to alleviate 
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problems such as poor working conditions in east Asian apparel factories 
(Smith, 2003; Spar & La Mure, 2003), poor healthcare and basic education 
in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta (Eweje, 2006; Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 
2002), and lack of access to HIV/AIDS medication in Brazil (Flanagan & 
Whiteman, 2007).
Two distinct approaches to examining the drivers of CSAs can be 
discerned in the literature: those that explain CSA as driven by the intrinsic
motives of organisational actors; and those that focus on CSA as extrinsically
motivated by actors external to the firm (Muller & Kolk, 2010).
Intrinsic drivers of CSA. These explanations locate the antecedents of 
CSA in the motives of organisational decision makers. An organisation’s 
managers may enact strategic CSR programmes in order to improve the 
firm’s financial performance and competitive advantage (Bansal & Roth, 
2000; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; Husted & Allen, 2007; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001). Also, a corporation may adopt CSR practices for normative 
reasons. Regardless of any gains in financial performance or competitive 
advantage to their organisations, managers may pursue CSR programmes out 
of a personal sense of altruism or duty to society (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, 
& Ganapathi, 2007; Carroll, 1979; Donaldson & Preston, 1995).
Extrinsic drivers of CSA. External actors in a firm’s institutional and 
stakeholder environment include the media (Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 
1999), investors (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007), local communities 
(Marquis et al., 2007) and civil society groups (Doh & Guay, 2006). CSR 
scholars have also emphasised that firms engage in CSA principally to garner 
legitimacy with external audiences (Aguilera et al., 2007; Claasen & Roloff, 
2012; Swanson, 1999).
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CSA like social entrepreneurship is a corporate response to social 
problems. However CSA differs from social entrepreneurship in the 
following ways: (1) CSA typically does not involve the formation of a new 
organisational entity; it is undertaken by established for-profit organisations;
(2) Organisations’ CSR practices are usually not integrated into rent-
generating processes of the organisation (Husted & Allen, 2007; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2006); and (3) outcomes of CSA have 
historically been studied at the firm level (Margolis & Walsh, 2003).
In Table 1-1, I summarise the differences between social 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CSR practices in the MNE. MNEs, like purely domestic enterprises, 
are ensconced in broader institutional and stakeholder environments 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; C. Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Due to 
their larger economic and environmental impacts (Christmann, 2004), MNEs 
have been pressured to address social problems within their operating 
environments (Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Spar & La Mure, 2003; 
Wheeler et al., 2002). However, scholarly examination of MNEs’ CSR 
practices has lagged that of domestic firms (J. T. Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 
2012; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006)
Unlike domestic corporations, the sub-units of an MNE operate in 
multiple heterogeneous institutional environments (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008). For MNEs, whose sub-units (headquarters, affiliates and subsidiaries) 
navigate those institutional environments, managing the CSR practices as a 
means to gaining legitimacy in the face of multiple institutional demands is 
a complex task (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013) for at least three reasons: 
(1) the various sub-units of the MNE may enact CSR practices for different 
strategic ends in response to institutional pressures (C. Oliver, 1991); (2) due 
to conflicting institutional demands, managers may not know what 
organisational policies to implement in order to satisfy institutional demands 
(Wijen & Van Tulder, 2011); and (3) MNEs not only have to enact CSR 
programmes, they need to communicate and justify those programmes to 
various institutional constituents that may be removed from location where 
the programme is implemented (Christmann, 2004). Thus, MNEs’ CSR 
practices as well as external discursive justification of those practices are 
likely to be elements of MNEs’ repertoire for managing CSR commitments.
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RESEARCH OVERVIEW
Aims and Contributions of Studies
The aim of this dissertation is to increase scholarly understanding in 
two substantive areas of research as follows:
1. The emergence of one type of response to social problems (social 
entrepreneurship);
2. The implementation and management another type of corporate 
response, corporate social responsibility, within an empirical 
context (MNEs) that has been ignored in the literature.
In addition, the dissertation contributes to the methodological 
literature, specifically, the organisational ethnography literature. I propose
techniques that ethnographers of rapidly-changing modern organisational 
field sites may employ to compensate for the limits of traditional 
interviewing and participant observation, and satisfy the key ethnographic 
criterion of ‘being there’.
Before providing details on the studies that comprise the chapters in 
this dissertation, I state the ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
underpin the methods in the dissertation.
Methods: Ontological and Epistemological Commitments
A researchers’ participation in any field of scholarship presupposes 
meta-theoretical commitments, essentially a worldview, comprising ‘sets of 
understandings regarding the nature of the basic entities forming a field of 
scholarly interest and the ways these entities interrelate’ (Ramoglou & 
Tsang, 2015, p. 411). These worldviews, though often unarticulated (Van de 
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Ven, 2007, pp. 36-37), concern assumptions about the nature of the social 
world or reality being studied (ontology) and how the researcher attains 
knowledge of that world (epistemology). These commitments, in turn, 
influence the choice of method and any truth claims that is made about the 
phenomenon under study (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Morgan & Smircich,
1980; Schwandt, 2000).
In the reflexive spirit of engaged scholarship championed by Van de 
Ven (2007), I wish to clarify the ontological and epistemological 
commitments that guided the methods in this dissertation. I take the 
perspective of realism (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2015; Van de Ven, 2007, pp. 
37–40). In the context of entrepreneurship research, this perspective holds 
that basic entities central to the field, such as opportunities (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000) and the phenomena I studied in the dissertation 
research—entrepreneurial and managerial action (Fisher, 2012; McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006; Sarasvathy, 2001)—are ontologically real; they exist 
objectively and independently of my cognition (G. Burrell & Morgan, 1979; 
P. Johnson & Duberley, 2003). Yet, they are complex and multi-faceted.
In epistemology, the realist perspective holds that though social reality 
is objective, individual understanding of that reality is partial, incomplete and 
limited; that researchers’ ‘observations [of social reality] are theory laden 
and fallible’ (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2015, p. 413). Therefore, robust 
knowledge of social reality demands multiple perspectives (Van de Ven, 
2007, p. 38).
Given my realist perspective and my preference for ideographic 
research, I employed two types of qualitative research designs in this 
dissertation: ethnography and the case study. I employed ethnography 
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principally as a type of method of ‘fieldwork activity’ (Bate, 1997, p. 1151).
This involved ‘participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for 
an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, 
and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting 
documents and artifacts—in fact, gathering whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry’ (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007, p. 3). The case study design was employed in order to
understand a temporally-bounded empirical phenomenon ‘in depth and 
within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18).
Abstract ontological and epistemological considerations alone did not 
determine my data collection and analysis strategies. I also considered 
pragmatic necessity (Bryman, 2007). Though my research was primarily 
qualitative, I relied on quantitative data and analyses when it suited my 
research interest. Throughout the research process, I relied on 
methodological triangulation across multiple, potentially contradictory data 
sources as I examined the phenomena of interest.
Outline of Dissertation
Study I: Social enterprise emergence by distributed and effectual 
agency. In the first study of the dissertation (Chapter 2), I theorise the 
emergence of a social entrepreneurship (the case). This study illustrates 
distinctive features of social entrepreneurship: the organisation formed (the 
social enterprise) to address the problem was new; the focal actor was not a 
heroic singular actor, but a heterogeneous group of actors; and the activities 
that address the social problems were central to the business model of the 
firm.
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The study is based on a 15-month long study of the social enterprise 
Fairphone. I draw on social entrepreneurship, commercial entrepreneurship, 
technology in management (TIM), and social movement theories to analyse 
the unlikely emergence of the venture. I propose a model of social enterprise
emergence from social movement activism. Specifically, I argue that 
entrepreneurial agency under an effectual logic, originally proposed by 
Sarasvathy (2001) to inhere within the entrepreneurial actor, is co-constituted 
by distributed agency, which I define as the proactive conferral of material 
resources and legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by heterogeneous actors 
external to the venture. I further theorise the role of material artifacts by 
arguing that artifacts, which were central to effectuation theory, but ignored 
in subsequent scholarship are essential to the commitment of resources to the 
venture by the effectual network.
Study II: Case study CSR in the MNE. The second study (chapter 3), 
addresses another type of corporate response to social problems: corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Unlike social entrepreneurship, the focal actor is 
an existing organisation and the activities that address the social problem are 
performed principally to acquire legitimacy from influential institutional and 
stakeholder constituents.
The study is an empirical analysis of the CSR practices of the MNE 
Huawei, based on interviews and secondary data during a six-week visit to 
Kenya 2013. I employ a paradox perspective to legitimacy management in 
the MNE (Scherer et al., 2013) and a theory of discursive justification 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) to analyse the practices and external 
justifications employed by sub-units of the MNE. The study suggests that the 
paradox approach may not lead to inherent conflict within the MNE if the 
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cost of conformity in one domain is low and institutional pressure in another 
weak.
Study III: Methodological reflections. The third study in this 
dissertation (chapter 3) follows chronologically after the first study. Having 
emerged, the social enterprise grows (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010). During 
fieldwork in a rapidly-changing research site, the lone ethnographer has to 
make data collection choices, such as whom to interview and whom to 
observe (Van Maanen, 1979). Due to cognitive and spatial limitations, 
researchers may miss out on significant aspects of the organisational realities 
that they seek to understand. In the study, I address a methodological 
question: how may qualitative researchers exploit the self-documenting 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 121) aspects of modern organisations 
in order to paint compelling accounts of organisational life?
Using my study of the implementation of formal organisational 
structure, i.e., defined functional roles, responsibilities and reporting 
relationships, within Fairphone, I argue that social network analysis of 
modern organisations’ digital traffic (e-mail logs) may be fruitfully 
combined with conventional ethnographic techniques, such as interviewing 
and participant observation, to: (1) compensate for the limits of the latter in 
rapidly-changing organisational research sites; and (2) establish researcher 
presence in physical and digital spaces that constituted the social worlds
inhabited by modern organisational informant. I argue that by doing so 
ethnographers produce more authentic portraits of modern organisational 
life.
In Table 1-2, I summarise the three studies, which will be elaborated 
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In this section of the introduction, following Erasmus Research 
Institute of Management’s (ERIM’s) doctoral regulations, I declare my 
contribution to each of the five chapters of this dissertation and acknowledge 
the contribution of other parties where appropriate.
Chapter 1. The work that constitutes this chapter was done 
independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I sent a draft of the 
chapter to my promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I 
incorporated their feedback into the final version.
Chapter 2. A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal 
of Management Studies (See Akemu, Whiteman, & Kennedy, 2016). I am 
the first author, and my promotor and co-promotor are co-authors. I collected 
the data—interviews, participant observation and documentary data—during 
my 15-month study of the organisation, Fairphone. I wrote the thick 
description of the organisation’s emergence and validated same with 
Fairphone staff. I formulated the research question, performed the literature 
review, coded all 47 interviews and available secondary documentary data. 
My co-promotor, the third author of the paper, coded ten (of 47) interviews. 
With input from my promotor and co-promotor, I led the development of the 
process model and the discussion section of the paper. Lastly, I managed 
correspondence with the journal reviewers and associate editors throughout 
the one-year review process, and presented the paper at conferences in 
Rotterdam, Kos, Tilburg, Denver and Anaheim.
Chapter 3. The work that comprises this chapter was done 
independently by me. I did the literature review, formulated the research 
question, collected data via interviews in Nairobi and in Amsterdam and 
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documentary data from the Lexis Nexis database and companies’ online 
archives (for annual reports). Furthermore, I analysed the data and wrote the 
manuscript. In addition, I presented a draft version at an internal seminar and 
a conference, and circulated to two colleagues—Dr. Samer Abdelnour and 
Riccardo Valboni—for comments. I also sent a draft of the chapter to my 
promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I incorporated their 
feedback into the final version.
Chapter 4. The work that comprises this chapter was done 
independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I collected the data 
during my 15-month study of Fairphone. I formulated the research question, 
performed the literature review, analysed the data, interpreted the same and 
wrote the manuscript. I sent the manuscript to my promotor and co-promotor 
for comments after which I incorporated their comments before submission 
to a journal. The manuscript is currently under review (R&R2) at 
Organizational Research Methods.
Chapter 5. The work that comprises this chapter was done 
independently by me, the author of the dissertation. I sent a draft of the 
chapter to my promotor and co-promotor for comments. Thereafter, I 
incorporated their feedback into the final version.
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CHAPTER 2 : SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EMERGENCE BY 
DISTRIBUTED AND EFFECTUAL AGENCY: THE 
FAIRPHONE CASE1
ABSTRACT
Effectuation theory invests agency—intention and purposeful enactment—
for new venture creation in the entrepreneurial actor(s). Based on the results 
of a 15-month longitudinal case study of Amsterdam-based social enterprise 
Fairphone, we argue that effectual entrepreneurial agency is co-constituted 
by distributed agency, the proactive conferral of material resources and 
legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by heterogeneous actors external to 
the new venture. We show how, in the context of social movement activism, 
an effectual network pre-committed resources to an inchoate social enterprise 
to produce a material artifact because it embodied the moral values of 
network members. We develop a model of social enterprise emergence based 
on these findings. We theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation 
and suggest that, in the case, the artifact served as a boundary object, present 
in multiple social words and triggering commitment from actors not 
governed by hierarchical arrangements.
Keywords: Social entrepreneurship; effectuation; distributed agency; 
material artifacts; social movement; longitudinal case study.
1 A version of this paper has been published as Akemu, O., Whiteman, G., & Kennedy, 
S. (2016). Social enterprise emergence from social movement activism: The 
Fairphone case. Journal of Management Studies, 53(5), 846-877.
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‘I sometimes think that there is an angel somewhere that is looking over 
Fairphone. The people we met by coincidence at some point, they become 
crucial people within Fairphone.’
Fairphone co-founder, Miquel Ballester, in interview December 2013
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a vast mineral-rich country in 
Central Africa, has witnessed devastating civil conflict related to mineral 
exploitation. Mineral ores mined in the context of the conflict—called 
‘conflict minerals’ (OECD, 2013)—are the raw materials used to 
manufacture the vital components of electronic devices such as smartphones. 
In September 2009, Peter van der Mark, a public relations (PR) expert, and 
Bas van Abel,2 an industrial designer, devised a campaign to raise awareness 
in the Netherlands about the connection between smartphones and the 
conflict in the DRC. They called their campaign Fairphone. They invited the 
Dutch public to develop collaboratively a ‘fair’ smartphone: a phone that 
would be ‘conflict-mineral free’. They had neither the intention nor the 
expertise to make a commercial product. They hoped that any resulting 
prototype would be a non-functional concept device destined for exhibition 
at a local museum. They were wrong.
By January 2013, Fairphone the campaign had morphed into a social 
enterprise with van Abel as founder/CEO and with a new objective: ‘to 
produce a cool phone that put human values first’. In mid-2013, with no 
2 Except for Fairphone’s founders, Bas van Abel, Peter van der Mark and Miquel 
Ballester, His Royal Highness (H.R.H), Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme and Waag 
Society, the names of all informants have been changed to protect their identities.
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prototype, no customer base, no employee with industry experience and 
limited working capital, van Abel and his staff of six launched a 
crowdfunding campaign via the company’s website. They expected to pre-
sell a maximum of 5,000 fair smartphones. They were wrong again. By 
November 2013, Fairphone had pre-sold 25,000 non-existent smartphones at 
€325 apiece. How do we theorise the unlikely emergence of Fairphone?
We present the findings of a 15-month longitudinal case study of 
Fairphone. Drawing on the social movement, commercial entrepreneurship,
social entrepreneurship, technology entrepreneurship literatures and on
effectuation theory, we develop a model that offers three key insights into 
social enterprise emergence. First, agency—intention and purposeful 
enactment—for social enterprise emergence does not inhere solely in the 
venture founders, as is assumed in effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; 
Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). The entrepreneurial intention and capabilities 
that are presupposed by a purposive enactment of the venture in effectuation 
theory may also originate from multiple actors, such as the media, corporate 
actors and government officials, external to the venture founding team. 
Distributed agency co-constitutes or enables effectual entrepreneurial agency
in the creation of a new social venture in two ways: (1) by the proactive 
commitment of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, 
capabilities and contingencies—ingredients that are necessary for the new 
venture to thrive (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002)—to the (eventual) effectual 
entrepreneurial agent; and (2) by eliciting a change in the intentions of a 
previously-reluctant effectual entrepreneur to pursue domain-specific 
entrepreneurial goals—a necessary condition for new venture emergence 
(Katz & Gartner, 1988).
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Second, material artifacts, which were central to the development of 
effectuation theory (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008), but 
ignored in subsequent work on the theory, are vital to the convention of an 
effectual network. The symbolic dimensions of a material artifact (a
smartphone) triggers resource pre-commitments from members of the 
effectual network. These members commit resources to the venture not based 
on assessments of utilitarian benefits, but because they interpret the artifact
as symbolising their beliefs and values.
Third, the material artifact served as a boundary object (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989) because it is comprehensible, possesses emotional power 
and enables contributions from members of different social domains—
consumer electronics firms, government actors, consumers, hackers—who
attributed various meanings to the artifact (Bijker, 1987). We propose that 
the concept be extended to include interactions that are not bounded within a 
single organisation as is the case in current organisational research on 
boundary objects (e.g., Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012; Yakura, 2002).
We begin our paper with a review of effectuation theory and distributed 
agency, the principal conceptual dimensions of the study. Next, we describe 
the method used in this paper—a longitudinal case study. We report our 
findings by presenting a summary of the case, the themes and the model of 
social enterprise emergence. Thereafter, we discuss the implications of our 
findings and, finally, we conclude with directions for future research.
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THEORETICAL CONTEXT
In this section, we present the main concepts that emerged as we 
analysed Fairphone’s history by pattern matching and referencing 
appropriate literatures. As we will discuss in the ‘Methods’ section of the 
paper, we employed an abductive inferential approach (Van Maanen, 
Sørensen, & Mitchell, 2007) to adduce the best analytical explanation for the 
data, rather than deriving these deductively from prior theory. If we presented 
the paper how the study unfolded, we would have to report our methods and 
data before the reader learns what the main conceptual components and 
contributions of the study are likely to be. In order to furnish the reader with
advance conceptual clarity (Suddaby, 2006), we abandon an abductive 
reporting approach. Instead, following traditional paper presentation 
approaches, we present the theoretical context first to preview the findings 
and the contributions.
Effectuation and the Creation of Social Enterprises
Like their commercial counterparts, social entrepreneurs act under 
conditions of uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) as they combine 
resources to form new products, services or organisations intended to 
stimulate social change or meet social needs (Mair & Martí, 2006). A
valuable starting point for understanding entrepreneurial action under 
uncertainty is Sarasvathy’s (2001) theory of effectual decision making or 
effectuation.
Sarasvathy (2001) argued that entrepreneurial action under an
effectuation logic differs from action under causal or traditional theories 
(e.g., Gartner, 1985) in the following ways: (1) effectual entrepreneurs are 
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more likely to start developing entrepreneurial opportunities not with a 
specific goal, such as making profit, but by deploying three sets of means—
their identity, knowledge, and networks; (2) they are more likely to assess 
risk using the principle of affordable loss (advance commitments to how 
much resources they are willing to lose in a new venture) rather than the 
principle of expected returns (advance calculations about expected financial 
returns from the venture); (3) they focus on building alliances with a network 
of stakeholders, such as potential suppliers and customers, instead of on 
analysing and outwitting the competition; (4) they exploit unexpected 
contingencies to mould the emerging enterprise, instead of minimising 
contingencies; and (5) they act in order to control an unpredictable future 
instead of predicting an uncertain future.
Effectuation theory has been applied to explain the formation of new 
technology firms (Sarasvathy & Kotha, 2001) and new industries 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). In the ‘dynamic model’ of effectuation 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005), the entrepreneur imagines some generalised 
desired end (e.g., a new venture) achievable using available means. The 
entrepreneur then interacts with people that she knows or meets. Due to this 
interaction, a self-selected ‘effectual network’ (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005, p. 
548) comprising potential customers, financiers and collaborators emerges. 
Members of the effectual network pre-commit resources to the 
entrepreneurial idea based on the principle of affordable loss. This results in 
an expanded flow of resources and/or change in the entrepreneur’s goals. 
Assuming the effectual network is not dismantled, this recursive process 
continues until an expanding cycle of resources and increasing constraints on 
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the entrepreneur’s goals coalesce to enable the formation of a new firm or 
new industry.
Though social entrepreneurship scholars have invoked cognate 
constructs such as stakeholder support and collective action (Corner & Ho, 
2010; Haugh, 2007; Montgomery et al., 2012) to explain social enterprise 
formation, our review of the social entrepreneurship literature suggests that 
effectuation in the context of social enterprise emergence has not received 
much attention. Broadly speaking, social entrepreneurship scholars have 
explained social enterprise formation by explicitly or implicitly invoking
traditional and bricolage theories of entrepreneurial action. In traditional 
theories of entrepreneurial action, the entrepreneur deliberately seeks 
resources to found a new venture predicated on exploiting some pre-
identified opportunity (Gartner, 1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). Thus, social entrepreneurs are reported to consciously 
leverage the assets of target constituencies (Alvord et al., 2004), actively 
develop social capital (Squazzoni, 2009) and proactively manage risks 
(Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, & Amezcua, 2013) to achieve social change
through their ventures. They also purposively progress through a trajectory 
consisting of temporally-distinct, pre-figured stages as they build new social 
ventures (Haugh, 2007; Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012; Robinson, 2006).
Applying bricolage theory, scholars have reported that social entrepreneurs
make do with available resources, creating ‘something from nothing’ (Baker 
& Nelson, 2005, p. 349), as they found and grow social ventures in resource-
poor environments (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Mair & Martí, 2009).
Like traditional and bricolage theories of entrepreneurial action,
effectuation theory locates agency for a new venture in the entrepreneurial 
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actor(s) who embark on the venture creation process with the intention to 
develop some business aspiration. In Sarasvathy’s (2001) seminal paper, for 
instance, she illustrates effectuation theory using the example of an 
imaginary entrepreneur who intended to start a restaurant business, Curry in 
a Hurry. The entrepreneur then deliberately sought resources and information 
to realise that goal. However, the nature of the eventual business was an 
emergent, i.e. unpredictable, outcome arising from repeated interaction and 
conceptualisation between the entrepreneur and the effectual network.
Furthermore, in effectuation theory, the entrepreneurial actor(s) is the basic 
unit of analysis and the motive force propelling the process of venture 
creation (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 244–253). As Arend et al. (2015) have 
pointed out, effectuation theory overlooks the role played by other actors in 
the entrepreneur(s)’ broader environment—such as competitors—in 
constraining or co-constituting entrepreneurial agency and, ultimately, new 
venture formation.
Scholars in fields as diverse as leadership (Gronn, 2002) and 
technology entrepreneurship (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Hargrave & Van de 
Ven, 2006; Van de Ven, 1993) have emphasised that the agency for outcomes 
such as organisational performance and the adoption of technology 
respectively does not rest in a single actor, but is distributed across multiple 
actors pursuing their particular, limited interests with varying levels of 
involvement (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). To illustrate the concept of distributed 
agency in the context of new firm and industry formation, we turn to 
emerging scholarship at the nexus of social movement and organisation 
theory (e.g., Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 
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2009; Sine & David, 2003; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005; Weber, Heinze, 
& DeSoucey, 2008).
Distributed Agency: An Illustration from Social Movement Literature
Social movements, defined as loosely-organised coalitions that 
provoke social change by challenging prominent social and cultural practices 
through sustained campaigns (Weber et al., 2008), promote the creation of 
new (social) ventures and industries. Diverse actors within social 
movements, such as the media and professional associations pursue varying 
interests (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000), and in the process, furnish
entrepreneurs with resources, capabilities and legitimacy—ingredients vital 
for the formation of new ventures.
Legitimacy for new industry or new venture. Social movement 
organisations (SMOs) and their allies in institutionalised political arenas such 
as policymakers embed their values into regulation, creating legitimacy for 
entrepreneurial activity that is aligned with those values (Hiatt et al., 2009; 
Sine & Lee, 2009). Increased legitimacy may foster the founding of 
organisations that may otherwise not have been formed. In Sine et al.’s 
(2005) study of the U.S. independent power sector, the passage of the 
National Energy Act prompted in part by social movement activism in the 
mid–late 1970s, legitimated the sector. Legitimation then had a stronger 
positive impact on the founding of firms by entrepreneurs employing risky,
novel technologies than those using established technologies.
Resources. As SMOs contest prominent social and cultural practices, 
they may inadvertently expand the pool of resources that entrepreneurs 
exploit to found new enterprises. In Hiatt et al.’s (2009) study of the 
American temperance movement in the period 1870–1920, the movement 
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successfully delegitimated the brewery industry. As a result, owners of 
disbanded breweries sold their capital equipment at highly discounted rates 
to opportunistic entrepreneurs in the budding soft drinks industry.
The transfer of resources to entrepreneurs need not be inadvertent; it 
may also be deliberate. Sine and Lee (2009) studied the rise of U.S. wind 
energy sector in the period 1978–1992. They reported that ideologically-
motivated entrepreneurs and investors, who eventually founded wind farms, 
were brought together through networks of the Sierra Club, an activist 
organisation that had been campaigning for legislation in favour of wind 
energy at the time.
Consumer demand. People change their consumption patterns in 
response to moral suasion by SMOs thereby creating demand for alternative 
products or services advocated by SMOs (Bartley, 2007; Hiatt et al., 2009; 
Sine & David, 2003). In a study of the market for certified wood products, 
Bartley (2007) found that corporate purchasers of wood such as IKEA 
switched to certified wood products in response to boycotts and market-
making practices of a coalition of grant-making organisations and 
environmental SMOs including the Ford Foundation and the Rainforest 
Action Network.
In summary, effectuation theory is a valuable lens for examining 
entrepreneurial action under conditions of uncertainty. However, 
effectuation theory assumes that agency for a new firm rests with a small, 
delineable group of actors, namely the entrepreneur(s) and ignores the role 
played by actors located in the entrepreneurs’ broader environment in 
constraining or enabling entrepreneurial agency. We address this gap with 
our study of the emergence of Fairphone. We integrate our empirical results 
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with insights on distributed agency from fields such as research on social 
movements, which recognise that multiple actors may contribute resources 
and legitimacy to enable the founding of new firms.
METHODS
We began this study in October 2013, when the first author became 
researcher-in-residence at Fairphone with the intention to study the evolution 
of the organisation’s capabilities.3 As we studied the organisation’s unlikely 
history, we developed a focused research question: ‘how do we theorise the 
emergence of the social enterprise, Fairphone?’
Step 1: Data Collection
To answer the research question, the first author collected data using
interviews, participant observation within Fairphone and documentary 
sources.
Interviews. We employed both deliberate and emergent sampling 
techniques to recruit informants. For instance, in order to avoid elite bias 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 263), the first author interviewed all members 
of Fairphone, including temporary staff and interns. To identify informants 
outside Fairphone, he used snowballing techniques (Patton, 2001, p. 237).
He asked Fairphone staff to introduce him to people who were 
knowledgeable about the company and contacted potential informants—
some of whom were critical of Fairphone—mentioned in third-party reports 
about Fairphone. In total, the first author conducted 47 interviews with 38 
3 The first author did not receive remuneration from Fairphone during his fieldwork in 
the organisation. Other than an agreement to respect the confidentiality of Fairphone 
members, Fairphone’s leaders put him under no obligation.
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Interview protocols were structured as follows: informants’ 
biographical information; their relationship to Fairphone; what role they or 
their organisation played in Fairphone’s history; the challenges that they had 
faced in that role; and an open-ended section in which informants provided
any information they deemed important to Fairphone’s story. Interviews 
lasted 55 minutes on average. All but one interview were recorded and 
transcribed.
We relied principally on retrospective accounts to reconstruct the story 
of Fairphone before October 2013. Recognising that retrospective accounts 
might be inaccurate (C. C. Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997), we followed 
methodological recommendations to improve the accuracy of the accounts. 
First, we interviewed informants with first-hand knowledge of Fairphone. 
Second, we asked informants to recall specific events rather than generalised 
information or opinions. To reduce hindsight bias, we asked informants to 
remember a time when they thought that Fairphone might fail. Third, we 
asked the same questions to multiple informants.
Participant observation. The first author had sustained access to 
Fairphone’s members. Over a 15-month period (October 2013–January 
2015), he visited Fairphone’s Amsterdam offices 1–3 times per week (total 
130 field visits). During these field visits, which lasted 6–10 hours per day,
he observed interactions among Fairphone staff in formal settings, such as 
team meetings, and in informal settings, such as weekly social events and 
Christmas dinners. He made detailed notes within 24 hours of a field visit.
Documentary sources. We employed Fairphone’s archival documents 
and publicly-available data to understand the context in which Fairphone 
arose and to triangulate interview reports. Fairphone’s archival documents 
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included grant applications, financial reports, business plans and the results 
of a survey of Fairphone customers while publicly-available data included 
Facebook entries, 1,870 Twitter feeds, campaign videos, five press releases, 
five radio shows, 158 press articles, and three television shows.
Step 2: Timeline Construction and Informant Validation
The objective of this step was to produce an accurate, complete and fair 
account of the emergence of Fairphone (Patton, 2001, pp. 559–561; Yin, 
2009, pp. 182–184). The first author prepared a detailed narrative and 
timeline of Fairphone’s history. He validated the narrative with Fairphone 
members on two occasions. The first occasion was a dedicated 1½ hour lunch 
meeting in April 2014 during which he presented the narrative and received 
feedback from Fairphone staff about the organisation’s history. The second 
occasion was an informal meeting in June 2014 with three of Fairphone’s 
founding employees. The staff independently crosschecked the timeline and 
clarified discrepancies with the first author. At the end of this step, we 
identified three distinct phases in the emergence of the enterprise, which we 
label ‘social activism’, ‘transition’, and ‘social entrepreneurship’.
Step 3: Identification of Emergent Themes
Our goal was to build theory from a rich, in-depth case study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). We employed an abductive inferential approach (Van 
Maanen et al., 2007), iterating between data and extant theory in order to 
theorise about the case. Theme analysis was used to explain patterns in the 
emergence of the enterprise. According to Dutton and Dukerich (1991, p. 
524), themes are ‘recurrent topics of discussion, action, or both on the part 
of the actors being studied…that captures the central ideas or relationships’ 
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regarding our research question. Theme analysis was performed in four
stages. First, the lead author noted in contact summary sheets (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, pp. 51–54), the concepts that had characterised 
interviewees’ accounts of Fairphone’s history. Second, these concepts were 
used as a starting list of codes. Using NVivo 10 qualitative analysis software, 
we then coded interview transcripts and secondary documents for actors’ 
decisions, activities performed by the actors, situations in which the actors 
took those decisions, and events—defined as time-limited occurrences 
beyond the control of focal actors (Langley & Truax, 1994). We retained 
informants’ ‘in vivo’ quotes if the quotes succinctly captured decisions, 
events and states in Fairphone’s story. Examples of first-order codes are 
‘legitimacy accretion’, ‘tangible resources’, ‘artifact attributes’, and 
‘material ends’.
Third, we then recursively collapsed codes into higher-level 
theoretically-distinct categories (Eisenhardt, 1989), iterating between the 
codes and the data. For instance, informant statements about the Fairphone 
team’s rationale for using a smartphone for an awareness campaign (‘artifact 
attributes’, ‘material ends’) were grouped into the category ‘artifact as 
storytelling device’. At the end of this step of the theme analysis, we had a 
total of 384 codes.
Fourth, we collapsed categories further into themes following Braun 
and Clarke’s (2006, p. 82) guidelines that themes should be not only 
prevalent across different data sources, but that they should also possess 
‘keyness’, capturing important patterns in the data. In the ‘Findings’ section 
of the paper, we discuss the themes that emerged from our analysis.
Page 47
Step 4: Pattern Matching with Extant Theory
In the fourth step, we compared the themes and the rich narrative with 
similar concepts within the social movement, commercial, social and 
technology entrepreneurship literatures in order to build a structured 
analytical explanation of the case (Yin, 2009, p. 141). After a detailed review 
of those literatures, we agreed to explain patterns of decision making in the 
data using effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005).
We then re-coded the data using constructs from effectuation theory as a list 
of codes. What means did Fairphone members employ? What goals did they 
start with and how did those goals change? How did Fairphone’s members 
interact with an effectual network? What pre-commitments were made by the 
network? How did Fairphone’s members leverage contingencies?
Step 5: Reliability Checks
In order to improve the reliability of the coding, two authors 
independently re-coded the ten most ‘information-rich’ interviews. (The first 
author re-coded all 47 interviews.) Then, all three authors discussed the 
codes—the codes from step 3 and the effectuation codes from step 4—until 
agreement on the coding and categories was strong. This form of reliability 
check has been used to establish coding reliability in qualitative research 
published in top-tier management journals (e.g., Plowman et al., 2007).
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FINDINGS
In this section, we present a detailed account of the creation of Fairphone and 
the themes that emerged from our analysis of the data.
Chronological Narrative: From Awareness Campaign to Social 
Enterprise
Since the mid-1990s, the mineral-rich DRC [Democratic Republic of 
Congo] has been engulfed in a civil war. Civil society organisations, such as 
Global Witness (U.S.) and a coalition of European organisations including 
SOMO [Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations] (Netherlands) 
and The Church of Sweden, have contended since the mid-2000s that global 
demand for mobile phones fuels the conflict because Congolese militia 
compete violently to control the mines that supply valuable mineral ores to 
the mobile phone industry (Pöyhönen & Simola, 2007). These NGOs [non-
government organisations] and their allies in U.S. and European Union (EU) 
legislatures have lobbied for legislation against the use of conflict minerals 
in electronic products.
In September 2009, in this context of social movement activity, Mesa, 
an Amsterdam-based NGO, approached van der Mark for ideas about an 
awareness campaign. Founded in the mid-1990s as a merger of three NGOs
that had campaigned against Apartheid in South Africa, Mesa had by 2009 
shifted to campaigning for equitable distribution of mineral wealth in sub-
Saharan Africa. In late September 2009, Mesa commissioned van der Mark
to develop an awareness campaign about the connection between 
smartphones and the conflict in the DRC.
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Once van der Mark and van Abel had identified the idea for a 
collaborative hands-on fair smartphone campaign, they were joined by two 
programme managers from Mesa to form the Fairphone campaign team. In 
March 2010, the team secured a public grant to run their campaign. In the 
grant application they described their plan as follows:
Important minerals used in mobile phones are being mined in 
degrading circumstances in Congo. We want to make consumers 
aware of the terrible situation in the Congolese mines. [By making a 
smartphone] Together with consumers we want to convince 
smartphone manufacturers of the importance and possibility of making 
a fair alternative.
None of the four Fairphone team members knew how to produce a 
smartphone. The campaign was intended merely to raise public awareness as 
Fairphone’s founder/CEO explained, ‘I didn’t even know about conflict 
minerals when I started this project…I was interested in making the [‘conflict 
mineral-free’] phone from a purely design perspective…The whole aspect of 
bringing the phone to market did not interest me’.
With grant money in hand, the Fairphone team launched Twitter, 
Facebook and web pages in the summer of 2010 and invited the public to 
contribute ideas for a fair smartphone. While the campaign was underway in 
mid-2010, two events kept the DRC in the news: (1) the publication in the 
Netherlands of a bestselling book about the DRC’s tragic history; and (2) the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.
Media and industry get involved. In October 2010, only seven months 
after the campaign began, Fairphone was hailed as ‘the world’s first 
collective non-profit developer of mobile phones’ by widely-circulated 
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Dutch newspaper, De Volkskrant. In March 2011, the Fairphone team 
travelled to the DRC to source ‘slavery-free’ minerals and publicised the trip 
on the campaign website.
Shortly after returning from the DRC in March 2011, van Abel was 
invited by the board of directors of Alpha-Mobile, a mobile network operator 
(MNO), to present Fairphone. Reflecting on the experience, van Abel
confessed, ‘It was really weird...I was doing a presentation to the board of 
directors. I didn’t even know what to ask these guys…People got excited and 
pulled me into the whole system [Alpha-Mobile]’. Within the month, Alpha-
Mobile agreed to buy 1,000 non-existent fair smartphones.
In the same month, the campaign team presented the Fairphone project 
to an executive of Macrobank, a large bank, after which the executive 
publicly endorsed Fairphone. Van der Mark remembered that, ‘They 
[Macrobank] gave us a little bit of money and they pushed us on their 
website’. In November 2011, the Fairphone campaign was voted as winners 
of a prestigious €10,000 prize for sustainable innovation in fair trade. Thus, 
remarkably by the end of 2011, the Fairphone team with no smartphone 
prototype, no intention to start a business and no expertise in the smartphone 
industry, had gained significant support for their project. But then, the 
Fairphone campaign team reached a crisis point.
Conflict, uncertainty, funding problems. Conflict within the 
Fairphone campaign team led to Mesa’s withdrawal from the campaign. The 
Mesa members did not understand Fairphone’s campaigning practices as one
Mesa programme manager explained, ‘we [Mesa] had one problem—that 
was the financing. The other problem was understanding Fairphone. What 
the hell is Fairphone?...It was a new way of communication. And we were 
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old-school’. Mesa members also believed that being associated with 
Fairphone threatened their organisation’s reputation:
How fair is Fairphone? Is it 1% fair? Is it 99% fair?...We [Mesa] took 
a lot of responsibility in the sense that if journalists would find out, 
like, Fairphone was not as fair as they claim to be, then because with 
our [Mesa’s] name we were connected to Fairphone—as an 
organisation it will get back to us. (Mesa consultant #2).
In addition to conflict over campaign practices, Fairphone had also run 
out of ideas and funds. Van der Mark recalled, ‘Nobody really knew what to 
do with Fairphone…We were sitting around with some people making plans, 
but didn’t know what to do. The first thing we thought about is, ‘why don’t 
we make a battery?’…Nobody dared to say that we were going to build a 
phone’. By early 2012, with their funds exhausted and no support from Mesa, 
van der Mark and van Abel could not afford to work on Fairphone. Thus, 
they returned to their paying day jobs.
In March 2012, Miquel Ballester, a university student, applied to Waag 
(van Abel’s erstwhile employer) for an internship position. Van Abel 
immediately recruited Ballester to work on the Fairphone project for latter’s 
master’s thesis. Two months later, a project manager at Waag serendipitously 
discovered an opportunity to develop Fairphone: a London-based 
entrepreneurship incubator had put out a call for sustainable business ideas.
I remember, I think it was a Thursday, and I saw it coming in my 
inbox...it was not that I was actively looking for an acceleration 
[incubation] program…but reading the text, I said, ‘this is what 
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Fairphone needs right now’…And I submitted the Fairphone plan [to 
incubator] without consulting anyone. (Fairphone ex-project manager)
Fairphone was selected to attend the three-month incubation 
programme in July 2012. While in London, the Fairphone team, principally 
represented by the intern Ballester, met telecommunication industry insiders,
technology entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
In September 2012, van Abel and Ballester secured an investment of
€400,000 from a business angel to incorporate a company. The angel 
explained his rationale for investing: ‘Investment for me is not like figures. 
For me it’s the story, it’s the people…I wasn’t calculating anything [when I 
invested]. It’s a luxury position...And it’s not a decision made on any plans. 
Nothing at all’. In January 2013, Fairphone the social enterprise4 was 
incorporated with van Abel as founder/CEO, and van der Mark and Ballester 
as co-founders.
Crowdfunding drive, media attention. In February 2013, van Abel was 
invited to the DRC by Prince Jaime de Bourbon de Parme, a member of the 
Dutch royal family and The Netherlands’ Special Envoy for Natural 
Resources. The prince was leading a multi-stakeholder project to source 
conflict-free tin from the DRC. ‘Would Fairphone be interested in 
participating in the pilot?’ he asked. Van Abel had played no role setting up 
the pilot, but he agreed to buy conflict-free tin from the prince’s project.
4 Fairphone is incorporated as a limited liability company. In the Netherlands, there is 
no legal organisational form to distinguish social enterprises from commercial 
enterprises. Fairphone’s claim to be a social enterprise is based on its operations and 
governance model. In 2015, the company obtained B-Corp certification as a ‘for-
profit’ company certified by the nonprofit B-Lab to meet rigorous standards of social 
and environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.
(https://www.bcorporation.net/community/fairphone).
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Despite their campaign promise, Fairphone could not afford to design 
a smartphone. Ballester recalled, ‘We didn’t design a phone [during the 
campaign]. We made…if you like, an artist’s impression of what a phone 
could look like. To design a phone from scratch, you need millions of 
dollars’. With only €400,000 working capital, designing a smartphone was 
out of the question. In early April 2013, van Abel agreed to license a 
smartphone design from a factory in China and to incorporate therein 
conflict-free components from Prince Jaime’s pilot programme.
After deliberation, van Abel and the Fairphone staff, now comprising 
six people (none of whom had phone industry experience), decided to finance 
production of the phone by appealing to the public in a ‘crowdfunding’ 
campaign. Their goal was to raise enough funds to cover the production of 
5,000 smartphones at a unit price of €325. They were not hopeful that they 
would reach the sales target. Van der Mark said of the period, ‘At first I 
thought, “Nobody is going to pay €325 for something you don’t have, that 
doesn’t exist.”’ Only three weeks after announcing the crowdfunding drive, 
all 5,000 smartphones were sold out. 
The crowdfunding drive generated substantial international media 
coverage for Fairphone. Reflecting on the period, one Fairphone employee 
said, ‘I have never been on a train that’s run so fast…I was amazed that Al-
Jazeera, the Wall Street Journal, CNBC, The Guardian and the BBC, 
everyone needed to report about us…the level of attention was quite 
amazing’. Customers called the company asking to pre-order more 
smartphones. Van Abel and his staff put an additional 20,000 phones on pre-
sale. To their surprise, all smartphones were sold out by November 2013.
Page 54
Incredibly, in less than a year, Fairphone, the start-up with no industry track 
record, had pre-sold 25,000 non-existent smartphones.
Producing the fair smartphone. Though Fairphone had the financial 
resources, the start-up did not have the technical expertise to produce a 
smartphone. In July 2013, van Abel hired a chief technology officer (CTO)—
Fairphone’s first employee with smartphone industry experience. With help 
from contacts at Beta-Mobile, a large MNO, van Abel and the CTO 
commissioned an audit of the Chinese factory. The results were 
disappointing: the factory did not have the capabilities to produce
smartphones meeting the exacting quality standards of the European market.
Following the audit, van Abel hired specialists to ensure quality at the 
factory.
Nevertheless, quality problems soon emerged as the first prototypes 
were being made. (The first author joined Fairphone soon after the audit in 
October 2013.) The defect rate of the prototypes was about 105 per 100 
produced smartphones, i.e. on average every prototype had 1.05 defects. The 
first author witnessed Fairphone staff frustration at the high defect rate and 
the seemingly intractable quality problems. One exasperated employee 
explained:
[T]he quality standards of [prototype] phones were completely 
different from what you would expect on a phone. There were no two 
phones that they [factory] built that the [power] button here [points to 
smartphone]…had the same feeling because of manufacturing 
differences…If you do not have this [smartphone] that works then you 
are done. Forget it. Done.
Page 55
Throughout the prototype development process, however, Fairphone 
received help. Friendly contacts at MNOs Alpha-Mobile and Beta-Mobile 
tested prototypes and provided invaluable feedback to Fairphone free of
charge. A director at Alpha-Mobile, who had instructed engineers at his 
company to test the prototypes, explained his support:
It’s also a personal relationship you are [I am] having [with 
Fairphone]. Much more personal involved than we [Alpha-Mobile] do 
have with all the other smartphone vendors. We are doing hundreds of 
thousands of euros with other vendors, but this [relationship with 
Fairphone] is really only on personal belief, personal commitment.
In October–November 2013, Fairphone staff in Amsterdam and in the 
factory worked with factory managers and MNO contacts to reduce the 
prototype defect rates. Van Abel explained the situation at the end of one test 
in November 2013 to the first author: ‘I [will] only believe it when the phones 
are here. That’s when I will feel relieved—and that the phones work, of 
course. We [Fairphone] are managing a lot of the processes [in the factories]. 
We have three people in five factories looking at the production aspects and 
working their butts off’.
In the first week of December 2013, Fairphone received more help. 
Engineers at Gamma-Mobile, a German MNO, voluntarily resolved a 
software problem they had discovered while testing a prototype smartphone.
Basically, there was a bug [software failure] that made phone calls not 
work properly with Gamma-Mobile in Germany, which is 40% of our 
customers...They’ve fixed it now…If we hadn’t connected with the
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right people at Gamma-Mobile, we wouldn’t have known. (Fairphone 
co-founder, Miquel Ballester).
In early December 2013, the defect rates dropped to about 17 per 100 
prototypes. Judging this to be an acceptable defect rate, van Abel approved 
production of the first 2,000 fair smartphones.5 These were assembled and 
delivered to European customers on Christmas Eve 2013. In subsequent 
weeks, the factory shipped several thousand assembled phones per week to 
customers who had been waiting for three to six months. By February 2014, 
all 25,000 smartphones had been shipped to customers in 32 European 
countries.
As we write this paper (October 2015), the company has pre-sold an 
additional 50,000 smartphones (total 75,000 phones; revenue €27.4million) 
and grown to 45 employees. Simply put, Fairphone the social enterprise has
emerged. Its founders demonstrated entrepreneurial intentionality, secured 
resources such as capital, established organisational boundaries and engaged 
in exchange across those boundaries (Katz & Gartner, 1988).
Our analysis revealed three themes that characterise the emergence of 
Fairphone: ‘perturbed contextual conditions’, ‘issue framing’, and 
‘distributed agency’. In the remainder of this section we present the three 
emergent themes, and then the evidence for effectual decision making.
5 Defects during prototype testing phase ranged from the functional, such as 
improperly functioning power buttons, to the aesthetic (e.g., barely-perceptible 
scratches on the screen). Defects in late December 2013 were all slight aesthetic 
defects.
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Theme 1: Perturbed Contextual Condition
The data shows that industry actors, who were aware of failures along 
the electronics industry supply chain, responded to perturbations within the 
industry and, in the process, advocated various solutions to the problem of 
conflict minerals.
Awareness of failure. Industry insiders were aware of problems across 
the consumer electronics industry supply chain. These problems included the 
opacity of the chain of custody as minerals travelled from the DRC’s mines 
through traders to ore smelters in Asian, and poor working conditions in East 
Asian factories where smartphones are assembled. A manager from Beta-
Mobile put the point concisely: ‘[W]e [industry] all know there’s something 
wrong with our supply chain and our business modelling. We all know that. 
We also know that it’s hard to change that’.
Disruption event. Despite this awareness, the solution space available 
to address supply chain problems was not expanded until the consumer 
electronics industry experienced a disruption event (A. D. Meyer, 1982; Sine 
& David, 2003): the promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act by the U.S. Congress in July 2010. The bill, 
which had been passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, contained a 
section unrelated to the crisis, which required U.S. companies to demonstrate 
due diligence in sourcing minerals from the DRC.
One informant made plain his assessment of how the legislation 
affected the industry.
You had a huge bill [Dodd-Frank Act], you know, 10,000 pages,…[it] 
was passed through very quickly and attached to it was this [conflict 
mineral legislation] and it landed on the SEC [Securities and Exchange 
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Commission]…they [SEC]…were, of course, completely unaware of 
how to handle this…So there you have this piece of badly-
contradictory, badly-worded, badly thought-out wish-list [conflict 
mineral legislation] without any mechanism or idea in terms of how to 
actually effectively…put it into law...So it was a real mess [for 
industry compliance]. (Director, Delta-Electronics).
Solution proliferation. The Dodd-Frank Act triggered three types of 
responses by actors: (1) Avoiding—Smelting companies and mining 
companies avoided sourcing from the DRC altogether to eliminate the risk 
of breaking U.S. law; (2) Legislating—European legislators and their civil 
society allies called for a European equivalent to the Dodd-Frank Act while 
some industry groups challenged the legislation in U.S. courts; and (3) 
Engaging—Some civil society groups, the Dutch government, and members 
of consumer electronics industry associations under the auspices of the 
OECD developed initiatives to source certified conflict-free minerals from 
the DRC.
Theme 2: Issue Framing
Issue framing refers to discursive and symbolic practices within 
Fairphone’s campaign repertoire consisting of a number of distinct elements: 
‘articulated ideals of practice’, ‘employment of artifact as story-telling 
device’, ‘perceptions of actor distinctiveness’, and ‘establishing category 
congruence’. Collectively, these elements trigger material support for the 
enterprise.
Articulated ideals of practice. The Fairphone campaign team 
repeatedly made normative claims justifying the campaign by articulating 
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two ideals of practice: transparency and fairness. Mesa justified participation 
in the Fairphone campaign to external audiences by portraying the campaign 
as part of its fight against economic injustice in Sub-Saharan Africa and by 
drawing on the organisation’s previous campaigns against Apartheid. Waag, 
represented by van Abel, justified participating in the Fairphone campaign 
by stressing the organisation’s hands-on approach to product design. Waag’s 
slogan, often repeated in documents was ‘if you can’t open it [a product] you 
don’t own it’.
Artifact as story-telling device. Fairphone’s founders used a
smartphone as the centrepiece of their campaign. The attributes of a 
smartphone—tangibility, ubiquity, emotionality—informed that choice as 
one Mesa programme manager explained, ‘It’s [a smartphone’s] just 
something which everybody uses and which is really important in people’s 
lives. And that’s why we went for the phone’.
Yet, the artifact was employed in differently by various team members. 
The smartphone was predominantly used for issue prognosis (Benford & 
Snow, 2000)—as a call to arms to the public to act and change the situation 
in the DRC. For Mesa, however, the artifact was a means of instrumental 
exchange.
[NGOs need] stories that are tangible. Mesa was working on 
something called ‘democratisation of society’ [before Fairphone]. That 
is not tangible I can tell you. You cannot turn that into a product and 
ten pictures each year to fund-raise on. But a phone that you and I use? 
I mean...It was just too good to be true if you could link yourself to 
something like that. (Mesa consultant #1)
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Establishing category congruence. While still a social movement 
campaign, Fairphone team legitimated the campaign by demonstrating that 
its objective was symbolically congruent (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) with 
an extant product category: Fair Trade. For instance, they chose the name 
‘Fairphone’, similar to Fair Trade and portrayed their objective as a variation 
of a familiar category, Fair Trade consumption. However, they did not 
attempt to establish category congruence in order to further entrepreneurial 
goals. Instead, they compared their campaign to Fair Trade in order to 
increase comprehensibility and ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 
582) of the campaign repertoire with audiences.
Perceptions of actor distinctiveness. We surmise from the data that 
informants perceived Fairphone to be distinct from both NGOs and 
smartphone manufacturers. Fairphone’s ‘positive’ story, contrary to NGO’s 
adversarial stance, engendered support from insiders:
They [Fairphone] said, ‘Hey, couldn’t we get conflict-free tantalum 
[metal used in smartphones]? We want to make a mobile phone’. And 
I think, this story is fantastic in itself in that the way they turned the 
story around [from how NGOs tell it] as it were, in that ‘all mobile 
phone makers were evil’, but actually there was a way in which you 
could make a fair phone. I think, personally, that was brilliant. 
(Director, Delta-Electronics).
Distinctiveness, however, did not always yield support for Fairphone. 
Where an organisation’s norms of practice and external legitimating 
criteria—for instance Mesa’s—did not match Fairphone’s, the organisation 
withdrew support for Fairphone.
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Theme 3: Distributed Agency
Distributed agency refers to the proactive conferral of 
entrepreneurially-valuable material resources and legitimacy to Fairphone’s 
founders by multiple, heterogeneous actors even before the founders had any 
intention to start an enterprise. We identified five types of distributed
agents—corporate actors, the media, the public, government officials, and 
consumers—who provided direct and contingent endowments to Fairphone’s 
founders. These endowments were beyond the immediate control or intention 
of Fairphone’s founders.
Direct endowments (legitimacy, material resources). These 
endowments were made despite the fact that Fairphone’s founders had no 
intention of making a commercial phone. Elite corporations provided funds 
and human capital to Fairphone, furnishing the founders with these vital 
building blocks for new venture success (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & 
Huy, 2007) for free. For instance, one informant lobbied his organisation to 
support Fairphone financially even though the campaign had no product—in 
violation of his company’s purchasing policies.
I said to him [van Abel], ‘no company in the world will give an order 
because we don’t know the price, we don’t know the product...Then I 
went to the legal department. They said, ‘no, we are not going to make 
an order’…And then I made a click with in those days a member of 
the board [of directors]...He said, ‘well, why not? What can be wrong?’ 
Because I told him the storyline...He said, ‘if it goes wrong, you are 
responsible’. (Director, Alpha-Mobile).
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Furthermore, the media and public granted the campaign moral 
legitimacy, which Suchman (1995, p. 579) defined as audiences’ ‘positive 
normative evaluation of an organisation and its activities as “the right thing 
to do”’. Media endorsement of the campaign assumed that a fair smartphone 
would materialise in the future despite the campaign’s lack of a performance 
record and no intention to make a product.
Every mobile phone drips with blood from Congo…Fairphone will 
make a fair smartphone with help from future users. You [reader] can 
help with the campaign, contribute to the design or travel to Congo to 
decide who Fairphone should purchase fair minerals from…Make sure 
that the fair phone comes. (Article Vrij Nederland, 30 April 2011).
The accretion of resources and legitimacy for the Fairphone campaign 
provided impetus to the founders to progress the idea beyond an awareness-
raising campaign.
[W]hen we joined the prize [voted by public]…and we won…We got 
a lot of media attention. Every newspaper in Holland wanted to write 
about Fairphone...But I think the most important thing that happened 
there was that we all got the feeling: ‘this [Fairphone] has to go 
on…We have to do something with this great idea’. (Fairphone co-
founder, Peter van der Mark).
Contingent endowments. These are endowments of material and 
immaterial resources that occurred after the founders had decided to start an 
enterprise, but which involve action by the founders to exploit the
opportunities inherent in the endowments. (See section on ‘effectual decision 
making’.) For instance, in 2013, professionals, such as hackers, marketing 
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experts and experts on Chinese labour law, volunteered their services to 
Fairphone. These volunteers provided a pool from which Fairphone’s 
founders hired new employees, thereby eliminating search costs for the start-
up. The hiring of Fairphone’s production manager in the Chinese factory,
Margaret, illustrates this theme:
Margaret sent us an e-mail from Columbia University [in July 2013]. 
She said, ‘I have seen Fairphone. I love the idea. I would like to work 
for you’...For some reason, there was something about Margaret’s 
application that sparked something…Bas [van Abel] said, ‘you know 
what, I am just going to invite her to China. We will work there for a 
week and if it works out, we will hire her’. (Fairphone co-founder, 
Miquel Ballester).
Fairphone staff exploited unexpected customer attention during the 
over-subscribed crowdfunding appeal. An ex-intern at Fairphone, surprised 
at customer support during the 2013 crowdfunding drive, said of the period,
‘we had people [customers] saying, “I don’t care if it’s a brick with numbers 
drawn on it. I will still buy it because of the mission.” And that was so 
amazing for me coming from a marketing background. Essentially, we were 
selling air for €325’.
Though we do not have direct access to the motives or interests of the 
distributed agents, the data strongly suggests that actors’ normative 
evaluation Fairphone’s stated goal was crucial to the commitment of material 
resources. In a March 2014 survey of 730 customers who had pre-paid €325,
respondents scored Fairphone very highly (4.2/5.0) on the extent to which 
the brand fit their personal beliefs and values and reported that they had not 
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done much rational search and deliberation before pre-ordering Fairphone 
(2.9/5.0). In Table 2-2, we summarise the evidence for the emergent themes.
.
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The pattern of decision making in Fairphone’s history shows the 
founders acting within available means, interacting with an effectual 
network, leveraging contingencies and changing goals to produce an 
emergent outcome that they did not originally intend. We present the 
evidence for effectual decision making in the study.
Acting within means. Even when they had no intention to form an 
enterprise, Fairphone’s founders exploited available means—identity, 
knowledge, networks (Sarasvathy, 2001)—to further the campaign goals. For 
instance, the idea of co-creating a material artifact with the public drew on 
the principles of open design, which were familiar to van Abel in his job as 
industrial designer at Waag. Mesa members of the Fairphone campaign team 
leveraged their networks with journalists and grant agencies in The 
Netherlands to secure coverage for Fairphone and finance respectively.
Interaction with stakeholders. In effectuation, a self-selected group of 
stakeholders contribute to the inchoate venture, shaping it in unexpected 
ways by interaction with the focal entrepreneurial actor (Sarasvathy & Dew, 
2005). As Fairphone team members acted on their means they interacted with 
self-selected stakeholders who were interested in the problem of conflict 
minerals and labour conditions in smartphone factories. Fairphone’s 
founders interacted with this network in the following ways: (1) in face-to-
face meetings and workshops with journalists, government officials, MNO 
executives and civil society members; and (2) indirectly via print, electronic, 
social media and the campaign website.
One important member of the effectual network, the business angel, is 
associated with van Abel’s former employer, Waag. He had heard about 
Page 75
Fairphone through contacts at Waag, who eventually introduced him to van 
Abel in 2012. The angel explained: ‘Of course I had a lot of information of 
what was going on here [Waag]. And a lot of things I discussed and I hear 
because I know them [Waag] very well. So I knew [of Fairphone]’.
Changing means, changing goals. Despite their original intention, 
Fairphone’s founders had by September 2012 decided to found a company. 
This change of goals occurred by interacting with and accumulating 
resources from stakeholders such as the angel investor.
They [Fairphone campaign] were trying to sell a report about the 
terrible situation in Congo…They said, ‘It is very difficult. They [the 
smartphone industry] accept us, but nobody listens’. [I said,] ‘Of 
course, if you really want to change something you must be dangerous 
for them [the industry]…You must be part of the game [the industry].
Not just telling other people what they should do, but showing people 
that it can be different. (Angel investor).
Also, Fairphone founders, by interacting with industry insiders, gained 
knowledge (new means) about how smartphones were actually produced.
For me, being in London in September 2012, I guess, [it was] the first 
time that someone told me, ‘we are going to make a phone’…For me, 
making a mobile phone is like going to Mars, you know, but these guys 
[van Abel, Ballester] found out pretty quickly [in London] that…you 
don’t have to make it [on] your own. (Fairphone co-founder, Peter van 
der Mark)
Leveraging contingencies. Contingencies, which are conceived as 
unexpected events that Fairphone’s founders did not anticipate (Sarasvathy, 
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2001), occur as a result of the agency of actors external to the founding team. 
From the perspective of Fairphone’s founders, these actions (resulting in 
contingent endowments as shown in Table 2-2) were contingencies beyond 
their immediate control. Yet, the founders acted opportunistically, exploiting 
these events to further their immediate ends. For instance, in July 2012, van
Abel and van der Mark could not attend the incubator programme in London 
for three months full-time. They encouraged Ballester, the intern with no ties 
in the Netherlands, to represent Fairphone.
He [Ballester] was a graduation intern before, and he was almost 
shocked that we gave him the opportunity to go to London. But for me 
it was very logical. [I said,] ‘You [Ballester] are the only one. You’re 
available’…and Bas [van Abel] had a family so he could not go full-
time to London. (Fairphone, ex-project manager).
Similarly, Fairphone’s founders enlisted the start-up to participate in 
the conflict mineral initiative and exploited oversubscription of the 
crowdfunding campaign to produce 25,000 phones, instead of the originally-
planned 5,000.
Affordable loss pre-commitments. This refers to advance 
commitments of resources (money, time, expertise) that an actor is willing to 
lose in supporting a new venture (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 
81–84). In our study, members of Fairphone’s effectual network pre-
committed material resources and conferred legitimacy on the emerging 
social venture after the founders decided to make a commercial product. We 
identify three types of actors who made affordable loss pre-commitments to 
Fairphone: (1) investors, such as the venture capitalist firm and the angel 
investor; (2) corporate actors, such as MNOs Alpha-Mobile, Beta-Mobile, 
Page 77
and Gamma-Mobile, who provided industry-specific expertise to Fairphone; 
and (3) cultural influencers, such as noted British activist George Monbiot 
(with over 140,000 Twitter followers), who tweeted in support of Fairphone 
in October 2014: ‘My @Fairphone has arrived. My first smartphone. And, I 
hope, if it’s as easy to repair as claimed, my last’.
To sum then, Fairphone’s founders acted effectually. They acted within 
their means, exploited contingencies provided by a distributed network of 
actors, and, in the process, changed their goals while attracting and 
maintaining an effectual network of supporters. In Table 2-3 we summarise 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s. Action: Founder enlists Fairphone as 
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We motivated this study by attempting to theorise the unlikely emergence of 
an enterprise, whose founders originally had no entrepreneurial intention and 
no capability to produce a complex product. We find that the firm’s founders 
employed discursive and symbolic practices centred on a material artifact to 
frame their solution to a social problem. This triggered the accretion of 
resources and legitimacy, despite the founder’s reluctance to start an 
enterprise. By acting using available means, leveraging contingencies and 
interacting with an effectual network, the founders changed goals and 
decided to found an enterprise. Thereafter, an effectual network provided 
support and legitimacy, leading to the outcome—a thriving social enterprise. 
We develop a model of social enterprise emergence, which summarises our 






























Distributed Agency: The Accretion of Legitimacy and Resources
The assumption that new ventures lack legitimacy is a ‘core premise’ 
among scholars of organisational legitimacy (Überbacher, 2014, p. 668).
Scholars have also reported that new ventures need to be legitimate in order 
to acquire the valuable resources, which they typically lack. Thus, these 
scholars emphasise that entrepreneurs must act purposively to acquire 
legitimacy from their environments in order to overcome resource constraints 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). Our study of Fairphone suggests that an (eventual) entrepreneurial 
actor may also inadvertently acquire legitimacy and entrepreneurially-
valuable resources despite having no entrepreneurial intention and no 
competence to transform inputs into economic outputs that its stakeholders 
want.
Resource availability within perturbed context. Unprecedented 
perturbations such as regulatory changes to an organisational field may 
disrupt the expectations of field members (Sine & David, 2003). These 
disruptions provoke multiple responses from organisational actors intended 
to obviate negative outcomes to their organisations (Haveman & Rao, 1997; 
A. D. Meyer, 1982) leading to a ‘solution bazaar’ (Sine & David, 2003, p. 
188)—a situation wherein organisational decision makers search for 
appropriate solutions and other actors proffer solutions to the decision 
makers’ needs.
Search processes and the solutions devised in the wake of such 
perturbations reflect different underlying ideologies, norms and values 
among heterogeneous actors (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; A. D. Meyer, 1982).
Our research shows, for instance, that after the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
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Act, European civil society organisations proffered solutions that: (1) located 
the cause of the conflict minerals problem in the electronics industry’s 
sourcing practices; and (2) presumed that legal coercion was the most 
effective way of changing those practices. Consumer electronics firms, on 
the other hand, proffered market-based solutions privileging voluntary action 
by the electronics industry, miners and the Congolese government. Thus, 
some solutions provided in the wake of the perturbation furnished potentially 
valuable resources which were conductive to entrepreneurial transformation 
of inputs, such as conflict-free components, into new economic outputs 
(Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine et al., 2005).
Issue framing and resource transference. While a field-wide 
perturbation may increase the availability of entrepreneurially-valuable 
resources, resource holders have to transfer those resources to (eventual) 
entrepreneurs. Social movement scholars have argued that SMOs’ action-
oriented frames are important to the resource transfer process (Benford & 
Snow, 2000). Resource holders are likely to extend material support to an 
SMO if the SMO’s frame is internally consistent, the claim-maker credible, 
and the frame resonates with resource holders’ values and beliefs (Benford 
& Snow, 2000). Consistent with these social movement scholars, we find that
the Fairphone campaign mobilised ideas and symbols that conveyed social 
meaning to audiences. Fairphone’s founders employed a comprehensible 
material artifact—a smartphone—to co-opt the attention of the media, 
NGOs, the public, mobile network operators, and consumer electronics firms 
to the problem of conflict minerals and link those audiences tangibly and 
intuitively to the DRC. Unlike social movement scholarship, however, which 
portrays SMOs’ framing actions as deliberate issue ‘packaging’ intended to 
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achieve utilitarian ends (Benford & Snow, 2000; P. E. Oliver & Johnston, 
2000), we find that Fairphone’s campaign framing was not intended to 
achieve any stable, concrete domain-specific goal.
Heterogeneous, distributed actors then channelled entrepreneurially-
valuable resources towards the firm founders and/or granted moral
legitimacy—essential building blocks for the formation and survival of new 
ventures—to the eventual entrepreneurs because: (1) diverse solutions were 
available within an organisational field in the wake of an regulatory
perturbation. Some of these solutions provided valuable input (resources) for 
a new social venture; and (2) Fairphone’s issue framing resonated with the 
values of audiences, some of whom were responding to the perturbed 
industry context.
Effectual Entrepreneurial Action
By acting within expanded means, interacting with an effectual 
network and leveraging contingencies, some of which occurred due to the 
action of distributed agents, Fairphone’s founders translated the translates the 
endowments of distributed agents (material resources, legitimacy) into a new 
venture. The observed effectuation process highlights an important aspect of 
effectuation: the role of material artifacts. Prior empirical studies of 
effectuation have shown how an effectual network make affordable loss pre-
commitments in the form of idiosyncratic knowledge, networks, and 
resources to the proprietors of some technological artifact (Sarasvathy & 
Kotha, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 246–254).
However unlike in previous studies, we find that the effectual network did 
not commit resources in order to further instrumental ends, but did so because 
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the social venture employed a material artifact that embodied their beliefs 
and moral values (Haveman and Rao, 1997).
The nature of the artifact—being ubiquitous, emotional and tangible—
connected to the lives of audiences and enabled them to make commitments 
that they might not have made otherwise. For members of the effectual 
network, acting on the artifact was a tangible expression of morality 
(Fuentes, 2014). We believe our findings on distributed agency and role of 
material artifacts make interesting contributions to effectuation theory and 
the literature on boundary objects.
Contributions and Future Research Directions
Effectual agency as co-constituted by distributed agency. Effectuation 
theory assumes that agency for a new venture inheres in the entrepreneurial 
actor (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). The theory overlooks
how actors located in the effectuator(s)’ broader environment are implicated 
in the emergence of a successful new venture (Arend et al., 2015). We argue
that agency does not lie solely with the entrepreneur or even the effectual 
network. The entrepreneurial intention and capabilities that are presupposed 
by a purposive enactment of the venture in effectuation theory may also 
originate from multiple actors external to the founding team. We do not 
imply that the effectual entrepreneur passively complies with the dictates of 
these distributed actors to channel their varied aspirations into a final 
commercial artifact. Instead, we suggest that distributed agency co-
constitutes or enables effectual entrepreneurial agency in the creation of a 
new social venture in two ways: (1) by the proactive commitment of 
entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, capabilities and 
contingencies—ingredients necessary for new venture flourishment 
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(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002)—to the (eventual) entrepreneurial actor; and (2) 
by provoking a change in the intentions of a reluctant entrepreneurial actor 
to pursue domain-specific entrepreneurial goals—a necessary condition for 
the emergence of a new venture (Katz & Gartner, 1988).
Social movements, which are characterised by the contestation of 
prominent social practices (Weber et al., 2008), may provide a fertile ground 
for distributed agency because the heterogeneous actors within a social 
movement are collectively interested in addressing some social problem. 
Garud and Karnøe (2003, p. 280) suggested that distributed agency in the 
field of technology entrepreneurship entails ‘the presence of multiple actors 
with different levels of involvement’. It may be that in the context of social 
enterprise formation higher levels of involvement by distributed agents 
involve the transference of material resources to the effectual entrepreneur, 
whereas lower levels of involvement translate to positive legitimacy 
evaluations.
Material artifacts in effectuation theory. Material artifacts are central 
to effectuation theory. For instance, Sarasvathy’s (2001) seminal paper was 
based on experiments in which expert entrepreneurs devised ways to market 
an imaginary entrepreneurial game (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 19–40). Similarly, 
the dynamic model of effectuation was induced from a study of an industry 
artifact, RFID [Radio Frequency Identification Technology] (Sarasvathy & 
Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 240–254). Yet, the role of the artifact in 
convening the effectual network, which is crucial to the emergence of new 
firms (Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 105–109), has not been explicated.
Material artifacts may influence the affective ways in which the 
effectual network is assembled. Social entrepreneurs, like their commercial 
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counterparts, perform meaning work; they produce and mobilise ideas and 
meaning to make their ventures comprehensible to target audiences. They 
may do this by ‘story-telling’ (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, Jennings, 
& Jennings, 2007) or by other symbolic actions calculated to increase 
legitimacy with key resource holders (Zott & Huy, 2007). This meaning work 
involves not only discursive elements (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004),
but also the socio-material since various social groups attribute functional 
and symbolic attributes to material artifacts (Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004; 
Shavitt, 1990). Thus, members of an effectual network centred on the 
creation of a material artifact make inferences about the artifact based on 
their shared interpretations of the artifact (Bijker, 1987; Pratt & Rafaeli, 
1997; Zott & Huy, 2007).
The symbolic dimension may be more salient in the case of social 
enterprises predicated on addressing a morally-charged social problem.
Actors may attempt to infuse moral values into the inchoate social enterprise, 
the purveyor of the artifact, more than might be the case in commercial 
enterprises introducing risky technological innovations (Fourcade & Healy, 
2007). Thus, members of the effectual network self-select and pre-commit 
resources to the social enterprise not because they expect immediate 
calculative benefits from the artifact, but because the artifact embodies and 
symbolises their beliefs and values.
Boundary objects in non-hierarchical interactions. Boundary objects 
are artifacts that are agreed and shared between communities of practice. 
They are ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites’. (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). In our study, a material 
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artifact, a fair smartphone, served as a boundary object. The artifact was not 
only tangible and ubiquitous in the developed world, but also connected users
through a complex supply chain to parts of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, 
members of various social domains attributed multiple meanings to the 
artifact. For consumer electronics firms and government actors, the 
smartphone provided a concrete demonstration of progress on conflict 
mineral initiatives. For consumers, the smartphone was a way to express their 
beliefs in fairness and ethical consumption. For hackers, the phone provided 
an alternative to the closed designs of dominant smartphone producers. In 
other words, the material artifact occupied different social worlds.
In the organisational literature, boundary objects such as project 
timelines and engineering drawings have been invoked to explain inter-
disciplinary collaboration mostly within the context of a single organisational 
hierarchy (Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002). We argue that the concept of 
boundary objects might be extended to cover interactions of loosely-coupled 
actors located in multiple domains that are not bounded within an 
organisational hierarchy and whose inhabitants have no mutual relations of
dependence. Such objects, as Nicolini et al. (2012, p. 614) observed have a 
‘deep emotional holding power’ and are potent enough to mediate 
interactions and trigger commitment of resources and expression of values 
by these dispersed actors.
Implications for practice. Our findings show that to facilitate the 
distributed accretion of resources and legitimacy, social entrepreneurs could 
embed themselves in communities of practice (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 
2006) that coalesce around addressing a social problem. Even if they are 
embedded in communities of practice, social entrepreneurs still need to retain 
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their distinctive identities in order to attract resources (Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001; Van de Ven, 1993). Our findings imply that social entrepreneurs could 
incorporate a comprehensible material artifact into their entrepreneurial 
narratives and carefully position their enterprises’ solution as cognate with, 
but distinct from extant product or service categories in order to attract 
resources.
Effectual entrepreneurial action is not always possible, or even 
desirable; it is applicable in environments characterised by uncertainty
(Arend et al., 2015; Sarasvathy, 2001). Our findings also suggest that social 
entrepreneurs need capabilities to assess which contributions are critical
inputs to the effectuation process and to understand how they may be 
successfully accumulated and exploited. To this end, social entrepreneurs 
may seek to balance their resource-seeking attempts between proactively 
pursuing contributions and releasing time to act upon contributions and 
contingencies offered by actors affiliated with those communities of practice.
Future research. Our study raises several questions for future inquiry. 
First, future research could examine how entrepreneurial decision making 
patterns change in the life of a social enterprise. Read and Sarasvathy (2005)
suggested that successful enterprises are more likely to have begun by 
effectual entrepreneurial action and grown through causal entrepreneurial 
action as the organisations endure over time. Scholars could explore this 
prediction using in-depth longitudinal multiple case study designs 
(McMullen & Dimov, 2013) to examine decision making patterns in social 
enterprises that originally emerged through effectual action.
Second, while distributed agency enables effectual action in the early 
phases of the enterprise how does the nature of distributed agency change as 
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the enterprise grows? If as the enterprise grows and decision making 
processes become more causal, does the heterogeneity and motives of the 
previously distributed agents change? Do they, for instance, make calculative 
contributions to the enterprise, instead of proactive, value-driven 
contributions?
Third, though scholars have begun to appreciate the importance of 
material artifacts in the field of organisation studies (e.g., Nicolini et al., 
2012; Yakura, 2002), little attention has been paid to the role of objects in
social entrepreneurship. How might the nature of material artifacts influence 
effectual commitment in social entrepreneurship? In our study, there was 
broad agreement on the functional as well as the symbolic dimensions of the 
artifact. What if Fairphone’s founders had campaigned using another 
material artifact, say an electric toaster? If there is low agreement on either 
functional or symbolic dimensions, would the effectual network commit 
resources in similar ways? We welcome scholarship investigating the role of 
material artifacts in social entrepreneurship within loosely-coupled 
collectives (Haugh, 2007; Montgomery et al., 2012).
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite its contributions, our study has at least two limitations. First, 
we relied principally on interviews to reconstruct Fairphone’s story before 
October 2013. We were careful to eliminate bias by developing a thick 
description of the case, triangulating informant reports using multiple 
independent data sources, seeking informant validation of the emerging 
analysis and by seeking discrepant information from informants who were 
critical of Fairphone. Yet, we still feel residual concern that bias was not 
completely eliminated. Second, Fairphone is but one organisation. It 
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emerged within a perturbed industry context in an economically-advanced 
part of the world. While our study offers rich insights into social enterprise 
emergence, we do not know with certainty whether our empirical findings 
are transferrable to other settings. However, recent scholarship at the nexus 
of social movements and organisation theory may provide clues on the 
transferability of our findings.
This body of scholarship suggests that social movements are 
implicated in the formation of new organisational forms and new enterprises 
(Hiatt et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2000; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Sine & 
David, 2003; Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001; 
Weber et al., 2008). Studies in this emerging stream of literature are typically 
large N studies that identify and explain the historical formation of a new 
organisational form or new class of enterprises based on variance in the 
presence and contestation activities of social movement organisations. While 
insightful, these studies do not present fine-grained process accounts of how 
new organisational forms or new enterprises emerge in the wake of social 
movement contestation. We conjecture that such a fine-grained account of 
enterprise formation in the wake of social movement activities, such as the 
temperance movement in the U.S. (Hiatt et al., 2009) or the grass-fed beef 
movement (Weber et al., 2008), will reveal effectual entrepreneurial decision 
making processes and distributed agency to be important precursors of 
enterprise formation, as we have observed in the Fairphone case (see Figure 
2-1).
Social entrepreneurship scholars have often depicted social 
entrepreneurs as visionary individuals who drive social change by 
innovatively combining resources (Dacin et al., 2011; Mair & Martí, 2006).
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We highlight social enterprise emergence as driven by distributed agents who 
provide the impetus to eventual effectual entrepreneurs. An effectual 
network pre-commits resources to the emerging social enterprise not based 
on instrumental exchange calculations, but because the artifact served as a 
boundary object, accessible to multiple social worlds and as embodying the 
moral values of network members.
Due to changing public expenditure priorities, social enterprises are 
being called upon to address social problems (Haugh, 2007; Santos, 2012).
Social enterprises need to be innovative as they reconfigure resources into 
new organisations, products and services to address these social problems as 
well as commercially-viable in order to have sustainable impact. These are 
formidable challenges for social entrepreneurs operating in highly-
competitive market environments. Yet, in the face of human suffering, social 
enterprises may find themselves surrounded by a groundswell of supporters 





CHAPTER 3 : CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PRACTICE IN THE MNE AS SYNCHRONOUS 
ACQUIESCENCE AND MANIPULATION: THE HUAWEI
CASE
ABSTRACT
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have adopted discretionary corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives that purportedly go beyond the 
immediate profit maximisation goals of the firm to address broader social, 
environmental and economic problems. The CSR literature has portrayed 
MNEs’ CSR practices as singular corporation-wide legitimacy-seeking 
responses to acquiesce, compromise with, or avoid the demands of influential
institutional constituents. Scholars have ignored how various subunits of an 
MNE may simultaneously adopt CSR practices and discursively justify those 
practices in multiple strategic responses to the demands of salient local 
institutional constituents—an approach to legitimacy management that has 
been labelled a paradox approach (Scherer et al., 2013). Based on the results 
of a case study of CSR practices and public justifications of Chinese MNE, 
Huawei, I show how a CSR programme that is developed in one country to 
acquiesce to local institutional demands is discursively justified by another 
subunit of the MNE to constituents geographically removed from the site of 
those practices. I suggest that the paradox approach to legitimacy 
management CSR may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed in the 
literature if the MNE’s cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and 
institutional pressure in another weak.
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Keywords: Common worlds; corporate social responsibility (CSR);
multinational enterprise (MNE); discursive justification; paradox approach 
to legitimacy; corporate response to institutional pressure.
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In the past two decades, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have adopted 
discretionary corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in response to 
pressure from governments, civil society groups and host communities to 
address economic, social and environmental problems (Flanagan & 
Whiteman, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001; 
Wheeler et al., 2002). Existing research on MNEs’ CSR practices emphasises 
that MNEs’ implement CSR programmes as single legitimacy-seeking 
responses to acquiesce, comply with or avoid the demands of influential 
institutional actors (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; Spar & La Mure, 
2003; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013).
Yet, CSR practices by MNEs need not simply instantiate single
corporation-wide responses to institutional demands. MNEs consists of 
geographically-dispersed, goal-disparate subunits ensconced in multiple, 
fragmented institutional environments (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova 
& Zaheer, 1999; Pache & Santos, 2010). Subunits of the MNE have diverse
legitimation needs. Ttherefore, for instance, they may employ CSR practices
to simultaneously conform with and resist institutional demands as they seek
legitimacy with locally-salient institutional actors (Surroca et al., 2013). This 
approach to CSR-legitimacy management in MNEs, which Scherer et al. 
(2013) label a paradox approach, has not been empirically examined in the 
CSR literature (Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014; Scherer et al., 2013).
Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the institutional 
environments that MNEs navigate, corporations that adopt a paradox 
approach to managing legitimacy using CSR practices may be more 
successful in the long term than those that do not (Scherer et al., 2013).
Therefore, empirical research illuminating how MNEs employ their CSR 
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practices in a paradox approach to legitimacy is a vital area of interest to CSR 
and international business (IB) scholars.
The starting point for an empirical examination of a paradox approach 
to CSR-legitimacy management should include analysis of organisational 
action as well as discursive aspects of legitimation (Vaara and Tienari, 2008; 
Geppert, 2003) because to gain legitimacy MNE actors not only align 
organisational practices with institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991), but 
also justify their actions to external institutional constituents. My research 
question is thus: in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy management,
how does public discursive justification of CSR practices relate to strategic 
response across MNE subunits?
I present the findings of a case study of the CSR practices of the 
Chinese MNE Huawei. Based on field work in Kenya and applying Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s (2006) theory of justification, I examine the actual CSR 
practices by Huawei’s Kenyan subsidiary and public discursive justification 
of those practices by Huawei actors. I find that the company’s flagship CSR 
initiative, which was adopted by Huawei Kenya to reduce local recruitment 
costs and to acquiesce to local institutional pressure, was publicly justified to 
influence perceptions of non-Kenyan constituents. Specifically, Huawei 
actors justified these practices by principally appealing to notions of 
technical efficiency, certified professionalism, competition and economic 
value while ignoring demands for social action in other domains such as 
conflict minerals and factory conditions. Moreover, the justification scheme 
was consistent regardless of the intended audience.
These findings contribute to scholarship on the CSR practices of 
MNEs, an area of inquiry that remains understudied (Doh & Lucea, 2013; 
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Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009), in two 
ways. First, employing multiple response strategies as presupposed in a 
paradox approach may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed (Scherer et 
al., 2013) if the cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and institutional 
pressure in another weak.
Second, studies have shown that the higher the external pressure for 
social action from entrenched, influential and pervasive elements of the 
institutional environment the more likely that a corporation’s externally-
directed CSR rhetoric will not match actual practice (Weaver et al., 1999).
The study suggests that an MNE’s justificatory statements for CSR practices
may be coherent (and match practice), regardless of the audience if the 
MNE’s industry is perceived to be benign to society, if there is weak 
international institutional pressure, and if there is fit between CSR practices
and product market strategy in the host country.
This paper is structured as follows. First, I present the theoretical 
context for the study by reviewing the literature on CSR in the MNE using 
Oliver’s (1991) organisational response framework and Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (2006) theory of justification. Next, I describe the method used 
in this paper. I report the findings by presenting an overview of Huawei in 
Kenya, the company’s CSR initiative and the public justification used by 
Huawei actors. Thereafter, I discuss the implications of my findings and 
conclude with directions for future research.
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THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Organisational Response to Institutional Pressure
Organisations are ensconced in and respond to pressure from their 
institutional environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; C. Oliver, 1991; Pache 
& Santos, 2010). In an influential article, Oliver (1991) developed an 
exhaustive typology of organisational response to institutional pressure. 
These are as follows (in increasing order of resistance): (1) Acquiescence—
Refers to an organisation’s complete accession to the demands of 
institutional constituents; (2) Compromise—In this response, organisations 
attempt to, at least partially, meet the demands of all institutional 
constituents. Compromise includes conforming minimally to institutional 
demands and bargaining with institutional actors in order to exact 
concessions; (3) Avoidance—This is a strategic response wherein the 
organisation does not conform to institutional demands, but masks non-
conformity behind a façade of symbolic compliance, protecting core 
activities from scrutiny by external actors, or escapes altogether exiting the 
institutional domain within which the pressure is being exerted; (4) 
Defiance—Refers to an active form of resistance to institutional demands. 
Organisations exercise defiance by ignoring institutional demands or 
explicitly challenging institutional rules and values; and (5) Manipulation—
Refers to purposeful attempts by the organisation to influence institutional 
constituents by lobbying and control of influential institutional constituents 
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In the remainder of this literature review, I employ Oliver’s (1991)
typology as a lens to examine existing scholarship on the CSR of MNEs.
MNEs’ Corporate Social Practices as Response to Institutional Pressure
In the past two decades, institutional actors, such as governments 
(Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003), civil society groups 
(Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Spar & La Mure, 2003), and host communities 
(Eweje, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2002), have pressured MNEs to alleviate 
economic, social and environmental problems in their operating 
environments. MNEs have responded by enacting discretionary corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programmes that purportedly address those
problems beyond the immediate profit maximisation goals of the firm 
(Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Tan & Wang, 2011). MNEs’ CSR practices
include formalised codes of ethics for conducting business around the world 
(Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001), philanthropic 
contributions (Brammer et al., 2009; Muller & Whiteman, 2015), healthcare 
programmes for underpriveleged communities (Eweje, 2006), ecological 
restoration (Claasen & Roloff, 2012), and the adoption of industry self-
regulation standards (Christmann & Taylor, 2002).
Despite the proliferation of MNEs’ corporate social programmes, these 
practices remain an understudied phenomenon (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Gugler 
& Shi, 2009; Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006). Addressing this 
gap is of scholarly interest for at least two reasons. First, IB scholars have 
theorised that the practice of CSR by MNE subsidiaries leads to increased 
legitimacy for MNE subsidiaries within the host country (Gardberg & 
Fombrun, 2006; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008). Yet, this 
link has not been widely empirically demonstrated (Claasen & Roloff, 2012; 
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Eweje, 2006). Empirical explication of this oft-theorised link between CSR 
practices and legitimacy will enable researchers understand the conditions 
under which social action results in increased legitimacy.
Second, as they attempt to attain legitimacy, MNEs are likely to 
employ action as well as discursive practices (Überbacher, 2014). However, 
existing research has focused on MNEs’ CSR actions, but not on discursive 
aspects of legitimacy attainment (Castelló & Galang, 2014). Thus, studying 
the actions and discursive elements of MNEs’ CSR responses will enable 
researchers to better understand the content of the strategic repertoires that 
MNEs employ as they seek legitimacy from their environments.
Predominant Conception—CSR practice as single general response 
strategy. Broadly speaking, scholarship on CSR by MNEs emphasises how 
MNEs’ CSR practices correspond to a single response strategy (of the five 
summarised in the preceding section). In a large body of work, it is assumed 
or implied that MNEs enact CSR programmes to acquiesce to the demands 
of institutional actors (J. L. Campbell, 2007; Eweje, 2006; Flanagan & 
Whiteman, 2007; Greening & Gray, 1994; Matten & Moon, 2008; Muller & 
Whiteman, 2015; Muller & Kolk, 2010; Spar & La Mure, 2003). Thus, for 
instance, Whiteman and Flangan (2007) examine the negotiation strategy 
deployed by the Brazilian government to successfully pressure 
pharmaceutical companies into securing access to low-cost HIV medication. 
Similarly, Spar and La Mure (2003) report how a coalition of NGOs 
pressured Adidas, Sara Lee and Levi Strauss to withdraw from Burma due to 
the poor human rights record of the country’s ruling junta.
A smaller body of work highlights how MNEs’ CSR practices
instantiate strategies of compromise with (e.g., Brammer et al., 2009; Meznar 
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& Nigh, 1995), and avoidance of institutional demands (e.g., Crilly, Zollo, 
& Hansen, 2012; David et al., 2007; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006; Surroca et 
al., 2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). For instance, Brammer et al. (2009) 
find that charitable contribution by firms in a sample of UK MNEs was 
positively related to the firm’s presence in at least one of 27 ‘countries of 
concern’, which are characterised by ‘lack of political rights and/or civil 
liberties’ (2009, p. 572). The MNEs, they theorised, made charitable 
contributions to offset negative impressions among home country 
constituents that may have arisen due to the firm’s presence in those 
countries.
Surroca et al.’s (2013) study of MNEs’ response to home country 
institutional demands for CSR illustrates strategies of avoidance. The authors 
show that in response to increased home country demands for social 
responsibility, MNEs across 22 countries exploited their organisational 
structures to transfer socially-irresponsible practices from headquarters to 
overseas subsidiaries while maintaining the appearance of social 
responsibility to home country audiences. Comparatively little empirical 
work has examined how MNEs employ their CSR practices as response 
strategies of defiance and manipulation of the institutional context (Pedersen 
& Gwozdz, 2014; Whiteman & Cooper, in press).
There are notable exceptions to the assumption that MNEs enact CSR 
as a single response strategy. In their study of Shell’s response to pressure 
from European activist groups and Ogoni communities in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta, Wheeler et al. (2002) show that the company defied pressure by 
initially challenging the legitimacy of the Ogoni and then attempted to 
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manipulate the environment in Nigeria by co-opting reputable local 
academics in its CSR communication.
A Gap in the Literature—Paradox approach to CSR in the MNE.
MNEs are not unitary, integrated entitites taking univocal actions in response 
to their external contexts. Instead, MNEs consist of geographically-
dispersed, goal-disparate subunits ensconced in multiple, fragmented 
institutional environments (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Pache & Santos, 2010). Actors, such as NGOs and governments, do 
not neccesarily cooperate across institutional boundaries to pressure MNE 
subunits in similar ways across the world (Ghemawat, 2007; Wijen & Van 
Tulder, 2011). Thus, the legitimation needs of an MNE’s subunits may 
markedly differ and they may enact different strategic responses to meet local 
legitimation needs (Surroca et al., 2013). Drawing on Oliver’s (1991)
typology and broader resource-based and institutional perspectives, Scherer 
et al. (2013) characterise this approach to CSR in the MNE as a paradox 
approach.
In the paradox approach, various MNE subunits do not choose a single 
response as implied by much of the empirical literature on CSR practices by 
MNEs. One subunit of the MNE may enact CSR to, for instance, acquiesce 
to institutional demands in its host country, whereas another subunit may 
develop CSR practices to defy similar demands in its host country (Scherer 
et al., 2013). The paradox approach to CSR in the MNE has not been 
empirically examined in the literature (Scherer et al., 2013). Given the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the institutional environments that MNEs 
navigate, corporations that adopt a paradox approach to managing legitimacy 
using CSR practices may be more successful in the long term than those that 
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do not. Therefore, empirical research illuminating how MNEs employ their 
CSR practices in a paradox approach to legitimacy is a vital area of interest 
to CSR and international business (IB) scholars. The present study addresses 
this gap in the literature.
The starting point for my study is that any empirical explication of the 
paradox approach should include: (1) the examination of actual 
organisational CSR action—corresponding to more passive response 
strategies (C. Oliver, 1991); and (2) the discursive aspects of CSR practices,
i.e. speech and textual acts which language is employed to influence social 
action (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)—corresponding to subunits’ defiance 
or active manipulation of institutional demands (C. Oliver, 1991).
I make this assumption for two reasons. First, there is an abundant 
literature examining the CSR communication of domestic corporations (e.g., 
Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Livesey & Kearins, 2002; Maignan & 
Ralston, 2002; Morhardt, 2010; Tregidga, Milne, & Kearins, 2014). These 
studies show that domestic firms employ communication channels to 
promote their interests and manage external impressions of internal 
organisational reality.
Second, CSR remains an ill-defined concept among the publics who 
grant legitimacy to MNEs, i.e. industry peers, civil society organisations, 
governments and consumers (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 2008).
Given this conceptual ambiguity, MNE decision makers may instrumentally 
deploy CSR practices as ‘corporate spin’ to manipulate and defy 
institutitional constituents (Banerjee, 2008; Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009).
Though limited, existing research on CSR in the MNE has focused 
more on organisational action than on discourse (Castelló & Galang, 2014).
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Indeed, there is a paucity of research on the discursive processes that MNEs 
use to establish legitimacy for their actions (Geppert, 2003; Kostova et al., 
2008; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Nevertheless, there is a body of empirical 
work that examines the CSR/sustainability communications of MNEs via 
annual sustainability/CSR reports (Jose & Lee, 2007; e.g., Kolk, 2003; 
Rondinelli & Berry, 2000). These studies do not systematically examine how 
MNE subunits use CSR to influence gain legitimacy; they are mainly 
taxonomic in character. In a review of 53 such studies, Morhardt (2010, p. 
437) states, ‘the main purpose of most of these studies is simply 
documentation of the types and quantity of sustainability reporting done by 
various subsets of companies at the time of the study’.
In order to explicate the discursive processes by which an MNE may 
employ CSR in a paradox approach, I turn to a theory of justification 
developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006).
On Justification: Boltanski and Thévenot’s Common Worlds Theory
How do social actors, such as MNEs, influence external constituents in 
their environments to reach agreements without resorting to violence? Luc 
Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot developed a theory to address that question
in their seminal work On Justification: The Economics of Worth. Drawing 
on their previous empirical work and an analysis of classic works of political 
philosophy (St. Augustine’s City of God, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s 
Politics, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s Social 
Contract, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and Henri de Saint-Simon’s 
Système Industriel), Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) propose that actors’ 
public justificatory accounts are made in reference to six mutually-exclusive
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bases for justification or conceptions of the common good, which they call 
concrete ‘orders of worth’6 or common worlds. They are as follows.
Inspired world. This is the world of creativity and imagination. In this 
world, what is worthy is original, passionate, inexpressible, emergent, and 
spontaneous. Actors are unworthy if they deliberately seek public 
approbation or behave in routinised ways.
Domestic world. This is the domain of tradition and place. In this 
world, worth is assigned based on people’s hierarchical position in a chain of 
personal dependencies. Actors are unworthy if they do not ‘stay in their 
place’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 176). Justifications in this domain 
invoke notions of locality as elements of the common good. In Thévenot et 
al’s (2000) study of a public dispute over the construction of a road linking 
France and Spain through a picturesque valley in the south of France, 
opponents of the project justified their position by appealing to the domestic 
world: they argued that they wanted to ‘protect the region’s treasured culture 
and heritage…of which the valley’s landscape is a significant part’ (2000, p. 
249).
World of fame. In this world, what is most valued is renown—positive 
recognition for distinguishing oneself in the opinion of the public. Public 
knowledge in this world determines the worth of a cause. Consequently, 
actors are unworthy if they do not command public attention or are banal in 
the eyes of the public.
Civic world. In this world, those who are granted higher states of worth 
are ‘not human persons but rather the collective beings that they constitute 
6 Following Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), I use the terms common world and ‘orders 
of worth’ interchangeably. 
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by meeting together’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 185). Actors are 
considered worthy if they work to promote collective welfare by achieving 
unity, equality, solidarity. The civic world counters the personal 
dependencies on which the domestic world is based and public opinion that 
is the basis of the world of fame (Jagd, 2011).
Industrial world. What is most valued in this world is efficiency and 
utility. The industrial world is the world of technological artifacts, the 
scientific method, and the certified professional. Actors are unworthy if they
produce nothing useful, unqualified or inefficient while artifacts are 
unworthy if they are subjective (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, pp. 159–211).
Market world. In this world, actors are worthy if they own desirable 
objects. They are assessed by success in competing in the market place. In 
Thévenot et al’s (2000) study of disputes over infrastructure projects, 
disputants over the proposed construction of a dam in a pristine region of 
California invoked the market world to justify their positions, but arrived at 
different conclusions: opponents labelled the dam as ‘economically 
unfeasible’, while proponents claimed that the project was the ‘cheapest’ way 
to meet the energy demand of local residents (2000, p. 242).
The market world, according to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), should
not to be confused with the industrial world. In the market world, worth is 
based on the economic value of goods and services (and short-term profits) 
in a competitive market whereas in the industrial world, worth is valued 
based on technical efficiency, professional planning and expertise (Thévenot 
et al., 2000, p. 240).
Summarising the significance of Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory, 
Cloutier and Langley (2013, pp. 366–367) state that it ‘effectively represents 
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a repertoire or a toolkit of cognitive, symbolic, and material elements that 
actors can actively draw upon to justify their actions and beliefs or to 
convince others as to what beliefs or actions are appropriate in a given 
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The common world model was developed for application in 
contentious situations (Thévenot et al., 2000, pp. 229–230). Thus, 
unsurprisingly, management researchers have applied the model to explicate 
the justifications of actors involved in public disputes (McInerney, 2008; 
Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011; Ramirez, 2013). Patriotta et al (2011)
employed the model to analyse how the media, environmental NGOs and a 
utility company engaged with discourses and objects to maintain the 
legitimacy of institutions that were relevant to their activity in the wake of 
public debate about the legitimacy of nuclear power in Germany.
However, since public justification need not occur only within 
disputes, other scholars have applied Boltanski and Thévenot’s model to non-
conflictual situations (Boivin & Roch, 2006; Fronda & Moriceau, 2008; 
Rousselière & Vézina, 2009). Rousselière and Vézina (2009) apply the 
model in a textual analysis of activity reports of a Canadian financial 
cooperative to explicate the process of identity formation within the bank. 
Boivin and Roch (2006) analyse Apple’s public communications in the 
period 1985–1995 to examine executives’ justifications for Apple’s failure 
to license its Mac operating system through alliances. Following the scholars 
cited above, I apply Boltanski and Thévenot’s model in a non-conflictual 
situation to analyse an MNE’s justification scheme across different 
institutional contexts and subunits.
So far I have argued that scholars have emphasised how MNEs (and 
their subunits) adopt CSR initiatives as single corporate-wide strategies of 
acquiescence, compromise and avoidance of institutional demands (C. 
Oliver, 1991), but have ignored ways in which MNE subunits employ CSR
simultaneously as multiple approaches to achieving legitimacy in response 
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to institutional demands—the paradox approach (Scherer et al., 2013). I have 
also argued that an empirical examination of the paradox approach should 
include the analysis of actual CSR actions as well as discursive process by 
which the subunits of an MNE justify those CSR programmes. My research 
question then is as follows: in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy 
management, how does public discursive justification of CSR practices relate 
to strategic response across MNE subunits?
In the next section, I describe the empirical case on which the study is 
based: Huawei Technologies’ CSR practices in Kenya.
METHODS
The selected case was part of a broader research project comparing the CSR 
initiatives of two sets of MNE subunits operating in a developing country.
The first set of MNE subsidiaries had parent companies that originated in 
economically-developed countries—or ‘high-CSR’ environments (Muller & 
Kolk, 2010, p. 2)—whereas the second set of MNE subsidiaries had parent 
companies originating in another developing country—or ‘low-CSR’ 
contexts (Muller & Kolk, 2010, p. 2). The cases were selected so that all 
companies operated in a relatively new industry, the information and 
communication technology (ICT), industry, that had not yet developed strong 
agreed-upon ‘preconscious or taken-for-granted rules’ (C. Oliver, 1991, p. 
152) for corporate social action within the host country but which have 
nevertheless was subject to pressure for CSR.
Huawei in Kenya: A Brief Overview
With a population of about 42 million spread over an area 
approximately equal to France’s, Kenya is a low-income country located in 
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east Africa. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya has 
enjoyed a relatively stable political system. Between 2002 and 2012, Kenya’s 
economy grew by an unprecedented average annual rate of 5%. The ICT 
sector has played an important role in that growth: export of technology-
related services increased from $16 million in 2002 to $360 million in 2010. 
Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, now attracts Western venture capitalists, 
multinational ICT companies such as Google, and academic institutions such 
as Columbia University (The Economist, 2013b). Table 3-3 summarises key 
social and economic data about Kenya.
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Huawei began operations in Kenya in 1998. The company is perhaps 
China’s best-known MNE (The Economist, 2012a) and the world’s largest 
telecommunication equipment provider with 2014 revenues of $46.5billion 
and 170,000 employees (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2015a, 
pp.10, 46). Huawei’s entry into Kenya coincided with a boom in mobile 
telephony in the country (The Economist, 2013b). As mobile network 
operators (MNOs) rapidly expanded their networks in the 2000s to keep pace 
with demand, Huawei positioned itself as a low-cost alternative to its 
Western rivals Alcatel Lucent, Nokia Siemens Networks and Ericsson 
(Bettuzzi & Karjalainen, 2010, p. 11; Luo, Cacchione, Junkunc, & Lu, 2011)
for supply of telecommunication products and services to the MNOs.
Huawei Kenya also benefited from the Chinese government’s 
diplomatic and economic initiatives in Africa. In 2000, the Chinese 
government launched the Forum on China-Africa Collaboration (FOCAC) 
under which it offers concessional loans to African governments. These loans 
are tied to purchases of Chinese goods and services (Brautigam, 2009, pp. 
77, 87, 114–115). Between 2007 and 2012, Kenya’s government secured 
concessional loans under FOCAC to build the country’s national fibre optic 
‘backbone’—the infrastructure through which Kenyans access the internet—
and awarded the contract for its construction to Huawei (Bettuzzi & 
Karjalainen, 2010, p. 10).
Data Collection
Though corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined in many ways 
in the literature (Garriga & Melé, 2004), I did not adopt an apriori definition 
of CSR. Instead, following an approach that has been used in the CSR 
literature (cf. Barnett & Lee, 2012; Claasen & Roloff, 2012), I relied on the 
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perceptions of Huawei actors and government stakeholders to identify the 
organisation’s CSR practices. To answer the research question, I collected 
data using interviews and publicly-available documents, such as 
sustainability reports and newspaper articles about Huawei’s CSR initiative.
Interviews. Through a colleague, who had contacts in Huawei, I 
secured in February 2013 a teleconference interview in Amsterdam with 
Huawei’s global CSR managers. (The managers were located in Shenzhen, 
China and Nairobi, Kenya.) Thereafter, I employed snowballing techniques 
(Patton, 2001, p. 237) to recruit informants. I asked Huawei managers whom 
I had interviewed in February 2013 to introduce me to people who were 
familiar with Huawei’s CSR programme. For a total of six weeks in 2013 
(three weeks in April 2013, three weeks in October 2013), I travelled to 
Nairobi to interview Huawei managers, beneficiaries and government 
stakeholders. I also contacted potential informants such as technology 
journalists and beneficiaries mentioned in the press coverage of the CSR 
initiatives. In total, I conducted interviews with 22 informants representing 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interview protocols were structured as follows: informants’ 
biographical information; their relationship to Huawei and the company’s 
CSR initiative in Kenya; their experience of the programmes; and an open-
ended section in which interviewees discussed their impressions of Huawei, 
its motives for the CSR programme, and any other information that they 
thought relevant to understanding Huawei’s programme. Interviews lasted 
on average 70 minutes. All interviews were recorded. I made detailed 
electronic and hand-written contact summary sheets (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, pp. 51–54) after each interview noting the themes and my impressions 
of the interview. 7
I validated informant reports of Huawei’s history and CSR practices in 
Kenya during interviews in 2013. I sent the transcripts to all three Huawei 
managers interviewed. They, in turn, read and validated the transcript. The 
Huawei managers I interviewed were public relations (PR) specialists. I 
assumed that they wanted to project a socially-desirable image of the 
corporation (Huber & Power, 1985). Therefore, I took care to corroborate 
their accounts of Huawei’s CSR programmes by asking non-Huawei 
informants in Nairobi about the details of the CSR programme.
In addition to conducting formal interviews, I had lengthy informal 
conversations with a Huawei informant in Nairobi during which I obtained 
‘backstage’ information (Goffman, 1956, p. 69) about how the company’s 
CSR initiative was actually run.
7 In mid-December 2013, my workbag containing my hard disc and laptop—
containing the interview data—was stolen. I lost electronic data for 7 of 22 
interviewees. Hence, I relied on my handwritten summaries of these interviews. All 
remaining electronically-recorded interviews were transcribed.
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Publicly-available documents. I collected publicly-available 
documents for two purposes: (1) to triangulate interview reports about 
Huawei’s CSR programme, and (2) as data sources for content analysing the 
company’s public justifications of its CSR programme.
The sampling unit for content analysis—those documents that are 
included in the analysis (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 98)—are public documents 
in which actors justified Huawei’s flagship social initiative, the ‘Telecom 
Seeds for the Future’. These documents include newspapers (Kenyan and 
international), company websites, and CSR/sustainability reports. Using the 
Lexis Nexis database, I searched for all newspapers in English that appeared 
in the period 2010–2015 containing the following terms: ‘Huawei’ and 
‘Telecom Seeds’. The search yielded 83 newspaper and newswire articles. I 
deleted duplicate articles, i.e., those articles with the same number of words, 
same titles and same date of publication, leaving a total of 51 articles. (I 
cross-checked the completeness of the LexisNexis search by performing a 
Google search for news articles featuring the phrase ‘Telecom Seeds’ and 
‘Huawei’. The search yielded 15 articles which were all included in the 
LexisNexis search.)
I also included two press statements published on Huawei’s websites, 
seven annual CSR/sustainability reports, an article from Huawei’s internal 
staff magazine and a slide deck about the company’s CSR programmes that 
I had received from Huawei’s managers. In total, therefore, I used 62 
documents in the analysis.
Analysis
This phase of the study was conducted in two steps. First, using 
interviews and documentary data, I wrote a 50-page report detailing 
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Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya and the industry/institutional context in 
which the company operates. I did this for two reasons: (1) to produce an 
accurate account (Patton, 2001, pp. 559–561) of Huawei’s CSR practices; 
and (2) to articulate ‘intimate familiarity’ with the phenomenon under study 
(Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006, pp. 15–16).
Second, I established the common worlds (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006) used to justify the company’s CSR practices to Kenyan and non-
Kenyan audiences. I did this by deductive content analysis (Potter & Levine-
Donnerstein, 1999), a method which assumes that the frequency of use of a
conceptual category—in this study, the common worlds—indicates users’
emphasis on the idea embodied in the category (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 59).
I read all 62 documents to ‘get a sense of the whole’ document (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005, p. 1287). Then, I coded the documents according to date of 
publication, author and location of the author—‘Kenyan’ (articles written by 
Kenyan news organisations) or ‘international’ (documents written by non-
Kenyans). In total, 49 documents were coded as ‘international’ and 13 as 
‘Kenyan’.
I chose the recording unit for content analysis, defined as ‘the specific 
segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given [conceptual] 
category’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 100), to be sentences in which actors 
justified Huawei’s CSR programme. In deductive coding, assigning these 
recording units to conceptual categories is essentially a task of pattern 
matching (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). A major challenge in 
pattern-matching categories from Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) theory is 
that real-life justifications rarely fit into the mutually-exclusive archetypal 
common worlds (Patriotta et al., 2011; Ramirez, 2013; Thévenot et al., 2000):
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actors simultaneously employ elements of different common worlds in their 
discursive justification. Thus, real-life justifications might be a 
‘compromise’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 277) between the various of 
orders of worth.
To facilitate coding, I developed a coding scheme based on Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s (2006, pp. 159–211) description of the common worlds, and 
three articles in which the model has been explicated or empirically applied 
(Cloutier & Langley, 2007; Patriotta et al., 2011; Thévenot et al., 2000).
Using NVivo qualitative data analysis software, I coded sentences 
(Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 99–101) in the 62 documents to a particular
common world if statements met at least two criteria for inclusion in that 
world: mode of evaluation of worth and test of worth (Thévenot et al., 2000, 
p. 249).
FINDINGS
In this section of the paper, I describe Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya, the 
host country institutional context (based on interview reports triangulated 
using documentary data) and the company’s justifications of its CSR 
initiative (based on analysis of publicly-available documents).
Huawei’s CSR practices in Kenya: From Philanthropy to ‘Telecom Seed 
for the Future’
Huawei’s historical approach to social responsibility in Kenya has been 
philanthropy. In the company’s first annual CSR report from 2008, it 
described its CSR practices in Kenya as ‘social donations’; Huawei claimed 
that it ‘donated food supplies to Kenya’s Red Cross to help the homeless 
refugees’, ‘endowed food and materials to needy children in Kenya to 
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celebrate an abundant Christmas’, and sponsored the ‘Safaricom Lewa 
Marathon in Kenya…to raise awareness for education of children in remote 
areas and for protection of wild animals’. (Huawei Technologies Company 
Ltd, 2008, pp. 22–23). In its 2009 CSR report, the company repeated the 
same words as the 2008 report.
However, since 2010 Huawei’s approach to CSR in Kenya has 
changed. Currently, the company’s main social initiative in Kenya is its 
Telecom Seeds for the Future programme (hereafter TSF). According to 
Huawei, the objective of the programme is to ‘bridge the gap between what 
is learned in IT education and what is necessary in the industry’. An 
informant8 explained the rationale for Huawei Kenya’s CSR practices:
I have seen them [Huawei Kenya] change. [In the past] Huawei was 
maybe giving cash to society and the like. Children’s home here, 
planting trees there. Then they realise at the end of the day when they 
go to recruit, they are competing for a small portion of unprofessional 
or rather not well-trained graduates. So they decided…to work on the 
talents pipeline. So go to the universities and create talent 
programmes…Partner with universities, let your students work with 
modern equipment and training. (Founder, CSR for Development)
One Huawei informant called the TSF in Kenya the company’s 
‘flagship’ CSR programme that ‘we are most proud of’. In its external 
communciation, Huawei claims that the TSF, piloted in Kenya in 2011, 
provided a template that has been implemented in 20 countries (Huawei 
Technologies Company Ltd, 2013). The scope of the CSR programme
8 The names of all informants have been disguised to protect their identity. 
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(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) in Kenya includes provision of internships, 
donation of equipment, review university curricula and hosting career 
develop talks. I describe each element below.
Host visits to learning centre. In 2008, Huawei Kenya built a learning 
centre in Nairobi to train company staff and customers in the use of its 
equipment. The learning centre appears to have been set up as part of a 
product market strategy of being responsive to local customer needs (Bartlett 
& Ghoshal, 1989). In fact, such a strategy is employed by Huawei’s 
competitors such as Cisco Systems (Luo, 2007).
Under the TSF programme, Huawei hosts one-day visits from students 
of three universities (Delta, Epsilon and Zeta universities). During those 
visits Huawei staff introduce students to telecommunication equipment. A 
Huawei manager enthused that the visits were a ‘wonderful opportunity for 
students to interact with networks and state-of-the-art equipment’. Yet, the 
only other informant that mentioned benefits from the visits was less 
enthusiastic: ‘You [student] may see the equipment…but is hard to learn in 
one day. But it [learning centre] is a good place they [Huawei] use for 
introducing students to how the equipment looks… telecommunication is a 
big field…they [students] get the knowledge, but not much’ (Huawei staff 
#1, former beneficiary of CSR programme).
Internships for students. Huawei provides annual internships to 30 
students per year from the three Kenyan universities. During the internship, 
students follow a training schedule mentors and are asigned from the 
company. Assessing the internships, a Huawei manager claimed, ‘Our 
training has been very important for them [students] because it puts the 
students on the same level with other global peers...So when they graduate 
Page 132
these students will be ready for the market as opposed to when they just have 
the theory’.
One former beneficiary, a Huawei employee, was positive about her 
experience of the internship:
Most of my colleagues normally say that Huawei is like another 
school. [Laughter]. They [Huawei] are teaching us a lot….They give 
you everything you need to learn. So it’s up to you to decide whether 
you want to learn or not. (Huawei staff #2, former beneficiary of CSR 
programme)
Donation of equipment. Huawei donates telecommunication 
equipment in partnership with a network operator, Tech-Mobile (a 
pseudonym), to the three universities for use in classroom instruction. An 
informant at one university that had received telecommunication equipment
(a radio tower), explained that ‘ these radio towers…installed on our 
premises to help us in training in that particular area…[the tower] has 
improved some of our training, especially microwave communication’ (Head 
of department, Epsilon University).
Review of engineering curriculum. Universities in Kenya are required 
by law to review their curricula every five years in order to align course
content with industry requirements. The review process is elaborate. 
Informants at each of the three universities—Delta, Epsilon and Zeta—told 
me that as part of the review process, engineering departments are required 
to incorporate feedback from industry actors such as Huawei and the industry 
association, the Engineering Board of Kenya (EBK), into the curriculum.
Huawei claims to support the curriculum review by: (1) sponsoring 
three-day retreats at which Huawei experts work with university staff to 
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review course content; (2) delegating at least two members of staff to follow 
up on the review process after the retreat; and (3) paying a stipend to the 
academic staff during the review process.
Career development talks at universities. Huawei sponsors career fairs 
at partner universities. One informant at Delta University explained, ‘They 
[Huawei] have been quite visible on campus in their participation in career 
development talks and other conferences’. Another informant said his 
students’ reactions to the career talks: ‘students found it [career talks] very 
inspiring and it showed from their response during these public lectures... 
Especially, some of the engineers who came to talk to the students were 
actually former students, graduates of the department’ (Head of department, 
Epsilon University).
Taken together, Huawei’s CSR programme in Kenya, the TSF, is 
designed to develop engineering talent by working closely with three public 
universities that offer undergraduate courses in engineering and information 
& communication technology (ICT).
Drivers of CSR: Local Market and Institutional Pressure
Market driver—a dearth of skilled ICT professionals. In developing 
countries like Kenya, there is a shortage of skilled ICT professionals (Cooke, 
2014). The rapid growth of the Kenyan telecommunication sector meant that 
telecommunication companies could not meet demand for skilled labour by 
recruiting within Kenya. They had to recruit expatriate workers at significant 
cost. A human resource manager from Tech-Mobile, which partners with 
Huawei to provide telecommunication equipment to Kenyan universities, 
explained his company’s rationale for doing so.
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We had a cost problem. We had a development & recruitment budget 
that was increasing. We had to do something about it. We were 
surviving with expatriates. We had to find a way to put costs under 
control. Instead of recruiting expat staff from South Africa and 
Nigeria, we want to recruit locally. Because historically we had go 
abroad to fetch that talent, but if you can get that locally it reduces your 
costs. (Manager, Tech-Mobile)
Even when new staff were recruited locally, Tech-Mobile and Huawei had 
to train the recruits.
In the past when our graduates came out, they joined Huawei or any 
other company, they would need a lot of extra training. Somebody [a 
new recruit] would be taken to South Africa or Italy to learn about fibre 
optics communication…So the companies were…investing a lot of 
money to kind of retrain these engineers... But I think some of them 
have recognised that by supporting the universities and equipping them 
to be able to give better training, they are going to spend less in sending 
the graduates elsewhere for further training. (Head of department, 
Epsilon University)
Interviewee reports suggest strongly that Huawei’s TSF programme in 
Kenya is closely-aligned with the company’s local recruitment needs. The 
TSF provides a filtered pool of engineering talent from which the company 
recruits for its operations. An informant, speaking about Huawei Kenya’s 
recuitment process, ‘Yes, there is always first priority [for Huawei interns] 
whereby they [Huawei] want people that they have already trained, who have 
knowledge of their products to get employed’ (Huawei staff #2). While
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another Huawei informant summarised the effect of the programme thus: 
‘[B]ut so far as of end of last year [2012],…we trained 209 and five of those 
students were employed by Huawei…They have been observed [sic] after 
their internships, and they were employed by Huawei. That is, five of them 
for Kenya’. (Huawei Manager #2).
Huawei publicises the TSF as CSR. However, an informant at Tech-
Mobile, who worked closely with Huawei Kenya, was emphatic that his 
company participation was not CSR:
It would be CSR to Huawei, but not CSR for us [Tech-Mobile]…We 
don’t take it like CSR...Our outlook is not CSR. It [management of 
company commitment] does not sit in the CSR team…It sits in the HR 
[human resources] team…It is a human resource development 
initiative for us. (Manager, Tech-Mobile)
Host country institutional pressures. Huawei’s current CSR approach 
is not only a response to a business need, but also a response to institutional 
and stakeholder pressure within Kenya. The data suggests that two sources 
of institutional pressure were most salient to Huawei Kenya managers. First, 
the Kenyan government’s drive to promote industry-academic collaboration 
as part of an ambitious development plan launched in 2008 by President 
Mwai Kibaki: ‘Vision 2030’. Informants often invoked Vision 2030 to 
explain Huawei’s CSR initiative: ‘For us in Kenya, it [Huawei’s CSR 
programme] is in line with our [Kenyan government’s] Vision 2030, which 
uses ICT actually at the base to both promote political, social, and economic 
pillars’. (Huawei Manager #1).
The plan identifies business process outsourcing (BPO) as one of six 
economic sectors that are expected to contribute to Kenya’s economic 
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competitiveness by 2030 (National Economic and Social Council of Kenya 
(NESC), 2007, p. 81).The Kenyan government has stated that shortage of 
engineering and ICT talent is an obstacle to its development goal. 
Consequently, the plan recommends increased collaboration between 
industry and academia to develop needed talent (National Economic and 
Social Council of Kenya (NESC), 2007, pp. 78–80).
The recommendation to increase collaboration between academia–
industry collaboration has been incorporated into ministerial policy (Gainer, 
2015) and codified into the curriculum review process: every five years, 
engineering schools are required to incorporate feedback from industry 
stakeholders into their curricula before the curricula are approved by 
universities’ governing council. An informant explained the importance of 
industry-academia collaboration.
In fact when we go to the Senate [governing board], these are some of 
the things we’re always been reminded, ‘We [the professors] must 
network with industry to remain relevant otherwise we will start 
teaching outdated stuff’… So they [Senate] have been very supportive. 
In fact this is one of the things in our [university’s] strategic plan; to 
partner with industry…In fact sometimes it is even the Vice 
Chancellor who…initiates some of these collaborations. (Head of 
department, Delta University)
I inadvertently confirmed the importance of industry-academia 
collaboration to university administrators during my visit to Delta university. 
As I walked to the carpark with my host, we met the Vice Chancellor of the 
university. After introductions, I told him about my research. He responded 
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pointedly, asking me to state in my disseration that ‘we [Delta University] 
are looking for ways to collaborate with even more companies’.
Second, Huawei Kenya is required by law to ‘Kenyanise’ its 
workforce. Foreign-owned firms operating in Kenya are legally required to 
sign an agreement with the Kenyan government pledging to train Kenyans to 
phase out expatriates in their workforce (Business Daily, 2012; US State 
Department, 2012). In 2012, Kenya’s immigration law may have been 
strengthened to stem an influx of low-wage immigrants from China 
(Olopade, 2012).
Huawei’s CSR programme, which emphasises training Kenyan 
students, complies with the employment legislation as an informant 
explained when I asked about Huawei’s motives for its CSR initiative.
That is where legislation comes in. When you have expatriates, they 
have to develop local talent [by law]…You [companies] are required
to develop local talent. You have to demonstrate to the government 
that you are more and more relying more on local talent than 
expatriates. (Manager, Tech-Mobile).
Another informant corroborated the importance of the Kenyanisation law:
You know, there is a law in Kenya, when they [MNEs] give you work 
you should be able to train other people. So the people in the 
universities and colleges should be given internships...So one of the 
reasons [for TSF] is because of that law. (Huawei staff #2).
Aside from pressures to comply with local law, Huawei Kenya’s CSR 
programme is motivated by demands of influential government stakeholders 
in Kenya. Huawei Kenya managers maintain relationships with senior 
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government stakeholders in Kenya’s ICT and education ministries. One 
informant, a senior official who had been instrumental in setting up the 
partnership between Huawei and the three universities, spoke admiringly of 
the company as an exemplar of China’s industrial emergence. During our 
interview, he said that MNEs in Kenya ought to be developing local Kenyan 
talent instead of simply setting up sales offices in the country to sell their 
products.. In other words, the CSR initiative is a form of acquiescence (C. 
Oliver, 1991) to the demands of an influential institutional constituent: the 
Kenyan government.
Giving his impression of Huawei’s reputation among government 
officials, one informant stated:
Huawei is well-regarded with government officials. At some of the 
academic activities conducted by Huawei, there are key government 
officials invited...When people in government talk about industry and 
academia collaboration, one of the companies that are mentioned as 
examples is Huawei. I have heard this from at least two people [senior 
government officials]. (Head of department, Epsilon University)
In summary, Huawei’s CSR initiative in Kenya, Telecom Seeds for the 
Future, is driven by market and institutional pressures: the company’s drive 
to reduce its recruitment cost; and the need to comply with local labour law 
and to acquiesce to the demands of influential institutional actors.
Discursive Justification of CSR practices
I identified a total of 382 passages in the 62 documents in which at least 
one common world was invoked to justify Huawei’s CSR programme: 94% 
of documents (59 documents) invoked the industrial world; 56% the market 
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world; 50% the civic world and 31% the world of fame. (A single document 
may contain multiple orders of worth justifying the CSR practices.) The 
domestic and inspired world were not invoked in any document. In Table 
3-5, I show the prevalence of the common worlds across all documents 

































































































































































































































Industrial world. This order of worth was most consistently invoked 
in both documents targeted at Kenyan and international audiences: 51.1% of 
passages targeted to Kenyan audiences and 54.9% of justificatory passages 
in documents targeted to international audiences. The prevalence of this 
common world is not surprising since it is the reason that was adduced in 
interviewees as a primary justification for the CSR programme in Kenya. In 
the documents, Huawei spokespersons justified the CSR programme most 
often by claiming that the programme would improve the professional skills 
of participants and advance development of Kenya’s ICT industry.
There is a significant gap between Kenyan universities’ curriculum 
offered to engineers, and the actual status of the ICT Industry. This can 
impede the development of the ICT industry. Thus, we launched the 
‘Telecom Seeds for the Future’ project in Kenya…(Huawei statement
on CSR Africa, 22nd March 2013)
As theorised by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), the industrial world 
involves certification of professionalism.
The ‘Seeds for the Future’ programme is aimed at up skilling top 
engineering students drawn from various local [Kenyan] universities 
with the requisite ICT skills and providing them with the opportunity 
to learn and apply the latest technologies…Following completion of 
the program, students were awarded certificates in addition to 
professional mentorship acquired in China. (CIO East Africa, 31st 
December 2014)
Market world. This was the second-most invoked order of worth—
20.2% and 18.4% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and 
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international audiences respectively. In the market world, worth is evaluated 
based on the economic value of a good or service in a competitive market. 
The data suggests that actors, such as Kenyan government officials, Huawei 
spokespersons and journalists, claimed that Huawei’s CSR programme 
would enable students to compete more favourably in the job market and/or 
for the country Kenya to compete economically in the ICT industry. For 
instance, quoting a senior Kenyan government official, Huawei reported, 
‘The facets of technology keep changing every day, and for students to 
remain competitive in the job market or in their own entrepreneurial 
endeavors, they require modern training. Thanks to Huawei for making this 
possible’. (2011 Huawei Sustainability Report, p. 81).
Huawei spokespersons also appealed to the supposed economic value 
of its CSR initiatives to justify the practice. Explaining the company’s CSR 
programme, a Huawei east and south Africa Region president, Li Dafeng 
said, ‘Through such initiatives, we can continue tapping and promoting local 
talents especially in the universities to increase localised content and spur 
[economic] growth’. (Nairobi Star, 09.12.2012)
Civic world. This was the third-most invoked order of worth—20.2% 
and 16.0% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and 
international audiences respectively. In this world, worth is evaluated based 
on goals such as equal access, solidarity, and civil rights (Thévenot et al., 
2000, p. 246). Huawei actors consistently justified the CSR programme by 
claiming that the programme addressed the ‘digital divide’, a concept which 
has been defined since the late 1990s to denote ‘the gap between those who 
have and do not have access to computers and the Internet’ (Van Dijk, 2006, 
p. 221).
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Huawei’s claims about the efficacy of its CSR programme in 
addressing the digital divide are ambiguous. In some statements, Huawei 
actors imply that the digital divide exists between the ‘haves’and the ‘have-
nots’ of technology within a country. For instance, the company claimed that 
it ‘launched the “Telecom Seeds for the Future”’ program in an effort to 
bridge the digital divide in emerging markets’. (2010 CSR Report, page 19). 
Yet, in other statements, the digital divide denoted a mismatch between 
institutions in a given country. In a 2013 article in Kenya London News, a 
Huawei spokeperson claimed that its CSR programme in Kenya ‘bridges 
digital divide between the academia and industry and promotes local talent’.
Despite the ambiguity in its use of the concept, Huawei’s claim to 
address a social divide between technology haves and have-nots is an 
invokation of the civic order of worth as the company purports to promote 
equality of access to technology within and across countries. Huawei Kenya 
CEO justified the CSR programme thus:
We believe in empowering the youth and creating an opportunity for 
them to grow as individuals and contribute to the development of this 
country...He added that in 2011, Huawei started the Telecom Seeds for 
the Future initiative, which bridges digital divide between the 
academia and industry and promotes local talent’. (Xinhua Economic 
News Service, 7th July 2013).
The world of fame. This was the fourth-most invoked order of worth—
8.5% and 10.8% of coded passages in documents targeted at Kenyan and 
international audiences respectively. In this world, worth is evaluated by 
public renown (Thévenot et al., 2000, p. 253) or approbation from influential 
arbiters of public opinion. The data suggests that Huawei spokespersons 
Page 144
invoked the world of fame the least of the four orders of worth. Huawei, for 
instance, claimed that its CSR programme has been recognised by a United 
Nations body: ‘Telecom Seeds for the Future was endorsed by the UN-
backed Principles for Social Investment (UNPSI) as a best practice of social 
investment’ (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2014, p. 9). While in 
other publications, the company’s CSR programme was awarded honours by 
private sector organisations:
Huawei…was honored with four awards at the World CSR Day 
conference. The company received..one [award] for ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Education’... It is an honor to receive these awards 
that recognize Huawei's CSR efforts, Edward Chen, Chairman of the 
CSR Committee, Huawei said. (‘Huawei wins four awards at the 
World CSR Day conference’ Web newswire, 12th March 2012)
In Table 3-6, I summarise the evidence for the common worlds in the 
documents analysed.
Page 145
Table 3-6. Evidence for presence of com
m
on w



















ent to responsible corporate 
citizenship, it w
orks to bridge the digital divide and im
prove 
the livelihood of the com
m
unities in w





























‘In 2012, all around the w
orld, w










sustainability, by creating opportunities through education and 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T education, helping bridge the gap betw
een w
hat 
is learned in IT education and w
hat is necessary in the industry, 






















e] is to provide 
up to date IC
T trainings to students, as there is a gap betw
een 
w
hat is learned in class and w
hat is happening in the industry. 
Students m
oreover require up to date training to rem
ain 
desirable
in the job m
arket: w
e m








enya is already a leader in IC









































































































































































































































































































































































































































ei’s efforts have been 
w
idely recognized by governm






















The ICT hardware industry (of which Huawei is a part) has faced 
pressure for social responsibility. This pressure has centred on practices 
within the industry supply chain including the sourcing of minerals, working 
conditions in the factories where electronic products are assembled, and the 
environmental impact of ICT hardware at the end of their useful lives 
(Dwyer, Lamond, & Lee, 2009; Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009; Yu, Welford, & 
Hills, 2006).
NGOs such as Global Witness (US) and MakeITFair, a coalition of 
European civil society groups including SOMO (Netherlands) and the 
Church of Sweden have accused the industry of using ‘conflict minerals’ 
(OECD, 2013)—minerals mined in the context of civil conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—and ignoring the human suffering 
in the DRC (Pöyhönen & Simola, 2007; United Nations, 2001). They and 
their legislative allies have since lobbied for US and EU [European Union] 
legislation against the use of conflict minerals in electronic products (Global 
Witness, 2015; SOMO, 2011).
NGOs have also campaigned against branded hardware firms like 
Apple and Samsung to improve working conditions in the east Asian 
factories where consumer electronic goods are assembled (Monbiot, 2013; 
Overeem, 2009; Schipper & de Haan, 2005), especially since a spate of 
worker suicides at the factory of Chinese mobile phone manufacturer 
Foxconn were attributed to poor working conditions (Chan, 2013).
The electronics industry has responded in various ways. Most notably, 
electronics industry firms and their suppliers in the mining industry have
developed reporting templates with which member firms demonstrate due 
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diligence in their sourcing practices (Azapagic, 2004; Conflict Free Sourcing 
Initiative (CFSI), 2015; Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), 
2015).
In addition to pressure directed against the ICT hardware industry as 
whole, Huawei in particularly has been subject to negative scrutiny from an 
influential actor: the US government. As Huawei expanded into the US 
telecommunications market in 2008–2010, the US Congress’ Select 
Committee on Intelligence launched an investigation into Huawei and ZTE 
(a state-owned Chinese telecommunication MNE) activities. The 
committee’s report was unequivocal:
The United States should view with suspicion the continued 
penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by Chinese 
telecommunications companies…Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted 
to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to 
the United States and to our systems. (Rogers & Ruppersberger, 2012, 
pp. vi–vii).
The company’s CSR/sustainability reports, which are prepared by staff 
at headquarters in Shenzhen China and in which its TSF programme is 
discursively justified, does not respond to demands by NGOs and the US 
government for industry action conflict minerals, data security and 
improvement of factory working conditions. (The company’s sustainability 
reports hardly mentions these issues.) At the time of writing this paper, 
Huawei has published seven annual CSR or sustainability reports (for the 
years 2008–2014). According to these reports, manufacturing staff worked 
at one facility in China and never exceeded 8% of the workforce (in 2011). 
There are two mentions of the company’s overtime policy in the factory 
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(2011–2012), but no details on actual overtime. Reports prior to 2011 make 
no mention of conflict minerals. In reports after 2011, conflict minerals are 
mentioned in ¼–½ page statements of the company’s conflict minerals 
policy. For instance, in the 2014 annual sustainability report, it is stated that:
The problem of conflict minerals has drawn the attention of the 
electronics industry and others….Huawei takes the problem of conflict 
minerals very seriously, and has taken action to reduce the risk of using 
these minerals on an ongoing basis. Since 2002, Huawei, in tandem 
with our customers, has investigated the use of conflict minerals in the 
supply chain…pledging to never knowingly procure or support the use 
of conflict minerals (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd., 2015b, 
p. 80)
To summarise the findings, Huawei’s CSR initiative in Kenya, 
Telecom Seeds for the Future, is driven by local market and institutional 
pressures: the company’s need to reduce its recruitment cost in Kenya; to 
comply with Kenyan labour law; and to acquiesce to the demands of 
influential institutional constituents in Kenya. However, in external 
communication to Kenyan and non-Kenyan audiences, Huawei actors justify 
these practices as CSR—drawing principally on the industrial and market 
world of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006)—while ignoring 
international institutional demands for social action in other domains such as 
conflict minerals and factory conditions.
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
I began this study by asking how in the paradox approach to CSR-legitimacy 
management within MNEs, discursive justification relates to strategic 
response across MNE subunits. I examined CSR practices as a strategic 
response to institutional pressure (acquiescence) by Huawei Kenya and 
discursive justification by two subunits—Huawei Kenya and Huawei HQ. I 
argue that external justification by the latter subunit instiantiates a 
manipulation strategy (C. Oliver, 1991). My findings show that the 
justification schemes—the rank ordering of common words—are virtually 
identical whether the audiences are located in Kenya or not and whether the 
subunit is acquiescing or manipulating. (Refer to Table 3-5.)
The industrial world (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006), characterised by 
notions of technical efficiency and certified professionalism, and the market 
world, characterised by competition and economic value, are the principal 
conceptions of the common good that are employed to justify CSR practices,
regardless of the nature of the response (acquiescence or manipulation) by 
the MNE unit. (Refer to Table 3-5.) How do I explain these findings given 
the heterogeneity in instititional demands that the company faces and 
difference in strategic responses?
CSR as Synchronous Acquiescence and Manipulation Responses
High locally salient pressure, low cost of organisational change.
Strategic or economic approaches to corporate social action suggest that a 
firm invests to meet institutional demands for CSR if the perceived benefits 
of legitimacy exceed the costs of doing so (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Orlitzky, Siegel, & Waldman, 2011; Sprinkle & Maines, 2010). If the cost of 
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meeting the demands of institutional constituents is low and pressure is 
applied from a few clearly-identifiable constituents, then the firm is likely to 
acquiesce to institutional demands (Scherer et al., 2013).
Huawei’s acquiescence to Kenyan institutional demands supports this 
argument. In the case, Huawei Kenya, which had had philanthropic CSR 
policies in Kenya acquiesced to the demands of influential institutional 
constituents—principally the Kenyan government—to ‘contribute to the 
development of local Kenyan ICT talent’. Huawei Kenya did so at low cost. 
The company had already built a learning centre as part of its product market 
strategy. It did need to recruit CSR specialists or implement structural 
solutions like a new CSR functional department to meet the institutional 
demand. Instead, Huawei Kenya employed existing staff at the learning 
center and in management functions (as communication specialists) to 
implement its CSR initiative, which it retrospectively labelled as ‘Telecom 
Seeds for the Future’.
Fragmented international institutional pressure, high cost of 
organisational change. Institutitional approaches to corporate strategies of 
legitimation suggest that organisational strategy is determined by the 
consistency of societal expectations that the firm has to meet (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013). If institutional constituents are 
fragmented, i.e., high number of uncoordinated actors to whom the 
corporation needs to respond with no centrally-recognised actor (Pache & 
Santos, 2010), then pressure is likely to be weak and organisations ignore or 
challenge instititional demands.
Though the electronics industry faces demands from influential actors 
like the United States government and the EU, and to a lesser extent, from 
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civil society groups, these demands are not cumulative. Hence, they may be 
weak. For instance, the United States has passed anti-conflict mineral 
legislation whereas the EU has not, despite repeated calls from NGOs and 
European Members of Parliament (SOMO, 2011). Various NGOs have 
pressured the electronics industry to improve labour conditions in east Asian 
factories, but there is no binding legislation in the US or the EU. There are 
voluntary guidelines such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the EICC code of conduct, but these self-regulatory schemes 
may lack credibility because enforcement is not independently monitored 
and there are no sanctions for malfesance (Christmann & Taylor, 2002; King 
& Lenox, 2000).
Huawei may be subject to even weaker international institutional 
pressure for several additional reasons. First, Huawei is a private company 
with headquarters in China. It is not listed on any US securities exchange. 
Hence, the company is not subject to US anti-conflict mineral legislation, 
which applies only to US-listed firms.
Second, civil society groups have directed their attention principally 
towards firms with strong retail brands (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, & Sasser, 
2001). Historically, Huawei’s customers were predominantly large 
enterprises. In 2014, for instance, these customers made up 74% of its 2014 
revenue (sale of branded smartphones comprised 26% of revenue). Thus, 
Huawei may have escaped most of the NGO pressure that familiar ICT 
hardware brands like Apple and Nokia have been subjected to (e.g., Monbiot, 
2013; Oberndorff, Vanheste, & Korai, 2010; Poulsen, 2010).
Third, the company may be operating in an industry segment that is 
considered benign by consumers and policy makers. Fombrun and Gardberg 
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(2006, p. 339) argue that MNEs in ‘visible’ industries face greater pressure 
to enact CSR programmes than those that operate in less visible industries. 
They argue that visibility stems from two features of an industry: the amount 
of economic, environmental or operational risk the industry impose on 
society; and the extent to which the industry generates benefits such as 
employment and taxes for the local economy.
The ICT industry comprises service companies such as MNOs and 
equipment providers operating in complex global supply chains (OECD, 
2007). Unlike extractive or manufacturing industries, the service sectors in 
the ICT industry do not entail obvious high levels of operational or 
environmental risk to society. (Huawei is an equipment as well as a service 
company.) On the contrary, the penetration of mobile telephony and 
broadband services in Africa has been widely celebrated as bringing 
increased economic efficiency and fostering new industries such as mobile 
banking on the continent (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Bloomberg Business Week, 
2007; Etzo & Collender, 2010; Röller & Waverman, 2001).
The telecommunications industry in Africa may be perceived to deliver 
more widespread developmental benefits than the extractive industries, 
which have traditionally dominated MNE activity in the region (UNCTAD, 
2012, p. 37, 41). Hence, MNEs like Huawei, have not attracted the high
levels of sustained direct international pressure for corporate social action 
that extractive MNEs like Shell have been subjected to in Africa (Amaeshi 
& Amao, 2009; Wheeler et al., 2002).
Fourth, the ambiguous meaning of CSR may enable manipulation by 
organisational actors. Customers, media, civil society groups, governments 
and academics, who are the principal targets of MNEs’ CSR communications 
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(Pomering & Dolnicar, 2009; Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008), do not have 
agreed-upon definitions of CSR (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 
2008). While acts of corporate social irresponsibility by extractive industry 
MNEs are well understood and challenged by activists (Frynas, 1998; 
Wheeler et al., 2002), corporate social responsibility by a service industry 
MNE in a supposedly benign industry may be less clear.
Huawei actors may be exploiting this conceptual ambiguity. An 
organisational practice that appears to benefit constituents external to the 
MNE—regardless of the intention of the practice—can be ‘spun’ as CSR. In 
the case, Huawei Kenya’s partner in its CSR programmes did not consider 
the provision of equipment and training as social action; whereas Huawei’s 
managers clearly did—and justified their practices externally in those terms.
Implications and Future Research
This study contributes to scholarship on the corporate social actions of 
MNEs, a phenomenon that remains understudied (Doh & Lucea, 2013; 
Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009), in the 
following ways. First, empirical studies of CSR in MNEs have emphasised 
CSR programmes as single strategies of acquiescence, compromise or 
avoidance in response to instititional demands (C. Oliver, 1991). The study 
provides an empirical illustration of the paradox approach to legitimacy 
management by MNE subunits in the face of multiple demands for corporate 
social action; this approach has been theorised, but not examined empirically 
(Scherer et al., 2013).
A single set of organisational CSR practices may be enacted by one 
MNE subunit to acquiesce to local institutional demands and simultaneously 
discursively justified by another subunit to influence perceptions of a 
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different set of institutional constituents. Employing multiple response 
strategies across the MNE may not lead to inherent conflict as supposed by 
Scherer et al. (2013) if the cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and the 
institutional pressure in another weak.
Second, scholars of CSR communication are often sceptical that 
MNEs’ CSR practices actually match the rhetoric contained in CSR 
communication (L. T. Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). Thus, CSR 
communication in MNEs has been reported as corporate spin (Jahdi & 
Acikdilli, 2009), ‘without any real substance’ (Kolk, 2003, p. 290), and as 
expressions of ‘ideological movements that are intended to legitimize and 
consolidate the power of large corporations’. (Banerjee, 2008, p. 52).
The findings from the study complement previous empirical studies, 
which show that the higher the external pressure for social action from 
entrenched, influential and pervasive elements of the institutional 
environment such as government, media, and standard-setting bodies, the 
more likely that a corporation will adopt decoupled CSR practices rather than 
integrated practices (Weaver et al., 1999), i.e., that externally-directed CSR 
rhetoric does not match actual practice. The study suggests that an MNE’s 
justificatory statements for CSR practices may be coherent (and match 
practice), regardless of the audience. I conjecture that the perceived benign 
social impact of the MNE’s industry, weak international institutional 
pressure, and the fit between CSR practices and product market strategy in 
the host country may provide MNE actors berth to make coherent external 
discursive justifications.
This study raises several questions for future inquiry. My account of 
Huawei’s justification of its TSF programmme suggests that operating in an 
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industry that is perceived to be benign (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) might 
enable an MNE to maintain a coherent justification scheme without resorting 
to the structural solutions, such as disguising socially-irresponsible practices
from relevant external constituencies (Surroca et al., 2013), that MNEs in 
less benign industries have adopted in response to institutional pressure. How 
does nature of the industry influence the match between CSR practices and 
public discursive justification?
Second, the growing literature on home country institutions and MNE 
CSR practices (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; J. L. Campbell, 2007; Fransen, 
2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001) suggests that CSR practices in foreign 
subsidiaries reflects the attributes of MNEs’ home country 
institutional/national business system. Using ideographic research designs, 
such as ethnography or longitudinal case studies, scholars could empirically 
examine recent claims that there is ‘Chinese-style concept of CSR’ (Wang & 
Juslin, 2009, p. 440) that carries with Chinese MNEs as they internationalise. 
They could also examine whether Chinese MNEs’ public invocations of the 
common good used to justify their CSR practices reflect the home country 
national business system.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the contributions, I see three limitations in this study. First, there is 
potential for bias in the data collection process. I relied on informant 
interviews in Kenya to reconstruct the history of Huawei’s CSR practices in 
the country. I was careful to minimise bias, especially in the accounts of 
Huawei’s managers, by seeking corroborating accounts from non-Huawei 
informants and triangulating interview reports using documentary evidence. 
However, I had only one informant from Huawei’s most influential 
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stakeholder in Kenya: the Kenyan government. Furthermore, I sampled only 
newspaper articles, press releases and Huawei corporate communication 
documents written in English. I ignored other forms of news such as video 
documentaries and non-English sources. Thus, I still feel residual concern 
that bias was not completely eliminated in the study.
Second, I coded and analysed only texts in the corporation’s 
CSR/sustainability reports. I did not analyse photographs and other graphical 
material. Omitting these materials, which may be effective non-textual 
means of communication, from the analysis might lead to an inaccurate 
characterisation of the justification scheme I presented (Preston, Wright, & 
Young, 1996; Unerman, 2000).
Third, I assumed that Huawei’s public discursive justification
amounted to manipulation (Oliver, 1991) of the perceptions of external 
constituences. This assumption was based on existing literature on CSR 
communication and in the facts of the case—the CSR function within the 
organisation is run by communication/PR specialists. In order to validate this 
assumption, I sent a complete draft of this article to Huawei informants at the 
company headquarters and in Kenya. I asked them specifically to comment 
on the assumption that I had made about the role of the CSR function in 
influencing external perceptions of the company. However, I did not receive 
any feedback from my Huawei informants. Hence, I could not validate the 
assumption.
MNEs are being called upon to address economic, social and 
environmental problems around the world (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). MNEs 
and their subunits need to be agile and responsive to these demands because 
doing so may be fundamental to maintaining legitimacy (Scherer et al., 
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2013). Whether MNE subunits respond to institutional pressure by 
substantively altering their organisational practices and/or employing 
discursive influencing strategies has been a subject of debate, with scholars 
maintain a sharp distinction between communication or ‘talk’ and CSR 
‘action’ (L. T. Christensen et al., 2013). The paradox approach suggests that 
MNEs can infact do both. It is time to examine both substantive practice and 
discursive acts in order to understand the multiple responses that MNE and 
their subunits employ in response to complex institutional demands.
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CHAPTER 4 : INTEGRATING SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS AND THICK DESCRIPTION IN 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF MODERN ORGANISATIONS:
REFLECTIONS OF A DOCTORAL RESEARCHER9
ABSTRACT
Conventional ethnographic data collection techniques, such as participant 
observation and interviewing, were developed for the study of territorially-
specific human interactions. Applying these techniques in ethnography of 
modern organisations may limit the authenticity of ethnographic accounts of 
modern organisational life because: (1) the singular physical locale (office, 
for instance) is becoming less central to organisational life; and (2) research 
subjects within modern organisations interact using computer-mediated
means, which are not amenable to researchers’ ocular observation. I argue 
that in the ethnography of small, rapidly-changing organisational research 
sites, traditional thick description of the texture of organisational life, based 
on interviews and participant observation, may be fruitfully complemented 
with social network analysis (SNA) of unobtrusive digital interactional data 
that is self-produced by organisations to produce more authentic accounts of 
organisational life. I illustrate my argument by drawing on my 15-month long 
study of a rapidly-growing entrepreneurial venture. By combining analyses 
of multiple forms of interactions, ethnographers of modern organisations can 
expand the notion of the ethnographic field, which has historically being 
9 A version of this paper is currently under review (R&R2) at Organizational Research 
Methods.
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conceived as a bounded, physical space in which social interactions occur, to 
include digital spaces characterised by a rich vein of informant interactions 
that are constitutive of the social worlds within such organisations that 
ethnographers seek to study.
Keywords: Computer-mediated communication (CMC); ethnography, 
social enterprise, participant observation, social network analysis.
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Qualitative methodology books provide guidelines on the elements of 
fieldwork including gaining access to the field (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007, pp. 41–62), interviewing (Ellis, 2005), participant observation (Adler 
& Adler, 1994; Jorgensen, 1989), and note taking (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 
2001). These guidelines rest on the assumption that the habits, rituals and 
patterns of interactions of human research subjects constitute a social 
world—the ethnographic field—circumscribed within a physical locale that 
is in principle accessible to the researcher (Bate, 1997; Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007, pp. 4, 52).
The assumption that the ethnographic field is physically bounded has 
enduring valence among ethnographers; the mainstays of data collection in 
the ethnographic method—interviews, participant observation—emerged 
from the study of territorially-specific human interactions (Deegan, 2001; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 1–2; Platt, 1983). Nevertheless, the 
assumption that the social world of ethnographic study coincides with a 
single physically circumscribed site is limiting for the study of modern 
organisations for at least two reasons. First, in modern organisations, 
research subjects, such as employees, managers, and executives, are not 
necessarily located in a single clearly-demarcated work space characterised 
by face-to-face member interaction. Market globalisation and advances in 
information and communication technology (ICT) have reconfigured the
boundaries, hierarchies, and governance mechanisms within modern 
organisations (Kallinikos, 2007; Smets, Burke, Jarzabkowski, & Spee, 
2014). Furthermore, modern organisational life has become fast-paced, 
complex and fragmented (Barley & Kunda, 2006; Brown-Saracino, Thurk, 
& Fine, 2008; Van Maanen, 2001). Thus, organisations no longer exist as 
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clearly-bounded entities or in territorial isolation. Unsurprisingly, given 
these changes, some organisational ethnographers questioned the primacy of 
the conventional ‘single-site, single scribe’ model of ethnography 
(Slutskaya, Game, & Simpson, 2016, p. 7).
Second, even if the organisational members being studied are located 
in a single physical space, they interact increasingly via computer-mediated 
means, such as e-mails and online chats (Beaulieu, 2010; Hallett & Barber, 
2013; Howard, 2002; Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000), which are not amenable 
to researchers’ direct observation. Thus, in many modern organisations, it is 
likely that a researcher’s reliance on ocular observation of face-to-face 
interactions among research subjects will produce a limited understanding of 
even the mundane patterns of organisational life, the subject of study within 
organisational ethnography (Bate, 1997; Van Maanen, 2001).
Regardless of the increasingly complex nature of the field site, 
however, organisational ethnographers still need to satisfy the ethnographic 
criterion of “being there” in order to produce authentic accounts of 
organisational life (Bate, 1997; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). The nature 
of modern organisations provide an opportunity to achieve this and to 
compensate for the limits of traditional interviewing and participant 
observation data collection techniques. Modern organisations are ‘self-
documenting’ entities (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 121). They 
produce voluminous amounts of documents, such as press releases, diaries, 
memos and letters; they also continuously log in real-time the digitally-
mediated interactions of their members using sophisticated information 
technology (IT) infrastructure. Yet, despite these changes in the nature of 
organisations, ethnographers of modern organisations have been slow to 
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exploit self-documenting practices in their accounts of organisational life. 
Instead, they have preferred traditional interviews and close observation of 
members’ face-to-face interactions (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Garcia, 
Standlee, Bechkoff, & Cui, 2009; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–
138; Murthy, 2008). My research question then is: How might ethnographers 
exploit the self-documenting aspects of within the context of a small rapidly-
changing modern organisational site to produce more compelling accounts 
of organisational life?
I argue that in small, rapidly-changing organisational research sites, 
traditional thick description (Geertz, 1973) of the texture of organisational 
life, based on data conventionally collected or interpreted via interviews and 
participant observation, may be fruitfully complemented with social network 
analysis (SNA) of unobtrusive digital interactional data that is self-produced
by organisations (electronic mail) to produce a richer understanding of 
organisational life. I illustrate my argument by drawing on my 15-month long 
study of a rapidly-growing venture, Fairphone. I expand on the results at the 
outset.
Throughout 2014, the leaders of Fairphone strove to implement a 
formal organisational structure specifying explicit functional roles and 
reporting relationships (Scott, 2003, p. 20) for the company staff. My thick 
description of the implementation process—based on interviewing and close 
participant observation of physical informant interaction—suggested that as 
the formal organisation structure was being implemented, discontinuities 
emerged across the organisation while SNA of self-documented digital 
interactions showed a stratification of staff into a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ in
the social networks. These analyses complement one another: Taken 
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together, they suggested that differences in the nature of interactions among 
core and peripheral members was due to differences in the task environment 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) faced by each group. If I had relied on only thick 
description of physical informant interaction, I would have reported on 
fragmentation in the organisation but would have missed differences in 
nature of intra-team interactions in the enterprise. If I had performed only a 
social network analysis of digital informant interaction, I would have 
observed distinct patterns of interaction (core versus periphery) across the 
teams, but would have missed the meanings that informants’ imputed to their 
evolving roles, the implementation process and how they purposefully acted
to form ties and change their relational positions within the company’s social
network.
Combining traditional thick description of small modern organisational 
field sites with analysis of the organisation’s self-documented digital 
interactional data contributes to the ethnographic analytical repertoire in at 
least three ways. First, doing so enhances the readability and validity of 
organisational ethnography studies (J. C. Johnson, 1994) because it enables 
access to a vein of data rich in interactions that are constitutive of the social 
worlds within such organisations, but which have been largely ignored by 
organisational ethnographers (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, pp. 56–57; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–128). Researchers thus can 
compensate for their cognitive limitations as well as the weaknesses of 
participant observation and interviewing, especially in rapidly-changing 
organisational field sites. Second, by analysing multiple forms of member 
interaction (face-to-face participant observation, interviewing and digital), 
organisational ethnographers in such field sites acknowledge an expanded 
Page 168
notion of the ethnographic field as one in which the traditional physical locale 
as well as virtual spaces intersect.
The paper begins with a broad overview of research on social networks 
and ethnography in the organisational literature. Next, I present the 
illustrative case and the discussion. Finally, I conclude with the limitations 
of including digital data, such as e-mails, in ethnographic studies.
FIELD MEMBER INTERACTION IN ORGANISATIONAL 
ETHNOGRAPHY
Ethnography does not have a standard definition (Bate, 1997; Bryman, 2001; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 2–3). In terms of data collection, 
however, ethnography is distinct from other forms of qualitative research. It 
involves ‘the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily 
lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to 
what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, 
collecting documents and artifacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are 
available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry’ 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3).
Organisational ethnographers have produced fascinating accounts of 
organisational life using rich, textured descriptions of the interactions, 
beliefs, habits and practices of organisational members, as well as the 
analysis of the macrostructure of interactions or the social networks within 
which those interactions occur. In this section, I review the use of social 
network analysis (SNA) first in organisational ethnography and then in the 
broader organisation literature.
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Organisational Ethnography and Social Networks Analysis
Social network analysis, a method that focuses on the ties or relations 
among people rather than on their attributes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994, pp. 20–21), has a rich history in organisational 
research. Organisational ethnographers, particularly producers of realist 
ethnographic accounts (Van Maanen, 2011a, pp. 45–72), have combined rich
description of work settings with social network analysis to present 
compelling accounts of organisational life. For instance, the famous 
Hawthorne studies conducted between 1927 and 1932 at Western Electric’s 
Hawthorne bank wiring observation room—and which discovered the 
existence of informal organisation mechanisms (Scott, 2003, p. 62)—
included analysis of informal networks among employees. Using a 
sociogram (a graphical representation of actors and ties among them), 
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939/2003, pp. 361–363) showed that the 
employees formed two spatially-separated groups that played different types 
of gambling games. The researchers suggested that the groups used games to 
express and cement interpersonal relations and that group membership was 
related to economic productivity of the workers.
Kapferer’s (1972) study of an Indian-owned garment factory in newly-
independent Zambia is another exemplar of rich ethnographic description 
and social network analysis (as cited in Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, pp. 14–17).
Kapferer (1972) mapped instrumental social networks among Zambian 
workers in the factory at two time points to predict a worker strike. As the 
workers become more densely-connected, they successfully organised a 
strike to demand higher pay from their Indian employers.
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More recently, Barley’s (1990) ethnographic study of the effects of 
new technology on organisational structure in two Massachusetts hospitals 
employed thick description—based on participant observation of and 
interviews with radiologists and technologists—and social network analysis 
of the ties among over 40 members of both organisations. He found that the 
effect of new technology on organisational structure was mediated by 
individuals’ roles and their positions in social networks.
Other researchers using qualitative case study and quantitative research 
designs have combined social network analysis with the mainstays of 
ethnographic data collection—participant observation and interviewing. My 
review of the organisational ethnography literature (see Bate, 1997; Hodson, 
1998; Morrill & Fine, 1997; Wadham & Warren, 2014; Ybema, Yanow, 
Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009) and the literature on social network analysis in 
organisation studies (see Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Jack, 
2010; Kilduff & Brass, 2010), suggests that in ethnographic and quantitative 
studies that include social network analysis, sociometric questionnaires, 
interviews and participant observation were the principal data collection 
techniques used to build social networks. Only one study, Burt and Ronchi 
(1990), employed archival records to construct the social network.
Burkhardt and Brass’ (1990) case study of a U.S. Federal government 
agency was done using questionnaires and interviews. Krackhardt’s (1995)
case study of a failed union initiative within a Silicon Valley start-up 
combined thick description with interviews and questionnaire data from 
which a friendship social network was developed. Similarly, in his influential 
article in which he found that arms-length transactions formed a small subset 
of inter-firm transactions, Uzzi (1997) employed participant observation and 
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in-depth interviews to ascertain the nature of inter-firm relationships. Taken 
together, these studies show that social network analysis and thick 
description are complementary analytical strategies that enable researchers 
to infer not only the pattern of interactions among organisational members, 
but also the antecedents and the consequences of members’ roles in social 
networks on outcomes such as promotions, power, influence and job 
performance (Brass et al., 2004; Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005).
I present selected empirical research that has combined traditional 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Scholars have recognised that there are several limitations with these 
widely used techniques for mapping social networks.
Sociometric questionnaires. The advantage of questionnaires is that: 
(1) they present standardised questions to research subjects; and (2) they rely 
on the respondents themselves to provide information on ties to other 
organisational members. Questionnaires, however, are not unproblematic: 
social networks developed using questionnaires may be biased by the 
education and experience of the researcher administering the questionnaire 
(Marsden, 2003; Van Tilburg, 1998); and for reasons of social desirability, 
informants may report relationships that are different from those they 
actually possess (Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 2005). Some scholars have 
even disputed the presumed ability of informants to accurately who they talk 
to on a given day (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984).
Regardless of the ability of research subjects to recall network 
information, the process of gathering questionnaire responses is labour-
intensive even in small to medium sized organisations (Human & Provan, 
1997; Krackhardt, 1995; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). The 
labour intensiveness of the data collection effort is multiplied if network data 
is collected at multiple points in time during a longitudinal research project.
Interviews. Unlike questionnaires, interviews are flexible formats that 
enable the researcher to obtain rich data about informants’ worlds (Ellis, 
2005). They give the researcher access to how research subjects maintain 
social categories, such as their identities, and to subjects’ private feelings, 
which may not be on accessible through participant observation (Kleinman, 
Stenross, & McMahon, 1994). However, there are at least two disadvantages 
to using interviews to build social network. First, interviewing is not simply 
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a neutral exchange between interviewer and interviewee, but an active 
process loaded with human interests and feeling (Ellis, 2005). Thus, 
interviews are amenable to manipulation by politically-motivated informants 
who might be uncomfortable with revealing their personal support networks 
(Burt & Ronchi, 1990).
Second, interviewing is inherently intrusive. To conduct an interview, 
the researcher needs to interrupt the daily routines of research subjects. In 
many cases, the researcher cannot interview every organisational informant. 
Thus, the choice of whom to interview during an ethnographic study will 
influence the patterns of informant interactions that the researcher reports 
(Fine, 1993; Van Maanen, 1979).
Participant observation. This involves the researcher’s empathetic 
first hand sharing or observation of the subjects’ experience that is being 
studied (Platt, 1983). The main advantage of this technique for collecting 
social network data is that it builds on the skills most ethnographers are 
trained to execute: direct, ocular observation of the minutiae of everyday life. 
Due to limits in human cognitive capacities, its application to social network 
construction is usually limited to small groups (cf. D. R. Gibson, 2005; Zack 
& McKenney, 1995).
Participant observation as a technique for mapping interactions is 
applicable if member interactions are not only limited in size, but also 
constrained in space (Jorgensen, 1989, pp. 13–15). If field members interact 
across multiple physical locations, or interact in ways that are not amenable 
to ocular observation, then it is likely that observation by the lone researcher 
will be impractical. For instance, Gideon Kunda writes of the limitations of 
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direct observation that he experienced in his exemplary ethnography of an 
American high-tech engineering firm:
Some of the events that were of interest to me occurred in inaccessible 
places: off-site meetings, private, after-hours discussions, secret one-
on-ones...My access was further curtailed by the nature of my 
involvement. By limiting myself to relatively standard working hours 
and to the main working facilities and their close environment, I 
restricted the range of events that were accessible for direct 
observation (Kunda, 2006, p. 245).
Modern organisational life does not necessarily occur in a clearly-
demarcated physical space characterised by face-to-face member interaction 
and amenable to researchers’ direct, ocular participant observation 
(Beaulieu, 2010; Van Maanen, 2001) or interviewing (Sedgwick & Spiers, 
2009). Even if members are physically co-located, they may interact in ways 
that are not observable by the researcher. For instance, organisational 
members within the same physical space may communicate using digitally-
mediated means such as chats and e-mails (Ahuja, Galletta, & Carley, 2003; 
Beaulieu, 2010; Markus, 1994). Thus, even if researchers can observe all 
face-to-face interactions within the studied group, they may miss out on these 
digital interactions. The nature of modern organisations offers the possibility 
to compensate for the limits of participant observation and interview data 
collection techniques.
Modern Organisations as Self-Documenting Entities
Modern organisations are self-documenting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007, pp. 121–122). They produce huge volumes of documents in the form 
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of reports, e-mails, pictures and videos that capture everyday intra-
organisational interaction. Despite the proliferation of these forms of data, 
organisational ethnographers have prioritised the study of face-to-face 
interaction—accessible by interviewing and participant observation—in 
their accounts of organisational life; they have largely ignored the 
voluminous amounts of texts produced in these organisations (Atkinson & 
Coffey, 2004, pp. 56–57; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–128) and 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) among organisational members 
(Murthy, 2008).
Organisations’ self-produced documents hold significant promise for 
ethnographic researchers. Records of the CMC of organisational members 
are an inexpensive, but rich data source that researchers could analyse to 
produce a continuous pattern of social ties and roles among organisational 
actors (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014; Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011; Zwijze-
Koning & De Jong, 2005). Digital self-produced organisational data is even 
more important organisational ethnographers as organisational work is 
increasingly done digitally making digital informant interactions more 
constitutive of the social world with organisations (Garcia et al., 2009; 
Ruhleder, 2000). By exploiting this data, ethnographers can address the 
limitations of surveys, interviews and participant observation discussed in 
the preceding section.
Using data on CMC to map intra-organisational interaction is 
complementary to interviews, participant observation and questionnaires in 
at least three ways. First, the data is produced unobtrusively by the 
organisation without the agency of the researcher. Thus, it is less susceptible 
to manipulation by research subjects and to researcher bias. Second, e-mail 
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data is continuously produced in real-time by the information technology 
(IT) infrastructure of the organisation. It can be used to explore longitudinally 
the dynamics of member interaction within organisations. Third, CMC data 
provide a record of interaction even among members that are geographically-
dispersed. Thus, in organisations where influential members are not 
physically co-located with the rest of the organisation or are difficult to reach, 
CMC data, such as e-mails, may be used to produce a record of interactions.
I illustrate how exploiting a particular form of CMC (e-mail) 
complements traditional interviews and participant observation in my study 
of the rapidly-growing enterprise, Fairphone.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF TRADITIONAL ETHNOGRAPHIC AND 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
The social venture Fairphone provided a rich, purposive sampling site 
(Patton, 2001, pp. 243–244) for my research interest: the processes of growth 
in new ventures. Within Fairphone, I could observe the content and patterns 
of employee interaction for an extended period of time as they implemented 
the organisation’s growth strategy in response to their external environment.
Research Design
The field—Fairphone the social enterprise. Fairphone was founded 
in January 2013 by two Amsterdam-based entrepreneurs: Bas van Abel 
(CEO) and Miquel Ballester.10 In May 2013, the venture launched a 
successful crowdfunding campaign to finance the production of 25,000 ‘fair’ 
10 The names of all Fairphone staff (except Bas van Abel and Miquel Ballester) and the 
functional groups that they belong to have been disguised in order to protect their 
identities.
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smartphones for delivery by December 2013. I began fieldwork in October 
2013 while Fairphone staff (numbering eight) were in the midst of the 
crowdfunding campaign. The entire staff occupied two tables in a cluttered 
shared office space on the fifth floor of a refurbished grain storehouse. 
During my 15-month fieldwork, the enterprise grew from eight to 43 
employees. As the number of employees grew, the company initially 
expanded to occupy the entire office floor, re-arranged the layout of the 
space, and eventually secured a spacious office overlooking Amsterdam’s 
river IJ.
Data collection—participant observation, interviews, documents. I
visited Fairphone’s office 1–3 times per week (total 130 field visits lasting 
6–10 hours per visit) and observed over 800 hours of interpersonal 
interactions among Fairphone members. These ranged from ‘daily corridor 
and office talk’ (Van Maanen, 2001, p. 245) to more formal interaction at 
team meetings and off-site strategy meetings. I electronically recorded all 
meetings that I attended (over 170 hours) and kept detailed field notes of my 
observations (Emerson et al., 2001). I wrote memos at the end of each visit 
in which I noted: (1) my impressions of the visit; and (2) and the themes 
emerging from the analysis of interactions that I had observed.
In addition, I conducted 64 interviews (average duration 60 minutes) 
all but two of which were electronically recorded. During interviews, I 
typically elicited information about my informants’ roles in the enterprise 
and various events in company life. At the end of each interview, I made 
contact summary sheets (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 51–54), summarising 
my impressions of and concepts from the interview.
Data collection—e-mail logs. I obtained e-mail data of all Fairphone 
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members for the period July–November 2014. The data consisted of log files 
showing e-mail addresses of sender and recipient, subject headings, and the 
date and time of the e-mail correspondence. The data excluded the content of 
individuals’ e-mails, i.e., I did not read any individual’s e-mail messages.
I cleaned the data in three steps. First, I removed e-mails sent as part of 
mass mailing distribution lists (Kossinets & Watts, 2006). Second, I 
eliminated all e-mails between Fairphone and non-Fairphone accounts with 
the exception of one external advisor who had separate Fairphone and non-
Fairphone accounts. I merged the accounts to represent one node. Third, I 
stripped the data of all subject headings, leaving behind only the name of the 
sender, the time and date on which e-mail was sent, and the name of the 
recipient of the e-mail. I then used a web-based random name generator to 
conceal the identities of individuals.
The result of the cleaning process was two datasets containing 18,501 
e-mails from 35 Fairphone members. Table 4-2 summarises the e-mail data 
for two periods: period I (July–August 2014); and period II (October–
November 2014).
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Number of Fairphone 
members sampled
30 29
Number of e-mails 8,763 9,288
Average degreeĮ of 
individual in network
23.13 22.55
Standard deviation of 
degree of individual in 
network
4.50 4.21
Density of network 0.798 0.805






Closeness centralisation of 
network
0.326 0.316
ĮDegree refers to the number of connections that an individual has
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Ethnographic Data Shows Discontinuity within a Growing Enterprise
Fairphone began life with no formal organisation structure. In its first 
year of operation (2013), the venture was characterised by ad hoc decision 
making, little functional specialisation and informal relations among the 
staff. Recalling the first year, one employee said, ‘It’s [was] so 
untidy…everybody is [was] just working very hard, but…no one is [was] 
working to the same point at the horizon. It’s more coincidence than that it 
is planned.’
Due to pressure to deliver smartphones to customers by end of 2013, 
Founder/CEO Bas van Abel had not given much thought to enterprise design. 
In November 2013, as we spoke about the company’s design, he admitted:
I think the whole company is being run like [an ad hoc] project with a 
deadline, whereas it should be run like a company...And the reason for 
that is that there is so much happening [to meet delivery deadline] that 
you can’t work on next steps. It is like giving birth and thinking about 
your second [next] child. It is not something that you can do.
By January 2014, the pressure to meet the delivery deadline had abated. 
Van Abel hired new employees and announced to the staff that he would be 
lead a ‘formal structure trajectory’ to implement formal organisational 
structure within the company. He addressed a company meeting in mid-
January 2014:
Last year [2013] was about setting up. And now it is about gaining 
control over what we are doing. That means that we are going to set 
up structure, we are going to destroy the past in a way...We’ve 
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achieved the impossible in a way, you know…We did grow a lot from 
two people to a full table [21 people]. It is kinda weird for me.
While van Abel spoke, Terrence, a staff member, chuckled. Van Abel 
noticed Terrence and asked in a light-hearted tone of voice, ‘Why are you 
laughing?’ Terrence put down his notepad and responded with a grin on his 
face, ‘I am laughing because I am happy that we are finally going to get 
structure.’ There was hearty laugher around the meeting room. Van Abel 
acknowledged Terrence’s concern: ‘Yeah, I know you really need some 
structure.’
Following subsequent consultations with staff, the CEO presented an 
organogram at a company meeting in February 2014. He announced that all 
staff had been assigned to one of five functional groups: Team Alpha, Team 
Beta, Team Gamma, Team Delta, and Team Epsilon. Van Abel repeatedly 
emphasised during the meeting that the formal structure would not result in 
functional compartmentalisation: ‘It doesn’t mean that we are going to have 
departments… [with] their own separate rooms…No, it is just to be able 
to…cluster also in terms of people.’
At the February 2014 meeting, Fairphone staff appeared to agree on 
the formal structure. Yet, the subsequent implementation of the structure was 
contested. Some employees questioned the efficacy of formal structure in a 
mission-driven enterprise.
[M]aintaining nimbleness and flexibility…should be unique to our 
model and not getting overburdened on structure…Yes, it’s important; 
it ticks a box, but does not necessarily create change…Look at 
other…big players and how they haven’t…even gotten close to 
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cracking the [social] issue[s], but they have very sophisticated policies 
and procedures. (Fairphone staff Anne-Marie, March 2014).
Other staff viewed talk of structure as imprecise semantic shorthand 
masking their colleagues’ ignorance.
I think that people here use ‘structure’ in order to name a hellful of 
things…People [Fairphone staff] just name structure [as] everything 
that they don’t know; as everything that they feel they lack. Even if it 
is structure, even if it is risk assessment, if it’s more knowledge, they 
just name it structure. (Fairphone staff Coleman, April 2014).
Some staff viewed a formal structure as alienating. In a May 2014 
interview Jacqui, a founding staff member, recalled the spirit within the 
company in 2013: ‘Last year [2013], all of us attended every meeting...We 
could directly react on things we saw happening with the media and with 
public opinion. We were very naïve, but flexible.’ I asked, ‘Would she be 
invited to a strategy meeting in 2014?’ She responded, ‘Well, actually, I think 
no. Because, they made a structure and they [her emphasis] didn’t make it for 
nothing. If you are going to invite everybody then why [make a structure]?’
Not everyone in the growing company was negative or ambivalent 
about implementing formal structure. Some employees such as Terrence and 
Lawrence welcomed functional differentiation.
You can see that Bas [van Abel] is a bit allergic for the word 
‘department’…I think, when you don’t have departments, Bas is 
responsible for everything. When you have departments, then you have 
head of departments [sic], and you [van Abel] delegate those 
responsibilities...I don’t think that’s a bad thing. It’s becoming bad 
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when every department is becoming a company on its own. (Fairphone 
staff, Lawrence, May 2014).
‘Who are all these new people?’ Between January 2014 and 
September 2014 the number of employees at Fairphone increased from 21 to 
34. Despite van Abel’s ‘allergy’ for functional compartmentalisation, the 
founding Fairphone staff, i.e., those who had been with the company since 
2013, tended to interact more with each other than with new recruits.
A founding employee, Chad, illustrates the point. Chad was articulate, 
politically-savvy and was well-respected by his colleagues. (One informant 
spoke admiringly of Chad during an interview, ‘Man, that guy [Chad] can 
project manage!’) He constantly elicited information from his colleagues in 
course of a regular workday and attended various team meetings. An 
informant in Team Gamma said of Chad, ‘though he is not in our team, he is 
just really involved with us.’
I asked Chad about his interaction with recent recruits. His response:
Maybe it is hard for me to trust…I am sceptical of bringing people into 
the fold...If you are going to represent the company, then I have to trust 
in you a lot. And so…I looked around when everyone [the founding 
team] was away on a business trip …I am like, ‘who are all these new 
people?’ (Fairphone staff Chad, May 2014).
Chad’s ambivalence towards new recruits was not an isolated 
phenomenon. Another founding employee nostalgically recalled the first 
year of the company when interpersonal interaction among employees was 
more informal and intuitive:
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Last year, it [Fairphone] felt like a band…And now you are [Fairphone 
is] like a classroom in terms of the amount of people that you have…I 
remember walking into Fairphone [in 2013]. There were five people 
in the team and we said, ‘We’re going to do this.’…Now it feels like a 
classroom. (Fairphone staff Claudio, May 2014)
Functional compartmentalisation. As different functional groups 
coalesced within the company, they developed different routines for 
performing tasks. For instance, in the period February–July 2014, Team 
Alpha held weekly team meetings while Team Beta held only one meeting. 
Members of one team used web-based financial accounting software while 
members of another team primarily used graphics design software. 
Externally, another team dealt with customers while another dealt with 
production partners and suppliers.
One Team, Team Gamma, illustrates the effects of functional 
compartmentalisation. Team Gamma consisted of employees recruited in 
2014, i.e. no member of the team was a founding employee. Members of 
Team Gamma were co-located at a table physically separated from the rest 
the company. (Refer to Figure 4-1 in which I show the separation between 
Team Gamma and the rest of the company.) Team Gamma held daily 
meetings between 08.30 a.m. and 10.00 a.m., the highest frequency of 
meetings of any team in the company. At these morning meetings, discussion 
centred on monitoring one performance metric: the number of open client 


















































































































I observed members of Team Gamma conversing loudly and debating 
work-related problems. They shared humorous ‘war stories’ about their 
dealings with clients. I recorded one such interlude in my field notes:
Emory takes a call from a client. The client mentioned that she had had 
a problem with the phone, but was afraid to take out the 
battery...Emory took her through the process of removing the battery. 
Thereafter, he tells the rest of the team that the customer was very 
satisfied with the help. Emory exclaims loudly to no one in particular, 
‘what a great customer!’ (Field notes January 2014).
Unlike other team members, Team Gamma socialised outside office 
hours; they attended yoga classes once a week before the start of the workday 
and went once a month in the summer of 2014 to sporting events. The team 
appeared to be cohesive and goal-focused as one member of staff explained 
to me.
I think not everybody really sees what we [Team Gamma] do 
actually—like the broad scope of it. On the other hand, I do think, we 
are a team…we have a clear goal. Every morning we see the numbers 
[tickets] and everybody knows that the numbers need to go down…For 
a team like Team Alpha, it [goals] is much more difficult. (Fairphone 
staff Ai, July 2014)
Nevertheless, members of Team Gamma appeared to be systematically 
disconnected from the rest of the company. For instance, the team members 
did attend weekly company-wide morning meetings. Emory, a member of 
staff, summarised the disconnection.
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[T]he pity was that in the beginning we [Team Gamma] were next 
door. So we were not really involved actually with…the rest of the 
team [the company]. We met at lunch a little bit, but not really that 
much. But then since we moved here [into the same office], I always 
had the idea that you had your tables and you had your ‘departments’ 
working separately.
Shifting team membership—‘No one wants to be in Team Gamma’.
Members of Team Gamma constantly sought to move to other teams within 
the company. Why, I wondered? I got the first glimpse of an answer during 
a Team Gamma meeting in June 2014. During the meeting, I overheard two 
staff members, Taisha and Shantel, complaining about their work in Team 
Gamma. Taisha said, ‘But the problem also [with Team Gamma] is that 
everybody is really high-educated [sic]. Just [working in] Team Gamma can
[her emphasis] be really boring.’ What did Taisha mean when she said that 
Team Gamma was ‘boring’, I asked. A Team Gamma member explained:
I think most people joined Team Gamma because they had the 
motivation that they wanted to do something else [within 
Fairphone]…Team Gamma is not the cool part of company. It is much 
cooler to be like Team Alpha or Team Beta…Like Team Gamma is 
normally just not ‘cool’…I couldn’t picture them [Teams Alpha, Beta] 
working as Team Gamma whereas we [Team Gamma] would do their 
job. (Fairphone staff, Emory)
In 2014, at least six staff who had been recruited to Team Gamma 
lobbied for new roles in other teams. They actively pursued joint projects that 
had been developed during the formal structure implementation trajectory. 
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(Three successfully switched teams.) One person who had done so expressed 
satisfaction with her choice:
The thing is that since you are working on other projects, you don’t 
have time to work on Team Gamma…In a way, it is good. Because 
now I am growing and there is opportunity [in the company]… It is 
responsibilities. You are taken serious, but it is as I expected: you have 
the opportunities to grow, to do other things and then you just take it. 
So I am actually very happy. (Fairphone staff, Shantel, May 2014).
In sum then, Fairphone Founder/CEO Bas van Abel led what he called 
a ‘formal structure trajectory’ to implement an organisational structure (i.e. 
a leadership hierarchy, reporting relationships, and functional specialisation). 
Traditional ethnographic data (interviews and participant observation) 
collected during the trajectory strongly suggested that: (1) despite van Abel’s 
intentions the formal structure was contested by staff: (2) members of Team 
Gamma were disconnected from the flow of information in the rest of the 
company; (3) Team Gamma, though disconnected from the rest of the 
company, was internally cohesive; and (4) members of Team Gamma 
attempted to switch team membership to pursue what they perceived to be 
more interesting job opportunities within the company.
How could I develop a more systematic understanding of interpersonal 
workflow interactions in the study? I needed to do so for two reasons. First, 
as the enterprise grew, the physical layout of the office space changed. 
Members of Team Gamma were hastily recruited in December 2013 and 
temporarily located in an office separated from the rest of the Fairphone staff. 
By choosing to observe Team Gamma members I could not observe 
simultaneously the rest of the Fairphone staff. Even after Team Gamma 
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relocated to the same office as the rest of the Fairphone staff in January 2014, 
they were physically separated from the rest of the company staff (Refer to 
Figure 4-1.) This separation caused the same problem for observation: 
choosing to be located with Team Gamma prevented simultaneous 
observation of other Fairphone staff.11
Second, even when physically co-located with all Fairphone members, 
I could observe only a small set of interactions during a field visit. As the 
number of employees increased from eight in December 2013 to 21 in 
January 2014 and then to 34 in September 2014, the number of potential 
interactions increased. Hence, I could not keep track of direct face-to-face 
interaction among the staff. I needed a complementary systematic assessment 
of work-related interaction. For this, I turned to social network analysis.
Social Networks within Fairphone
I assumed that: (1) e-mails exchange among Fairphone members were 
mostly work-related (cf. Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014); and that: (2) the 
frequency of e-mail exchange between two individuals indicated the strength 
of work-related interaction between the pair (cf. Granovetter, 1973; 
Krackhardt, 1992, pp. 216–218).
Centrality of Fairphone members in social network. Individuals 
within a social network vary with respect to their connectedness within the 
network. Freeman (1979) proposed three measures of centrality: degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. Degree centrality 
of an individual, defined as the number of other individuals to which the focal 
individual is connected as a fraction of the maximum possible number of 
11 I split my time between the teams in order to observe staff interactions
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connections, is a measure of the involvement of that individual in the network 
(Ahuja et al., 2003). The higher the centrality score of an individual 
(maximum score = 1) the more central she is in the social network. A person 
with a high degree centrality score is ‘in the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, 
p. 219) within the organisation.
Betweenness centrality of an individual is a measure of the ability of 
that individual to control the flow of information within the network while 
closeness centrality is a measure of the independence of an individual or ‘the 
extent that it can avoid the control potential of others’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 
224).
The density of the entire network is the average degree centrality score 
of all individuals in the network. In Table 4-3, I summarise the centrality 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While centrality scores indicate the structural positions of individuals 
in a social network, centralisation measures the cohesion of the entire 
network. A network with a high centralisation score is one in which 
‘information spreads easily, but the center is indispensable for the 
transmission of information’ (De Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2011, p. 123).
The higher the centralisation score of the network, the more indispensable 
the core members of the network are to the transmission of information.
Since I was interested in the involvement of Fairphone members in the 
network, i.e. who interacts with whom, which individuals or functional 
groups interact more frequently than others and who is central in the flow of 
information, I focus on degree centrality of individuals and the degree 
centralisation of the networks.
Comparison of social networks. I computed the correlation between 
the networks in periods I and II using the quadratic assignment procedure 
(QAP) (Krackhardt, 1987), which is considered the appropriate method for 
comparing social networks (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). I also computed 
the correlation between tenure of a Fairphone staff and the normalised degree 
centrality of the staff in the networks in periods I and II. (The scores reported 
below Table 4-3.)
Interaction among staff in social network. Figure 4-2 shows the 
seating arrangements of Fairphone members in periods I and II. Fairphone 
staff occupied an open plan office in which all members were located at one 
of three seating areas—seating areas 1, 2 or 3. (The names of Fairphone staff 










































































I ordered nodes according to seating locations in order to visualise 
interactions (Weiss & Jacobson, 1955). These matrix of interactions, called 











































































The darker the cells in Figure 4-3, the higher the frequency of 
interaction between the individuals representing the column and rows 
bounding the cell and, hence, the stronger the ties between them. Visual 
inspection of Figure 4-3 suggests that in periods I Fairphone members Susana 
and Leslie had the strongest tie in period I. Also, in period I and II: (1) within 
a given seating area, Fairphone members seated in areas-1 and -2 had 
stronger ties with each other than those working in area-3; and (2) between 
seating areas, Fairphone members seated at areas-1 had stronger ties with 
those in area-2 than with those seated in area-3.
Figure 4-4 shows the social network in Fairphone in period I while 
Figure 4-5 shows the network in period II. These sociograms are a visual 







































Figure 4-5. Social netw







The size of a node indicates the number of e-mails sent by the 
Fairphone member in the period. The colours of a node in Figure 4-4 and 
Figure 4-5 indicate the seating area at which Fairphone member is located: 
cloud grey indicates seating area-1; the medium shade of grey (smoke grey)
indicates area-2; and the dark shade (lead grey) indicates seating area-3. The 
further an individual is from the centre of the network diagram, the weaker 
her social ties to other organisation members.
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show company members at the core and 
periphery of the networks. Core members are located near the centre of the 
sociogram. They have stronger ties among themselves and with other 
members than peripheral members. All founding members of the enterprise 
(those who joined in 2013) are located in the core of both social networks. 
Figure 4-4 shows that apart from Ai, Breanna and Susana (who belonged to 
Team Gamma and were located in seating area-3), all other members at the 
core of the social network were located at seating areas-1 or -2. Similarly 
apart from Branden and Cayla, who were temporary interns, all members at 
the periphery of the network were located at area-3. Figure 4-4 shows that 
members of Team Gamma, except Ai, Breanna and Susana, were at the 
periphery of social network within Fairphone in Period I.
The social network in period II (Figure 4-5) was slightly less 
centralised (degree centralisation decreased from 0.217 to 0.209 as shown in 
Table 4-2) than in period I’s, but still shows a core and a periphery. Susana 
and Ai were ensconced in the core of the social network in period II while 
the remaining members of Team Gamma were on the periphery. In period II 
(Figure 4-5), Breanne was no longer a member of Team Gamma even though 
she continued sitting in the same area (area-3) as Team Gamma members. 
Page 213
The correlation coefficient between the networks from QAP analysis was 
0.70 (p < 0.0002). This high correlation coefficient suggest that both 
networks reflect similar patterns of interaction in the two periods.
The sociograms shown in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 confirm interviews
reports, my ocular observations about discontinuities between Team Gamma 
members and the rest of the company staff. The figures also shows that Team 
Gamma members had few ties with each other. I checked whether individuals 
at the periphery of the network formed cohesive sub-groups using the 
component and k-core commands in Pajek (De Nooy et al., 2011, pp. 66–
72). Both networks could not be split into unconnected clusters. There was 
no evidence of clustering of Team Gamma staff located at seating area-3. 
The implication of this finding is that in both periods, though the peripheral 
members of the Fairphone social network in periods I and II have fewer and 
weaker ties with the core members, they (the peripheral members) did not 
form a distinct cohesive cluster.
This finding contradicts reports of members of Team Gamma, like 
Melynda, who reported that, ‘We’re [Team Gamma] like basically an island, 
together. Yes, like basically, you have to see it like this...They, like Team 
Alpha or Team Beta, they make decisions. And we are the first line, basically. 
As I see it, I see it different, we have more as a team together.’
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
So far, I have presented the findings of my study of implementation of a 
formal organisational structure within the venture Fairphone. In this section 
of the paper, I discuss complementarities between analysis of traditional 
ethnographic data and social network analysis using digital interactional 
data. I then discuss potential contributions that complementary analysis may 
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make to organisational ethnography and the ethical issues involved in 
analysing individuals’ e-mail within the context of an ethnography.
Complementarity between Thick Description and Social Network 
Analysis
Analysing digital data and producing thick description bases on 
conventional ethnographic data—interviews, observations—was 
complementary in three respects: it enabled (1) triangulation of reports and 
observations; (2) enriched understanding of interaction patterns; and (3) 
identification of the sources of discontinuities.
Triangulation of interview reports and observational data. Formal 
analysis of the social network confirmed interview and observational data 
about some members of Fairphone. For instance, consider the employee 
Chad (seating area-1), who had no formal authority and who I had observed 
to be articulate and politically-savvy. The social networks based on e-mail 
exchange (Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5) show that Chad, located at the core of 
both networks, was ‘in the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 219). The 
social networks show him to be at the nexus of information flow within the 
company, corroborating interview and observational data that suggested he 
was central to the functioning of various teams.
The social networks also confirmed interview and observational data 
on Team Gamma members (who had the shortest average tenure in the 
company): they occupy the periphery of both social networks. They were 
‘disconnected’ and ‘left out’ from the rest of the company during the study 
period.
Enriched view of interaction patterns. However, network analysis 
suggests a more complex pattern of interaction than the observational and 
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interview data do. The social networks do not show Team Gamma members 
as ‘like basically an island’, as one informant suggested. Instead, extending 
the geographical metaphor, Team Gamma members were scattered 
archipelagos at the periphery of Fairphone social network (see Figure 4-4 and 
Figure 4-5). How do I reconcile these accounts of Team Gamma forming a 
cohesive sub-group with the social network analysis which shows clearly that 
they did not? I believe that the nature of various teams’ task environment 
explains this difference.
Team Gamma faced a task environment that was unique from the other 
teams’ in two respects. First, members of Team Gamma dealt with a sub-
environment (clients) that routinely provided instant performance feedback 
to the team whereas other teams in Fairphone dealt with sub-environments 
or stakeholders, such as the media, production partners, universities who 
provided feedback only at the completion of long-term interactions 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Second, Team Gamma, unlike the other teams, 
had a clear performance metric: client satisfaction. As a result, Team Gamma 
members held daily meetings during the study period—more frequently than 
other teams—during which they constantly focused on this widely-agreed, 
explicit performance criterion.
Furthermore, unlike members of other teams in Fairphone, members of 
Team Gamma socialised with each other outside working hours. It is likely 
that the high frequency of face-to-face work-related and personal interaction 
among Team Gamma members minimised the need for e-mail exchange 
within the team. Team Gamma members, on average, exchanged 
comparatively few e-mails (see the size of the circles in Figure 4-4 and Figure 
4-5) with each other than the rest of the company.
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Taken together, these suggest that the social networks shown in Figure 
4-4 and Figure 4-5 do not capture adequately the work-related ties among 
Team Gamma members. The pattern of communication within the team was 
different from those in the other teams. It is likely that due to the task 
environment within Team Gamma, which demanded frequent interactions 
with company clients, frequent team meetings, informal conversations and 
friendship ties substituted for work-related electronic communication (e-
mails).
Member agency reflected in social network structure. By combining 
analysis of e-mail traffic with thick description (gained from observation and 
interviews), I could explain members’ structural position in the network in 
terms of purposeful action of the members. Six members of Team Gamma—
Breanne, Chrystal, Hendra, Shantel, Susanna and Tamera—had lobbied to 
join other teams in company. However, only three successfully did so 
(Breanne, Shantel and Susanna).
These employees began working closely with Teams Alpha and Beta 
because they wanted to exploit more rewarding career opportunities within 
the company. Their calculated action to leave Team Gamma resulted in 
changes in their structural positions. For all three staff, centrality scores 
increased throughout the study periods. (See Table 4-3.) Breanna’s centrality 
score increased from 0.897 to 0.966, Shantel’s from 0.793 to 0.828 and 
Susanna’s from 0.759 to 0.857. At the end of the study period, the three staff 
were more in ‘the thick of things’ (Freeman, 1979, p. 219) than they were at 
the start due to their purposive actions.
In sum, combining analysis of Fairphone’s (electronic) social network 
and rich description of organisational life over an extended period of time, 
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enabled me to develop a nuanced understanding of the interaction of 
Fairphone staff as the formal structure was being implemented. If I had 
performed only social network analysis, I would have observed the varying 
structural positions (centrality) of Fairphone members in the networks. 
However, I would have missed rich interpretations through which Fairphone 
actors perceived and acted to exploit opportunities within the company, and 
in the process, change their positions in the network. If I had performed only 
a rich description based on traditional ethnographic data, I would have biased 
findings to observational and interview reports about discontinuities in the 
company as the formal structure trajectory was being implemented. 
However, I would have missed the differing nature of intra-team interactions 
in Fairphone. Specifically, I would have missed how Team Gamma members 
relied on interpersonal and face-to-face communication as a substitute for 
electronic communication due to the nature of the task environment facing 
the team.
The combination of traditional ethnographic and the organisation’s 
self-documented data enabled me develop a richer interpretation of intra-
organisational interactions within Fairphone. Using these multiple 
complementary data forms in the ethnography of modern organisations offers 
the potential to contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography and 
social network analysis.
Contributions
E-mail logs—an inexpensive product of organisational self-
documentation. In a review of the contribution of ethnography to social 
network analysis, J. C. Johnson (1994, p. 134) observed that ‘formal social 
network analysis in combination with the richness of ethnographic 
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description and analysis can significantly enhance both the validity and the 
readability of a given [ethnographic] work.’ To organisational 
ethnographers, there are at least two practical methodological benefits of 
using e-mail traffic to construct social networks. First, an organisation’s e-
mail logs are an unobtrusive record of member interaction. Unlike using 
interviews and observational data, using the e-mail record for social network 
analysis does not involve researcher interruption of the routine of research 
subjects or the active participation of the researcher. E-mail logs are less 
susceptible to researcher bias, informant self-reports and to purposeful 
manipulation than interviews and questionnaires (Zwijze-Koning & De Jong, 
2005). Hence, they are suited to studying informant interaction in highly-
contentious organisational settings (Burt & Ronchi, 1990; Krackhardt, 1995).
Second, no ethnographic account of organisational life is complete 
(Emerson et al., 2001; Jorgensen, 1989, pp. 83–86). It may be difficult for a 
researcher to reach all influential organisational members because they may 
are not be physically co-located with the rest of the organisation (Howard, 
2002; Human & Provan, 1997; J. C. Johnson, 1994). Even if all 
organisational members are located in the same physical space and are, at 
least in principle, accessible to the researcher, close participant observation 
and interviewing will miss out on many aspects of organisational life. This 
may be due to the cognitive limitations and data collection decisions of the 
researcher (Fine, 1993; Van Maanen, 1979) and to spread of CMC within 
organisations (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–133; Murthy, 2008),
which are not amenable to direct ocular observation.
The organisation’s e-mail record, logged continuously in real-time by 
the organisation’s IT infrastructure, then, provides a broad readymade 
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inexpensive self-documenting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 121)
dragnet with which the researcher can scour the organisation for valuable 
information on members’ interactions that are not directly observable.
Dynamic characterisations of social networks in organisation 
research. Studies of organisational social networks have usefully shown that 
the structural features within which actors operate (e.g., centrality) are 
associated with outcomes such as status (Lincoln & Miller, 1979) and power 
(Ibarra, 1992). Yet these studies have been criticised for providing limited 
explanation of the qualitative content of the ties between actors (Jack, 2010; 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, pp. 113–123; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Rodan & 
Galunic, 2004) and for ignoring the dynamic processes by which 
organisational actors purposefully form network ties (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994; Ibarra, 1992; McPherson et al., 2001).
Diachronic research designs that include complementary analysis of an 
organisation’s e-mail data and thick descriptions can address these 
weaknesses in organisational social network research. By exploiting an 
organisation’s continuously self-generated e-mail traffic, researchers can 
obviate the high-cost and time-consuming work of repeated cross-sectional 
data collection for social network construction while thick description based 
on researcher’s deep immersion in and understanding of the organisational 
context setting in which member interaction occurs will provide context of 
network ties (Borch & Arthur, 1995; Jack, 2010; Lincoln & Miller, 1979).
The field in organisation ethnography. Though I have focused in this 
paper on organisational ethnography, I do not imply that social scientists in 
general have neglected the advent of digital communication technology on 
society. In fact, the study of computer-mediated interaction using research 
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designs called ‘virtual ethnography’ or ‘cyber ethnography’ (Hine, 2000; 
Markham, 2004) has proceeded at pace and has stimulated vibrant debates 
about ethnographic concepts, such as the ‘field’ (Amit, 2003; Beaulieu, 2010; 
Howard, 2002; Ruhleder, 2000), ‘fieldwork’ (J. Burrell, 2009; Ruhleder, 
2000), and ‘community’ (Wilson & Peterson, 2002), among sociologists and 
anthropologists.
Where is the field then in ethnography of modern organisations? Is it 
synonymous with the shared physical, public space in which employees 
interact for limited periods during a typical work week as is assumed in 
methodology books (Amit, 2003; Deegan, 2001; Platt, 1983) and in much 
exemplary scholarly research (Barley, 1990; Kunda, 2006)? Or does the field 
embrace and extend beyond that single physical space?
Marcus (1995), in the earliest explication of ‘multi-sited ethnography’, 
describes it as a research design that involves “chains, paths, threads, 
conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit posited 
logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the
argument of the ethnography” (Marcus, 1995, p. 105). In multi-sited 
ethnography, ethnographers move beyond “committed localism” (1995, p. 
99) to study people, knowledge, objects and discourses as they move across 
physical boundaries. In Marcus’ (1995) conception, may adopt a “follow the 
people,” “follow the metaphor,” or “follow the object” approach (Marcus, 
1995, p. 106–108) as they track research subjects across physical space.
Due to the distributed nature of modern organisational life (Berthod, 
Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2016; Van Maanen, 2001), high levels of 
digitally-mediated interaction (Beaulieu, 2010; Howard, 2002) and 
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organisational self-documentation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), the 
field—the spaces in which social interactions occur—are physical sites as 
well as digital sites. In other words, modern organisations are multi-sited.
In Marcus’ (1995) conception of multi-sited ethnography, researchers 
may adopt a “follow the people,” “follow the metaphor,” or “follow the 
object” approach (Marcus, 1995, p. 106–108) as they track research subjects 
across physical space. By combining analysis of CMC with traditional thick 
description based on interviews and ocular observation, organisational 
ethnographers adopt a “follow the people” approach and advance a more 
expansive notion of the ethnographic field as one in which physical and 
digital spaces intersect. In so far as an organisation’s members interact via 
face-to-face as well as digital means (and other self-documenting practices), 
combining both forms of analysis enables researchers to be co-present in the 
real and virtual spaces that research subjects occupy, rather than being simply 
co-located in only the same physical space (Beaulieu, 2010).
Epistemological Considerations
Being co-present in the virtual and physical spaces that constitute the 
field in organisational ethnography implies that ethnographers embrace 
diverse analytical techniques. For instance, social network analysis is 
primarily quantitative (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) whereas the analysis of 
traditional ethnographic data is primarily qualitative (Gephart, 2004). This 
raises the question of methodological compatibility.
Methodologists have debated the irreconcilability of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in the social sciences for at least 40 years, with purists 
emerging on both sides of the debate (Bryman, 1984; R. B. Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). These debates, which are often superficially about 
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methods or technical issues, are usually a manifestation of more fundamental 
ontological and epistemological differences among social science 
researchers (Bryman, 1984; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Yet, quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to organisational ethnography are not mutually 
exclusive (Berthod et al., 2016; Van Maanen, 1979). Thus, more practically-
inclined organisational ethnographers while remaining abreast of these 
debates—as they are worthwhile and are unlikely to abate anytime soon—
may need to eschew the metaphysical and epistemological dualisms (e.g. 
subjectivism versus objectivism) that animate methodological debates 
between qualitative and quantitative researchers (Halton, 2005, pp. 646–649; 
R. B. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
As Berthold, Grothe-Hammer & Sydow (2016, pp. 18–19) argue, each 
analytical approach to understanding the mundane interactions, habits, rituals 
and patterns of organisational life ‘must be detached from its usual 
[philosophical] paradigms to contribute jointly with insights about the same 
phenomenon’. Organisational ethnographers need not de-emphasise 
traditional techniques, such as interviewing and participant observation, in 
their research. On the contrary, since it is likely the organisational members 
interact differently depending on the medium (Markus, 1994), analysing the 
face-to-face as well as digitally-mediated interactions will produce a richer 
account of organisational life.
Ethical Issues in using Organisations’ Digital Data
Analysing individual’s digital data, such as e-mail exchange, in an 
ethnographic study raises complex ethical issues. Hammersley & Atkinson 
(2007, pp. 209–229) suggest that ethical issues in ethnography fall into five 
categories: informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation and consequences 
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for future research. I used the first four to guide my actions and reflection on 
the ethics of analysing the e-mail exchange of Fairphone staff.
Informed consent. I requested access to Fairphone’s e-mail logs only 
after I had achieved a high level of trust with every individual within the 
company. At that point (late 2014), I had interviewed every company 
member at least once. Despite the high level of trust I enjoyed with the 
organisation, I requested restricted access to the e-mail logs—only three 
days. I did so for two reasons: (1) to restrain myself from downloading any 
data that was not necessary to my original request; and (2) in order to forestall 
the possibility that accessing the data would jeopardise Fairphone’s IT 
infrastructure. Before obtaining the data, I made it clear to Fairphone leaders 
that I did not want to read individuals’ e-mails.
Privacy. I anonymised the e-mail data using a web-based random name 
generator. To check that the data had been properly anonymised, I asked 
three founding Fairphone employees to read independently a draft version of 
this article in order to identify their colleagues. Two of the staff correctly 
identified themselves, but could not identify their colleagues.
Harm. Throughout the study, I continually clarified to Fairphone staff 
that my research was strictly for academic purposes. I emphasised that the 
results of my study would not be communicated to the company’s leaders 
and would have no bearing on the staff’s performance evaluations. 
Nevertheless, two employees asked me for behavioural feedback during the 
study. They reasoned that since I had observed how they interacted with their 
colleagues for over a year, I could give them informed feedback about their 
behaviors. I politely refused to do so even though I had my personal opinions 
on their behaviors.
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Exploitation. This involves asking the question, ‘What do research 
subjects get in return for providing information to the researcher?’ 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 217). As the study progressed, my role 
changed from an unobtrusive ‘complete observer’ to a ‘participant-as-
observer’ (Gold, 1958). I periodically shared my insights into the rapidly-
changing organisation with Fairphone’s leaders. For instance, in July–
August 2014, I helped the organisation’s leaders assess the company culture 
using an influential framework from the organisational literature and a 
thematic analysis of interviews I had conducted up to that time. I also acted 
as a ‘sounding board’ as they debated the organisation’s structure and 
strategy in October 2014. I became involved to the extent that during a 
leadership meeting, one of Fairphone’s leaders jokingly referred to me as 
‘Fairphone’s institutional memory’. I believe that taking these steps 
engendered trust and goodwill from Fairphone staff during and after my 
fieldwork in the company.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Analysing digital and physical, face-to-face human interactions are not 
equivalent ways to study human subjects. By carefully observing subject 
interaction and eliciting informant perspectives through interviews, 
researchers can adduce the meanings that informants impute to rituals, 
relationships and other events in organisational life. Indeed, this approach to 
deep contextual understanding of human thought, metaphors, and action is 
one of the strengths of ethnography as applied to organisation theory (Bate, 
1997; Cornelissen, 2016; Van Maanen, 2011b; Watson, 2011). In my study 
of Fairphone, some organisational members interpreted the formal structure 
as a threat to the creative spirit of the entrepreneurial firm while others 
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interpreted it as alienating leadership from the staff. Barring access to the 
contents of e-mail messages, analysing e-mail exchange enables researchers, 
at best, to explain the structure of a digital social network; the researcher 
cannot infer participants’ meanings from such networks.
Network analysis assumes that organisational actors are embedded in 
social relationships that engender and constrain their behaviour (Brass et al., 
2004; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). I exploited the self-documenting 
practices (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) of a small rapidly-growing 
organisation that produces huge volumes of digital information to assess the 
structure of informant interaction. Though there are practical advantages to 
exploiting an organisation’s digital traffic, there are at least three
methodological limitations to this approach. First, in my case, I assumed that 
e-mail exchange between the Fairphone staff captured socially-meaningful 
relations within the organisation. I did not distinguish between e-mails that 
were sent directly to recipients from those in which the recipient was only 
copied in the transmission. Standard e-mail protocol suggests that there is a 
difference between being copied in an e-mail and being the direct recipient 
of one. The former typically suggests passive interaction between parties to 
the e-mail while the latter involves active interaction (hence, more socially-
significant relations). Not making the distinction between direct and copied 
recipients implies that I may have over-estimated the occurrence of socially 
significant relations in the social network.
Second, I assumed that the frequency of e-mail exchange between any 
two members is indicative of the strength of work-related ties between them 
(Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992, pp. 216–218). But does a high 
frequency of e-mail exchange between any two organisational members 
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mean that the pair have a socially significant relationship? Based on my 
observations of Fairphone staff, I believe this to be the case. However, this 
may not be case in other organisations, especially larger organisations. In 
some large organisations, e-mails are used for complex communication and 
may be preferred to ‘richer’ face-to-face or telephone interaction (Markus, 
1994). This supports the case that frequency of e-mail exchange is a good 
indication of the strength of socially-significant relationships. In other large 
organisations, professional staff frequently exchange e-mails with assistants, 
but that exchange is only an administrative relationship that lacks social 
significance (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). In that case, using frequency of 
e-mail exchange to indicate tie strength will lead to misleading conclusions 
about the nature of social relations in the organisation
Third, I assumed that e-mail networks best capture work-related 
interactions across the organisation. Yet, research suggests that multiple 
social networks may exist simultaneously even within small organisations 
(Brass, 1984; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). There may be friendship and personal 
support networks which rely on face-to-face or other forms of interaction and 
which may complement or substitute for e-mail communication.
A modern organisation’s digital traffic provides researchers an 
inexpensive, unobtrusive vein of data rich in informant interactions that are 
constitutive to the social worlds that ethnographers study within such 
organisations. Organisational ethnographers have been reluctant to 
incorporate such self-documents into their research toolkits, preferring 
instead face-to-face observational and interview data (Garcia et al., 2009; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–133; Murthy, 2008). In modern 
organisations, computer-mediated communication occurs between 
Page 227
informants outside the conventional physical and temporal boundaries of 
organisational life. Incorporating digital interactions into traditional 
ethnographic data collection repertoires—participant observation, 
interviews—will not only enable researchers overcome the limitations of 
these methods especially in small rapidly-changing organisational research 
settings, but also foster co-presence (Beaulieu, 2010) with our informants as 
their mundane interactions recursively move between observable physical 
space and unobservable virtual space.
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CHAPTER 5 : GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main findings and the key 
scientific contributions of the dissertation. Next, I highlight the implications 
for practice and areas for future research. Finally, I conclude with a reflection 
on the methods that I employed in the dissertation.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In this dissertation, I examine two types of corporate response to social 
issues: social entrepreneurship and corporate social action (CSA). Social 
entrepreneurship involves the formation of new organisations and ‘the 
innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to 
catalyse social change and/or address social needs’ (Mair & Martí, 2006, p. 
37) while CSA involves the enactment of programmes that go beyond the 
profit maximisation goals of an established for-profit corporation to alleviate 
some social problem. In social entrepreneurship, the activities that address 
the social problem are central to the business model of the enterprise whereas 
in corporate social action those activities are usually not integrated into the 
corporations’ business model—the system of activities by which an
enterprise produces and delivers a valuable product or service to its 
customers and captures economic rents (Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010).
Instead, CSA is typically supplementary to the business model and done to 
acquire legitimacy from influential institutional constituents. Specifically, I 
aim to contribute to scholarly understanding of the emergence of social 
entrepreneurship and the implementation and management of corporate 
social practices within MNEs. In addition, the dissertation also aims to 
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contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography within rapidly-
changing organisational research sites. In the remainder of this section, I 
summarise chapter by chapter the findings of the papers that comprise the 
dissertation.
In chapter 2, we theorise the unlikely creation of a social venture, 
Fairphone. The chapter is based on a 15 month study of the organisation. We 
performed an abductive analysis of qualitative data, such as interviews, 
participant observation, electronic, archival data and a thick description 
(Geertz, 1973) of the organisation’s emergence. We drew on insights from 
the social movement, technology entrepreneurship, commercial 
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship literatures to craft a structured 
analytical explanation of the case. We find that the enterprise emerged in a 
perturbed industry context (A. D. Meyer, 1982; Sine & David, 2003) in 
which the eventual founders employed a comprehensible material artifact to 
frame their solutions to a social problem. In the process, they inadvertently 
garnered legitimacy and resources from diverse audiences. Thereafter, a 
distributed set of actors further committed resources to the founders who 
acted effectually, drawing in an effectual network of supporters (Sarasvathy, 
2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008), that enabled the venture 
to emerge.
In chapter 3, I examine corporate social action. I investigate the 
implementation of CSR practices by a Chinese multinational enterprise 
(MNE), Huawei in Kenya, and the discursive public justification of those 
practices. In contrast to chapter 2 in which I employ abductive theorising, my 
approach in chapter 3 is deductive. I applied Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006)
theory of justification to perform a content analysis of public justification of 
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the firm’s CSR practices. I find that CSR practices implemented to acquiesce 
to institutional pressure in one domain (Kenya) are discursively justified by 
other subunit of the MNE to manipulate institutional constituents in another 
domain—a paradox approach to legitimacy management in the face of 
multiple demands for social action (Scherer et al., 2013).
In chapter 4, which is based on the ethnographic study discussed in 
chapter 2, I address a methodological question: how may organisational 
researchers in rapidly-changing modern organisational field sites exploit the 
self-documenting aspects of modern organisations to produce more 
compelling accounts of organisational life? I show that the information 
technology (IT) infrastructure of modern organisations unobtrusively 
produce a rich vein of digital data that constitutes the social world occupied 
by informants within these organisations. I argue that researchers may 
fruitfully combine this data on digital informant interaction with data on 
physical informant interaction traditionally generated through interviews and 
face-to-face participant observation. By combining digital and physical 
informant interaction data, researchers compensate for their cognitive 
limitations in observing small, rapidly-changing research site and for the 
limitations of the conventional ethnographic techniques. I illustrate my 
argument using the case of formal structure development within Fairphone 
in 2014. In the case, thick description, thematic analysis of interviews and 
participant observation, and social network analysis of Fairphone staff e-mail 
traffic provided complementary insights about the nature of inter-team 
fragmentation, leading to a richer understanding of interaction patterns in the 
organisation. In Table 5-1, I summarise the findings and key contributions of 
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This dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship, corporate social 
responsibility and organisational ethnography literatures. Below, I expand on 
these contributions.
Contributions to Entrepreneurship Literature
Effectuation theory is an influential emerging theoretical perspective 
for explaining entrepreneurial action under uncertainty (Fisher, 2012). This 
dissertation contributes to effectuation theory in three ways. First, we 
highlight how agency for the creation of a new venture may not lie solely in 
the entrepreneurial actor(s) as is assumed in effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 
2001; Sarasvathy, 2008, pp. 15–16). In the context of social movement 
activism, the entrepreneurial intention and capabilities that are presupposed 
by effectuation theory may also originate from diverse actors external to the 
entrepreneurial team—a process we term ‘distributed agency’. Distributed 
agency co-constitutes or enables the agency of an effectual entrepreneurial 
actor in the creation of the new venture: (1) through the proactive 
commitment of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources, legitimacy, 
capabilities and contingencies to the entrepreneurial actor(s); and (2) by 
changing the intentions of the actor to pursue entrepreneurially-specific 
goals—a necessary condition for the emergence of a new venture (Katz & 
Gartner, 1988).
Second, we theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation theory. 
We show that material artifacts, which were central to the development of 
the theory (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008, 
pp. 19–40, 240–254) but ignored in subsequent work, may influence the 
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affective ways in which an effectual network is assembled. Entrepreneurs 
perform meaning work by using symbolic actions to make their ventures 
comprehensible to target audiences (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Lounsbury 
& Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). This 
meaning work involves not only discursive elements (Phillips et al., 2004),
but also the socio-material since various social groups attribute functional 
and symbolic attributes to material artifacts (Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004; 
Shavitt, 1990). Thus, members of an effectual network convened for the 
creation of a material artifact make inferences about the artifact based on 
their shared interpretations of the artifact (Bijker, 1987; Pratt & Rafaeli, 
1997; Zott & Huy, 2007). In the context of social movement activism, they, 
in turn, commit resources to the creation of the artifact as an expression of 
moral values.
Third, in the organisational literature, boundary objects have been 
invoked to explain inter-disciplinary collaboration mostly within the context 
of a single organisational hierarchy in which members share similar goals 
and relations of dependence (Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002). We argue 
that the concept of boundary objects could be extended to cover interactions 
of loosely-coupled actors located in multiple domains that are not bounded 
within an organisational hierarchy and whose inhabitants have no relations 
of mutual dependence.
Contributions to Corporate Social Responsibility Literature
Despite the proliferation of CSR programmes by MNEs, scholarly 
work on these programmes is surprisingly sparse (Doh & Lucea, 2013; 
Husted & Allen, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009). Extant 
empirical studies of corporate social actions in MNEs emphasise that MNEs’ 
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CSR practices are single corporate strategies that correspond to 
acquiescence, compromise or avoidance of instititional demands (C. Oliver, 
1991) in the organisations’ attempts to obtain legitimacy from salient 
institutional constituents. Moreover, these studies focus on corporate actions, 
but ignore the discursive aspects of legitimation.
I provide an empirical illustration of the paradox approach to 
legitimacy attainment through CSR practices by MNE subunits in the face of 
multiple demands for corporate social action. In this appoach to legitimacy 
management, various subunits of the MNE simultaneously employ corporate 
social action and discursive tactics to passively comply with, as well as defy, 
institutional expectations. This approach has been theorised, but not 
examined empirically (Scherer et al., 2013). It is assumed that the paradox 
approach entails inherent organisational tensions as multiple strategic 
responses are simultaneously enacted. I suggest that these tensions may be 
minimal if the cost of acquiescence in one institutional domain is low and the
institutional pressure in another weak.
Contributions to Organisational Ethnography
In their accounts of organisational life, organisational ethnographers 
have largely ignored documents and artifacts produced by modern 
organisations, privileging instead interviewing and ocular observation of the 
face-to-face interaction of research subjects (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I suggest that organisations produce a vast 
array of documents, particularly continuous real-time digital data such as 
email logs that constitute a space of digital interaction vital to modern 
organisational life. As organisational ethnographers seek to provide authentic 
accounts of organisational life that meet the ethnographic criterion of ‘being 
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there’ (Bate, 1997), they may exploit this vein of informant interaction to 
complement qualitative analysis of traditional ethnographic data and produce 
richer accounts of organisational life. In rapidly-changing modern 
organisational field sites, such as growing new ventures, analysis multiple 
data forms—the physical and the digital—enables researchers to: (1) 
compensate for their inability to make observe subjects’ face-to-face 
interactions; and (2) become co-present (Beaulieu, 2010) in the virtual spaces 
that characterise modern organisational life.
By incorporating analysis of continuous real-time data into the 
ethnographic analytical repertoire, researchers not only produce more valid 
and readable accounts of organisational life, but also extend the notion of the 
ethnographic field, which is usually conceived as a physical, circumscribed 
space in which the interaction of research subjects occurs. The field then 
includes the virtual digital spaces that pervade much of modern 
organisational life and which are not accessible by traditional ethnographic 
data collection techniques.
IMPLICATION FOR PRACTICE
The studies in this dissertation have implications for the practice of 
entrepreneurship and corporate social action and organisational ethnography.
Entrepreneurship. Traditional and bricolage theories of 
entrepreneurial action emphasise how new ventures are created by 
entrepreneurs deliberately assembling resources to exploit some pre-existent 
opportunity (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). My in-
depth study of Fairphone highlights that new ventures can also be created by 
effectual entrepreneurial action (Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, entrepreneurs need 
not begin the successful venture creation process purposively with a fixed 
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end goal, such as creating serving a particular market segment, but may act 
effectually using their means and drawing an effectual network to produce 
an emergent outcome (a successful firm).
Regardless of their paths to venture creation, entrepreneurs need to 
acquire resources and legitimacy in order to succeed (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). Our findings suggest that they may deliberately pursue venture 
creation within communities of practice (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006), i.e. 
groups of individuals and organisations that coalesce to address pressing 
social problems. These communities, such as social movements, provide 
information, networks, resources and legitimacy to their members.
However, the accretion of legitimacy and resources is not an automatic 
consequence of membership in communities of practice. Entrepreneurs need 
to create distinct identities within these communities in other to attract 
legitimacy and resources. The study in chapter 2 suggests that they may 
achieve this in two ways: First, by incorporating a comprehensible material 
artifact into their entrepreneurial narratives; and, second, by carefully 
positioning their enterprises’ solution as cognate with, but distinct from 
extant product or service categories.
Our findings also have implications for managers with established 
MNEs, such as the large telecommunication MNEs. MNEs face increasing 
pressure to improve sustainability within their operations (Scherer et al., 
2013). Addressing sustainability concerns may involve changing 
organisational practice as well as introducing new products or services into 
current or non-existent markets (Hart & Milstein, 2003). Yet, managers 
within large complex organisations may face institutional inertia as they 
attempt to address sustainability concerns. Managers may not recognise the 
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opportunity to develop new sustainable products, services or markets due to 
the power of their organisations’ dominant logics (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; 
Prahalad, 2004)—powerful cognitive schemas or conceptualisations of 
business that managers employ to filter information from their 
environment—which favour existing business models. Even if managers 
recognise opportunities to address sustainability by developing new products
or markets, they often have to champion these innovations in the face of 
conflicts with business models established for the firm’s existing products or 
services offerings (Chesbrough, 2010; C. Christensen, 1997).
The emergence of Fairphone (chapter 2) suggests that sustainability 
champions within MNEs, who are skilled at navigating complex intra-
organisational obstacles (Dorado & Vaz, 2003), could exploit industry-wide 
perturbations to advance their sustainable innovation ideas. They may do so 
by channelling resources to support external entrepreneurs developing 
products that address sustainability. In effect, these managers/champions can
purposefully experiment with new business models by making affordable 
loss commitments of entrepreneurially-valuable material resources and 
legitimacy to a new venture. The potential payoff of such a commitment, as 
the study of Fairphone suggests, is the establishment of a profitable business 
venture whose product may expand the MNEs’ product offerings.
Corporate social action (CSA). Like resource-constrained 
entrepreneurs, MNEs subunits need to acquire legitimacy from their 
environment in order to thrive. However, the various sub-units of an MNE 
need to navigate complex, heterogenous institutional environments in order 
to thrive (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Wijen & Van Tulder, 2011). The results in this dissertation 
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suggest that in order to manage demands for social action from multiple 
institutional constituents, managers may enact practices to acquiesce to 
demands in one domain while simultaneously deploying discursive tactics to 
justify those practices to elements of another institutional domain. The results 
also suggest the conditions under which such synchronous justification or 
manipulation are likely to succeed: if the latter institutional domain is weak 
and fragmented, and the MNE’s industry context considered benign.
The practice of organisational ethnography. Unlike the non-literate 
societies and social worlds studied by earlier generations of ethnographers, 
modern organisations produce voluminous documentary and digital records 
of organisational life (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 121–122; Murthy, 
2008). As argued previously, these records provide the potential to 
compensate for the limits of traditional ethnographic data collection 
techniques and, thereby, increase the validity and richness of ethnographic 
accounts.
However, to exploit these records, particularly in rapidly-changing 
organisational contexts, ethnographers need to embrace diversity in the 
analytical repertoires. Thus, thick description of the field site and reductive 
techniques, such as theme analysis of interviews and close participant 
observation of physical in-person interactions, need to be combined with 
quantitative techniques such as social network analysis and content analysis. 
In practice, however, accessing individual digital data raises ethical 
concerns about obtaining the informed consent of research subjects, the 
potential for exploitation by the researcher and organisational decision 
makers, and privacy. Though I do not provide a comprehensive template for 
addressing these questions, my reflection on my experience using such 
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individual level data suggests that the ability of the researcher to garner the 
trust of research subjects is a sine qua non for avoiding harm to subjects.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, I have documented the case of a venture that 
emerged by effectual and distributed agency. In the case, causal 
entrepreneurial action, defined as an entrepreneur’s purposive acquisition of 
resources to pursue a pre-identified opportunity, played no role in the 
creation of the enterprise. This dissertation raises several fascinating 
questions for future study. First, how do the patterns of decision making 
change as an enterprise grows? Read and Sarasvathy (2005) suggested that 
successful enterprises are more likely to have begun by effectual 
entrepreneurial action, but grow through causal entrepreneurial action as the 
organisations endure over time. They suggest that while effectual decision 
making may be more prevalent in the formative stages of the enterprise, 
subsequent decision making in the life of the organisation is likely to be 
dominated by casual processes. Why is this the case?
A strong tradition within organisation theory provides well-supported 
reasons for Read and Sarasvasthy’s prediction. For instance, a high degree of 
internal uncertainty prevents effective individual and organisational decision 
making. Thus, organisational actors develop formal decision making and role 
structures that reduce role ambiguity, control performance variability and 
decrease coordination costs within their organisations (Mintzberg, 1979; 
Perrow, 1986). Yet, empirical work within this tradition has been performed 
mostly on large, established organisations; it is not known whether these 
theories apply to nascent rapidly-growing ventures (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 
2010; Sine, Mitsuhashi, & Kirsch, 2006).
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Read and Sarasvathy’s prediction may be tested using a longitudinal 
multiple case study design. Researchers may examine longitudinally decision 
making patterns, especially on critical elements of strategy such as product 
innovation, and formal role assignation in ventures like Fairphone. It may be 
that social enterprises whose business models incorporate an explicit social 
value proposition may evolve in different ways than strictly commercial 
enterprises.
Second, how does the nature of resource and legitimacy commitment 
by previously distributed actors change as the enterprise grows? For instance 
as the social enterprise grows, it may incorporate more of a commercial, for-
profit logic than its original social movement logic (Ebrahim, Battilana, & 
Mair, 2014; Jay, 2012; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015). If so, will the 
motives of the previously distributed agents change? Will they, for instance, 
make calculative commitments to the enterprise, instead of proactive, value-
driven contributions?
Third, though scholars have begun to appreciate the importance of 
material artifacts in the field of organisation studies (e.g., Nicolini et al., 
2012; Yakura, 2002), little attention has been paid to the role of objects in
social entrepreneurship. How does the nature of material artifacts influence 
effectual commitment in social entrepreneurship? In the study in chapter 2,
there was broad agreement on the functional as well as the symbolic 
dimensions of the artifact. What if Fairphone’s founders had campaigned 
using another material artifact, say an electric toaster? If there is low 
agreement on either functional or symbolic dimensions, would the effectual 
network commit resources in similar ways?
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Fourth, my account of Huawei’s justification of its CSR programmme 
(chapter 3) suggests that operating in an industry that is perceived to be 
benign (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) might enable an MNE to maintain a 
coherent justification scheme without resorting to the structural solutions, 
such as disguising socially-irresponsible practices from relevant external 
constituencies (Surroca et al., 2013), that MNEs in less benign industries 
have adopted in response to institutional pressure. How then does the nature 
of the industry influence the match between firms’ CSR practices and public
discursive justification of those practices?
Finally, the growing scholarly work how an MNE’s home country 
institutions influence its CSR practices abroad (Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; J. 
L. Campbell, 2007; Fransen, 2013; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001) suggests that 
CSR practices in foreign subsidiaries reflects the attributes of MNEs’ home 
country national business system. Using ideographic research designs, such 
as ethnography or longitudinal case studies, scholars could empirically 
examine claims that there is ‘Chinese-style concept of CSR’ (Wang & Juslin, 
2009, p. 440) that carries with Chinese MNEs as they internationalise. They 
could also examine whether Chinese MNEs’ public invocations of the 
common good used to justify their CSR practices reflect the home country 
national business system.
EPILOGUE: REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY AND
CONCLUSIONS
Philosophers of science often distinguish between method, which 
denotes ‘a procedure, tool, or technique used by the inquirer to generate and 
analyze data’ (Schwandt, 2007, p. 191), and methodology, ‘a theory of how 
inquiry should proceed…a particular social scientific discourse (a way of 
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acting, thinking, and speaking) that occupies a middle ground between 
discussions of method…and discussions of issues in the philosophy of social 
science’ (Schwandt, 2007, p. 193). In this dissertation, I have employed 
interviews, participant observation, and documentary techniques to collect 
data and performed thematic analysis, content analysis and social network 
analysis on the data. I employed these methods within case study and 
ethnographic methodologies.
As various scholars observe (e.g., Bryman, 1984; W. Gibson & Brown, 
2009, p. 56; Stake, 2010, p. 15), researchers’ preferences for particular 
methodologies typically reflect personal choice and pre-disposition. I am no 
different. My preference for idiographic methodologies for the study of
organisational phenomena reflects: (1) my previous education and career
background in an natural science-based industry that privileges exhaustive 
empirical descriptions of local natural phenomena while recognising the 
value of global, parsimonious theories of the phenomena; and (2) an 
intellectual fascination with understanding how human action in naturalistic 
organisational settings produces value for proximate stakeholders and 
broader societies in which those organisations are ensconced. My research 
goals were to explicate the theoretical mechanisms underlying human action 
in context, rather than to generalise my inferences to a population of similar 
organisations removed from the original context of research.
Case Study versus Ethnography?
One methodological challenge I had to deal with in my research 
journey was the distinction between case study and ethnography. Influential 
qualitative methodology books (e.g., Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–81; Patton, 
2001, pp. 81–84) suggest a straightforward distinction. The main difference 
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between these research designs lies in their foci: ethnographies focus on 
describing a group’s culture (Patton, 2001, p. 81) while case studies provide 
in-depth understanding of an activity or event within some bounded system 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 73). However, in the first study in the dissertation 
(chapter 2), the distinction was not as clear as the methodology books 
suggested. I began the study intending to observe processes of organisational 
growth and capability development within Fairphone using ethnographic 
methods to capture the meanings—the emic perspective—of organisational 
participants as they developed capabilities to produce a complex product and 
coped with the challenges of rapid growth. Yet, I also wanted to impose 
analytical order—the etic perspective—on the ethnographic data.
By the time I submitted the first draft of the article to the Journal of 
Management Studies (JMS) in January 2015, I had been immersed in the 
organisation for about 15 months. In the first draft of the paper, I did not feel 
confident to ‘let the data speak’. It felt inauthentic to present the emic
perspective since the events described in the article mostly covered occurred 
before I joined the organisation. Hence, I did not observe first hand most 
events reported in the paper. I relied mainly on retrospective interviews 
carefully triangulated using multiple independent data sources.
During the review process at JMS, a perceptive reviewer observed this 
tension and wrote in his/her review letter:
I do not see any evidence of a meaningful contribution from the 
participant observation data and was disappointed to find that the 
researcher was not able to capture the emergence process while 
themselves [sic] embedded in the company. This sadly strips away a 
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layer of emic understanding of the emergence process since post-hoc 
interview data is all that can be acquired. (Anonymous reviewer).
Upon reflection, I realised that though the overall research design was 
an ethnography, the subject of the article in chapter 2, the emergence of the 
enterprise, was a case study. Furthermore, by allowing themes to emerge 
from the data and by pattern matching the data with constructs from 
effectuation theory, I was reporting an etic perspective that was strongly-
grounded in multiple data sets and validated by my informants.
In the second study (chapter 3), it was not difficult to make the 
distinction between case study and ethnography. There was no need. The 
topic (corporate social action) and the unit of analysis (MNE subunit) were 
straightforward. Moreover, I had not performed participant observation in 
the study of Huawei—a necessary condition for organisational ethnography 
(Bate, 1997).
Thus, the exchange between reviewer and researcher during review 
process triggered a reflection on methodology, enabling me to articulate the 
nature of my research designs clearer than methodology textbooks had done.
The Normative versus the Descriptive Model of Research
Despite my preference for notoriously messy idiographic qualitative 
research (cf. Fendt & Sachs, 2008; Pratt, 2008; Suddaby, 2006), I subscribed 
unconsciously to a normative model of research at the start of my doctoral 
journey. In the normative model, research unfolds in a linear, sequential 
process that starts with the formulation of a research question and ends with 
the final research report (W. Gibson & Brown, 2009, pp. 9–10). As I reflect 
on the last three years of data collection, analysis, writing and presentation, 
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I am struck by the iterative, open-ended nature of qualitative research. In my 
time at Fairphone, for instance, I gathered a vast amount of data across 
multiple units of analysis: over 800 hours of structured and unstructured 
observation; 83 interviews (average duration 56 minutes); about 60 pages of 
single-space typed memos; 270 pages of typed field notes (excluding 
handwritten notes); 142 pictures; 11 videos; and over 170 hours of company-
wide and team meetings. I also collected over 1,800 tweets, about 160 press 
articles and countless archival documents, radio and television shows. As I 
gathered the data, I navigated diverse scholarly literatures including 
organisational capabilities, social movement, commercial entrepreneurship, 
social entrepreneurship, and the methodological literatures to make sense of 
the data.
Unlike in the normative model of research where data collection neatly 
precedes data analysis, data collection and data analysis during my research 
in Fairphone occurred concurrently. Indeed, data analysis guided my 
subsequent data collection efforts. As I identified the conceptual categories 
in the data, my initially well-formulated research question changed from one 
about enterprise capabilities to one about enterprise emergence. This resulted 
in constant iteration between disparate scholarly literature—such as 
entrepreneurship, social movement, and technology in management 
literatures—and the data in order to ground the emerging theoretical insights 
and craft a conceptual contribution. While the normative research model was 
a useful guide throughout the research process, I concur with Paul Bate who 
observes in his excellent review of organisational ethnography that 
‘ethnography is not so much method in the madness, as madness in the 
method’ (Bate, 1997, p. 1152).
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Whatever frustrations I encountered as I navigated the methodological 
madness were surpassed by the intellectual satisfaction of achieving 
conceptual clarity in the explanation of the enterprise emergence. I marvelled 
as the mass of raw data were first reduced to manageable forms and then 
marshalled into codes, categories, and ultimately themes (Saldaña, 2009) that 
hinted at interesting scientific contributions.
My idiographic research journey involved more than abstract 
theorising, data reduction and analysis; it was an intensely human affair. As 
I researched Huawei’s CSR programme in 2013, I also became friendly with 
a key informant in Kenya. Over a period of three weeks, my informant shared 
stories about his family, career aspirations and about Huawei. During an 
informal dinner, the informant even gave me ‘backstage’ information 
(Goffman, 1956, p. 69) about how the company’s CSR initiative was 
conceived and run, and how organisational members perceived the 
programme.
Human interaction within my other research site, Fairphone, was even 
more intense and long-lasting. Being embedded within Fairphone, I became 
friendly with many of my informants. They shared with me organisational 
gossip. Over lunch, we exchanged light-hearted banter, compared notes on 
the latest episodes of Game of Thrones and The Wire, and in more 
philosophical moments, we discussed religion. They invited me to their 
housewarming parties and to company social events at which I met their 
spouses, partners and their children. Consequently, I did not leave the field 
as I had initially planned.
At the start of the research, I anticipated that I would spend a maximum 
of six months within the organisation. Following methodological guidance, 
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I reasoned that that was enough time to become familiar with the company 
and to observe a sufficient number of production cycles (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007, p. 94–96). I ended up staying at Fairphone for 15 months. 
This lengthy fieldwork duration reflected my commitment to observe the 
growth of the firm through three production cycles. It also reflected—and I
grudgingly admit so—my reluctance to leave the field. I had conflicted 
feelings about leaving my informants: they had been very kind to me as they 
shared with me their personal stories, confidential organisational data and 
their perspectives on their rapidly-changing organisation. For instance, 
during interviews, some informants became emotional, breaking down in 
tears while others often joked that speaking to me was like therapy. At least 
one Fairphone staff even thought that I was trained in psychology. Was it 
ethical, I wondered, to take away all that confidential information without 
maintaining some ties to Fairphone? As I struggled to maintain links to 
Fairphone, I also realised that I needed to leave the field in order to gain the 
analytical distance vital for the research process.
While researching Fairphone in mid-2014, I compared notes with a 
fellow doctoral candidate who had also conducted a nine-month 
ethnography. I remarked to her that I had a compelling thick description, an 
exhaustive, holistic explanation for my case, but could not yet adduce a 
conceptual contribution. She replied, ‘Ona, that’s qualitative research for 
you. But I promise you, as long as you keep questioning and reflecting on 
the data, you will find a contribution. It’s there. You just have to look hard 
enough’. It is my sincere hope that this dissertation accurately reflects my 
efforts to interrogate the data, to critically examine the literature and to craft 
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a contribution to scholarship on corporate responses to social issues,
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (STUDY I)
Thematic area Question
Introduction Opening introduction. Doing in a Ph.D. in business at 
the Rotterdam School of Management.
Note: Set the rules of the game:
1. Confidentiality
2. Processing of interviews 
3. Recording – Ask for permission to record 
interview?
4. Transcripts – s/he gets a transcript
Biographical What is your background and role within NORDIC?
Probe—How long have you worked for NORDIC?




and the project 
(campaign and 
research)
Tell me about your organisation, NORDIC. What does 
the organisation do?
Probe—How did your organisation become involved in 
the human rights in the electronics industry?
How did NORDIC fund its activities in this project?
What did NORDIC hope to achieve within the 
CAMPAIGN project?





What role did NORDIC play in the CAMPAIGN? 
What did you and your team actually do?
Probe—What other organisations were involved in the 




Could you tell me about some positive and negative 
experiences that you faced as part of the project? What 
were most difficult challenges that were faced?
What is your current relationship with CAMPAIGN?





Was NORDIC involved with Fairphone?
What were the main challenges that you saw for 
Fairphone at the time? (if applicable)
Snowballing What do you think you achieved as NORDIC?
Is there anything else that you that you would like to 
add?
Who else should I speak with if I want to know more 
about CAMPAIGN?
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Corporations face pressure from governments, civil society groups and 
consumers to respond to social problems in their operating environments or 
to improve the sustainability characteristics of their products, services and 
supply chains. Companies respond to these problems in order to gain 
legitimacy with these stakeholders while entrepreneurs new develop 
products/services to take advantage of opportunities to address these social 
problems through market mechanisms. In this dissertation, I examine two 
forms of corporate responses to social issues: social entrepreneurship and 
corporate social action (CSA). Specifically, I aim to theorise the emergence 
of social entrepreneurship and explicate the implementation and 
management of CSA in a multinational enterprise (MNE). In addition, I aim 
to contribute to the practice of organisational ethnography by proposing 
techniques that researchers may employ to compensate for the limits of 
traditional interviewing and participant observation in the study of a rapidly-
changing organisations.
The three studies in this dissertation advance scholarship in 
entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and organisational 
ethnography. In the first study, I conduct a 15-month study of Amsterdam-
based social venture, Fairphone. I argue that effectual entrepreneurial agency 
is co-constituted by distributed agency, the proactive conferral of material 
resources and legitimacy to an eventual entrepreneur by actors external to the 
new venture. I show how, in the context of social movement activism, an 
effectual network pre-committed resources to an inchoate social enterprise 
to produce a material artifact because it embodied the moral values of 
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network members. I develop a model of enterprise emergence based on these 
findings and theorise the role of material artifacts in effectuation. I suggest 
that a material artifact served as a boundary object, present in multiple social 
words and triggering commitment from actors not governed by hierarchical 
arrangements.
In the second study, I investigate the implementation of corporate 
social actions (CSA) and public justifications of those actions by a Chinese 
MNE operating in Kenya. I show how a corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programme that is developed in one country to acquiesce to local institutional 
demands is discursively justified by another subunit of the MNE to 
constituents geographically removed from the site of those practices. I 
suggest that the paradox approach to legitimacy management by social 
action—an approach that has been theorised but not empirically examined—
may not lead to inherent conflict as assumed in the literature if the MNE’s 
cost of acquiescence in one domain is low and institutional pressure in 
another weak.
In the third study, I investigate the limits of traditional data collection 
techniques in the ethnography of modern organisations and examine how 
organisational ethnographers may employ self-documenting practices in 
these organisations to produce compelling accounts of organisational life. I 
argue that modern organisations produce voluminous amounts of 
documentary records and digital data that organisational researchers can 
exploit to increase the validity of ethnographic studies and produce 
compelling portraits of modern organisational life. I illustrate my argument 
by drawing on my 15-month long study of Fairphone. I suggest that by 
combining analyses of multiple forms of interactions, researchers of modern 
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organisations can expand the notion of the ethnographic field, which has 
historically being conceived as a bounded, physical space in which social 
interactions occur, to include the virtual spaces comprising digitally-




Overheden, maatschappelijke groeperingen en consumenten oefenen druk uit 
op bedrijven om ze te laten reageren op maatschappelijke problemen in hun 
werkgebied of om de duurzaamheid van hun producten, diensten en wijze 
van bevoorrading te verbeteren. Bedrijven reageren op deze problemen met 
de bedoeling om belanghebbenden aan hun kant te krijgen, terwijl 
ondernemers nieuwe producten/diensten ontwikkelen die hen in de 
gelegenheid stellen om via marktwerking de maatschappelijke problemen 
aan te pakken. In deze dissertatie onderzoek ik twee manieren waarop 
bedrijven reageren op maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen: sociaal 
ondernemerschap en bedrijfs sociale actie (CSA). Specifiek streef ik ernaar 
om de opkomst van sociaal ondernemerschap te theoretiseren en de
toepassing en management van CSA toe te lichten in een multinationale 
onderneming (MNO). Tevens streef ik ernaar om een bijdrage te leveren aan 
de uitvoering van de organisatie-etnografie, door technieken voor te stellen 
die onderzoekers ter compensatie van de beperkingen die ze ondervinden bij 
traditionele interview- en observatieparticipatie kunnen gebruiken in het 
bestuderen van een snel veranderende, moderne organisatie.
De drie studies in deze dissertatie zijn een wetenschappelijke stimulans 
voor ondernemerschap, maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO)
en organisatie-etnografie. De eerste is een studie van 15 maanden bij de in 
Amsterdam gevestigde organisatie Fairphone. Ik stel dat de acties van een 
ondernemer onder een logica van effectuation mede is gevormd door 
distributed agency, de pro-actieve toekenning van materiële bronnen en 
legitimiteit voor een mogelijke entrepeneur, gegeven door spelers buiten het 
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nieuwe bedrijf. Ik toon hoe, in de context van sociaal betrokken activisme,
een netwerk van hulpbronnen gaf steun aan een opkomend bedrijf om een 
tastbaar product te maken omdat het de morelle waarden van het netwerk
belichaamt. Ik ontwikkel een model van enterprise emergence gebaseerd op 
deze bevindingen en ik theoretiseer de rol van tastbare artifacts in de 
ontwikkeling. Ik suggereer dat een tastbaar artifact als een begrensd object 
dient, aanwezig in meerdere sociale werelden en dat het zorgt voor een 
verbinding van spelers die niet geleid worden door hiërarchische regelingen.
In de tweede studie, onderzoek ik de realisatie van sociale 
bedrijfsacties door een Chinese MNO die opereert in Kenia en de publieke 
rechtvaardiging van die acties. Ik toon hoe een programma voor 
maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO) dat ontwikkeld is in het 
ene land volgens lokale institutionele voorwaarden, discursief is toegestaan 
door een andere onderafdeling van de MNE die geografisch verwijderd is 
van de plek van de sociale acties. Ik suggereer dat de paradoxal manier van 
legitimatie management van sociale actie—een benadering die 
getheoretiseerd is maar niet empirisch onderzocht—misschien niet leidt tot 
inherente conflicten zoals verondersteld wordt in de literatuur, mochten de 
MNO kosten van berusting in één domein laag zijn en internationale druk in 
een ander zwak is.
In de derde studie onderzoek ik de grenzen van de traditionele 
technieken voor dataverzameling in de etnografie van moderne organisaties 
en onderzoek ik hoe organisatie-etnografen de zelf documenterende aspecten 
van modern organisaties kunnen benutten om sterker, authentische portretten 
van moderne organisaties te creeren. Ik stel dat moderne organisaties grote 
hoeveelheden documentatie en digitale data produceren die 
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organisatieonderzoekers kunnen gebruiken om de validiteit te vergroten van 
hun etnografische studies en treffende portretten kunnen maken van moderne 
organisaties. Ik illustreer mijn argument door het schetsen van een 15 
maanden lange studie van Fairphone. Ik stel voor dat door het combineren 
van analyses van verschillende vormen van interactie, onderzoekers hun 
begrip van het etnografische veld kunnen verbreden. Het etnografische veld,
dat historisch gezien beschouwd werd als een begrensde fysieke plek, zal nu 
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